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The general assumption that we judge the content from the form (signification) can 
thus be challenged. The opposite is also possible: the content makes us perceive 
form. This is a new understanding of the old question of whether music is a repre-
sentative or just form. The meaning is immanent in the form. 
These processes are pre-attentive. It has been shown that we do not have to per-
ceive music consciously to be emotionally affected by it. This has an interesting 
consequence. We do not always connect the emotion caused by the music to the 
music heard. This is obvious in the case of film music. The emotion could attach 
to anything that we happen to attend. If we pay attention to film characters, the 
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to the music and we experience the music as emotional. 
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Introduction 
In 1994, I was sitting in a church in my home village Olofstorp, 
Sweden listening to a speech concerning social work in Brazil. To 
round up, the speaker showed some tourist pictures from Rio de 
Janeiro and put on a tape with Brazilian music. 
I heard a distinct but humble voice smoothly moving over floating, 
dynamic guitar chords. It was not a samba or bossa but it still felt 
Brazilian. For some reason I was deeply moved. The melody was 
simple and yet perfect, performed in the most sensitive way. I could 
hear the richness of associations in the performance. The rhythm was 
delicate. The voice was charged with closeness and sincerity. 
On my way home I was convinced that something had been pro-
posed to me and that I had to follow this new trail. 
I began to explore what I had heard. The song was ‘Asa Branca’ 
performed by the Brazilian singer/composer Luis Gonzaga Junior 
(1945–1991) at a live concert just days before his tragic death in a 
car accident. Asa Branca was written by Gonzaguinha’s father, Luis 
Gonzaga, one of the icons of Brazilian music. 
The thing is that when I first heard the music I did not know any-
thing about Gonzaguinha, nor did I understand a single word of the 
song. So, how could this song move me so much? 
I managed to get hold of the CD ‘Cavaleiro Solitario’1 and found all 
the songs wonderful. I played the CD over and over on the car ste-
reo that summer and always got goose flesh on my arms, and tears 
in my eyes, and when I tried to talk about it with my passengers I 
was unable to speak. In fact it was ridiculous and quite tiring, but I 
could not do anything about it. I had to play it, and I always had to 
go through these emotions. 
There was one song ‘Fotografia’ that shook me more than any 
other. I made my own epigone version of the music and wrote lyr-
ics in Swedish. Later I found out that the lyrics of the two versions 
connect emotionally. They are both about sorrow, longing and 
                                           
1 Gonzaguinha (1993) CD: Cavaleiro Solitario, Som Livre 
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death. I have to draw the conclusion that this is not merely a coinci-
dence. 
Why did I feel addressed by this singer? There was nothing con-
necting us. He was a mulatto brought up by foster parents in the 
favela São Carlos in Rio de Janeiro, close to the red light district 
Estácio – the very cradle of samba music. It was far from my little 
town Växjö, Sweden where I grew up as the son of the town physi-
cian who used to spend an hour after work playing classical music 
on the grand piano. 
The interest of how Gonzaguinha touches me emotionally took 
over. My need to investigate this was aroused by an interest in my 
own reactions. I thought I could learn something about myself here. 
I wanted to cover his shadow with my own body. 
On Christmas Eve 2004, some friends had gathered in a neigh-
bour’s house to celebrate the holiday. We played the Gonzaguinha 
song É on the CD-player. The guests spontaneously took each 
other’s hands and in the second verse we were all on our feet danc-
ing, still holding hands. I asked them what they thought this song 
was about. The host’s mother immediately shouted out from her 
wheelchair that it is about the pride of the people. This remark was 
absolutely accurate. This is what the lyrics are about. How could she 
tell? 
I wanted to write about my emotional reaction to Gonzaguinha, 
but it was hard to make this a scientific project. There were two 
obvious dangers with this project: It was about emotions and it was 
subjective. It had the sign of woolliness written all over it. 
I became interested in the general question of how music com-
municates emotions. My interest was provoked by prevailing semi-
otic thinking in musicology. The general claim is that music struc-
tures are signs of extra-musical meaning. Music was treated as a lan-
guage with syntax and semantic meanings to be decoded. I saw this 
theory as too intellectualistic. It did not fit with my experience of 
working with mentally retarded children suffering from Down’s syn-
drome. These children are very affected by music. It did not fit with 
my experience as a father, since music was the first way of commu-
nication with our kids. It did not fit with my experience as a profes-
sional musician. It disturbed me that music was explained as an ab-
Introduction 
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straction of something else. The beautiful experience was reduced to 
intellectual understanding. 
I have realized that perception-action theory could offer a more 
body oriented and direct explanation of musical emotions. An article 
on empathy (Preston & de Waal 2002)2 gave me the idea that mirror 
neurons could have something to do with musical emotions. In 2004 
Helge Malmgren and I wrote an article suggesting this possibility 
(Vickhoff & Malmgren 2005)3. This article is presented in a revised 
version as Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Mirror neuron reactions 
imply that we take the perspective of the other. This fact made me 
start thinking about other possible perspectives in music listening 
and what they would imply in terms of perception and emotion. 
Problem formulation 
The problem with music and emotion is not that music may make us 
think of something that might move us emotionally. If music signifies 
something delightful or something terrible, this will affect us. The 
problem is that music seems to move us emotionally even if there is 
no such obvious reason. This is the enigma. 
In 1979 Philip Tagg wrote 50 seconds of television music – towards 
an analysis of affect in popular music. This is an influential disserta-
tion on music and emotion combining semiotics (the study of signs) 
with communication theory. In the conclusive chapter Tagg ex-
presses the difficulty in explaining the music emotion phenomenon 
in words: 
If we were to analyze or explain in cognitive verbal terms what 
exactly happens in another type of nonverbal communication, for 
example when someone strokes the cheek of a loved one and 
                                           
2 Preston, S.D. & de Waal, F.B.M. (2002) Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Vol. 25. Issue 1. 1–72  
3 Vickhoff, B. & Malmgren, H. (2005) Why does music move us? Philosophical Com-
munications. Web Series, No. 34. Dept. of Philosophy, Göteborg University, 
Sweden. ISSN 1652–0459 
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looks longingly into his/her eyes we would find ourselves up to a 
similar problem. (Tagg 1979: 231)4 
This parallel is accurate. It comes closer, I would say, to the listen-
ing situation that reading a book does (decoding signs). Thus it 
points rather to a phenomenological approach than to semiotics. This 
hunch is the starting point of this dissertation. 
Phenomenological theory is focussed on the direct subjective ex-
perience of the present moment. Progress in perception-action the-
ory (which overlaps with phenomenology) and new findings in 
brain research supporting perception action theory, have made it 
possible to analyse the music-emotion question from new perspec-
tives. The focus is moved from explicit understanding to implicit 
understanding. New methods, such as ERP (event related potential) 
and brain scanning, allow us to study the perception of music on 
lower levels of consciousness. These studies indicate that we do not 
always, in everyday listening, analyse what we hear, but perceive it 
directly. We live in the movement of the music, rather than take it 
to be a sign of something. In fact music can be perceived without 
being attended to. What does this tell us about the music emotion 
question? 
Question 
The question propelling this dissertation is: How are we moved 
emotionally by music? This question can be broken down into three 
questions: 
1. How do we perceive music? 
2. What is the connection between music perception and 
emotion? 
3. What is the nature/function of music elicited emotions? 
                                           
4 Tagg, P. (1979) 50 Seconds of Television Music – towards an analysis of affect in 
popular music. Studies from the Department of Musicology. No 2. Gothenburg  
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As can be seen from these questions, this subject entails major musi-
cological questions. To answer these questions other issues have to 
be discussed concerning the understanding of the concepts emotion 
and perception, the relation between emotion and perception, as 
well as different levels of consciousness of emotions and percep-
tions. 
We cannot avoid questions such as: What is the nature and function 
of music elicited emotions? Are they of the same kind as everyday 
emotions? And if so, what everyday emotion should they be com-
pared to? Is a music-elicited emotion a reaction to an object? Is it a 
reaction to a representation of an object? Is it a reaction to a form? Is 
it a reaction to something imagined? Is it an emotion communicated? 
Is it a reaction to expectancies and the fulfilment/violation of these 
expectancies? Or is it something else? 
Background and previous research  
In the following, we will scan previous research and theories on 
music and emotion. The field is cross-disciplinary and for this reason 
the terminology is not coherent. The purpose is to inform the reader 
about the diversity of approaches and present the main lines in the 
development of these theories. In the chapters to come we will 
have many occasions to reconnect to these theories. 
The question of why music affects us emotionally has attracted phi-
losophers. It can be spotted already in Plato’s dialogue with Socrates 
in The State, where the subject of emotional properties of scales is 
discussed. 
Philosophers have a way of asking seemingly naïve questions. In 
this case the question is: Where is the emotion? Is it in the per-
former, in the music or in the listener? As we will see, the theories 
on music and emotion reflect this question. 
We can see a pendulum movement between two positions in the 
view of music. One holds that music is representative and the other 
that music is pure form. If music is representative there are two op-
tions: it could represent emotions or it could represent an object that 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
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we can react to emotionally. On the other hand, if music is just form 
it is hard to see why it moves us emotionally at all. 
During the Baroque era the Figurenlehre was developed (Wessely 
1972)5. This was a composer’s dictionary of music emotions. Rhetoric 
figures or gestures in music were thought of as representations of 
emotion in the Baroque opera. The idea was theoretically devel-
oped in the Affectenlehre (Mattheson 1739)6. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
rather took a formalist stand in his 1761 article Essay on the origin of 
languages. Rousseau’s mimetic theory drew on resemblances be-
tween emotional expression in music and emotional expression in 
speech (Rousseau 1986)7. 
Immanuel Kant discussed the concept aesthetics 1790 in the sec-
ond part of Critic of Judgement called The Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgement (Kant 1952)8. Kant did not restrict aesthetics to art – any-
thing could give an aesthetic experience (Kivy 2002)9. Kant claimed 
that aesthetic judgement is based on form and content. Our personal 
feelings and beliefs are affected by content, whereas a universal 
judgement of beauty is based on form. We contemplate form in a 
“disinterested” way – in a free play of imagination and knowledge. 
Kant’s ideas inspired the musician and critique Eduard Hanslick. 
Hanslick was the first person to systematically discuss form and 
content in music. His Vom Musikalisch Schönen (On the Musically 
Beautiful) from 1854 contains a critique of Mattheson’s Affectenlehre 
(Hanslick 1986)10. Hanslick arrived at the conclusion that music can-
not evoke emotions. He presented three main arguments: 
1. “The content of music is tonally moving forms” (p. 29). In 
the music’s themes, “form and content cannot be separated” 
(p. 81). Music is made of tones – tones are its content, not to 
be confused with the “subject matter” inspiring it (p. 78). To 
have a subject matter as content, the extra-musical element 
                                           
5 Wessely, O. (1972) Musik. Habel, Darmstadt  
6 Mattheson, J. (1739) Der volkommene Capellmeister. Herold, Hamburg 
7 Rousseau, J.J. (1986) Essay on the origin of languages.  On the Origin of Language: 
two essays. (Eds. J.H. Moran & A. Gode) University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 5–74 
8 Kant, I. (1952) The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. Clarendon, Oxford 
9 Kivy, P. (2002) Introduction to a Philosophy of Music. Clarendon, Oxford 
10  Hanslick, E. (1986) On the Musically Beautiful. Hacket Publ., Indianapolis 
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must be definite and we must be able to formulate it in 
words. This is not the case as we have no agreement on the 
“definite” description to give it. So, it can only have an “in-
definite” content. Since music cannot represent extra-musical 
objects it cannot represent objects that we react to emotion-
ally.  
2. There is no agreement between listeners about what emo-
tion they hear in music. 
3. It is unthinkable that music could be dispositionally emo-
tional, meaning that it could not upset you the way an event 
(such as an accident) can. 
Hanslick was thus a formalist. The prevailing understanding of emo-
tions at this time was Kantian. To Kant “emotion” implied an object. 
We do not just love or hate; we love or hate something. There must 
be an object for the emotion. Since this object cannot be represented 
in music, Hanslick argued, music cannot cause emotional reactions.  
Hanslick’s arguments have been contested. In Emotion and mean-
ing in music Leonard Meyer dismisses the argument that emotions 
must have an object as a confusion of expressionism with referential-
ism (Meyer 1956)11. As we will see, emotion is a concept that has a 
tendency to escape definitions. All definitions of emotion do not 
require consciousness about an object. Hanslick’s second point is 
overthrown by numerous experiments in music psychology. There is 
a significant correlation between listeners concerning what emotion 
they perceive in a piece of music. However, Hanslick’s idea that the 
content of music is the sounding and moving form is interesting. In 
this respect, he was ahead of his time. He argued that content was 
not represented by the form, but is inseparable from it. This theme 
will be developed in Chapter 1. 
The 20th century witnesses interesting ideas about music and emo-
tion. The psychologist Carroll C. Pratt claimed that  “[m]usic can be 
agitated, restless, triumphant, or calm since it can possess the charac-
ter of the bodily movements which are involved in the moods and 
                                           
11  Meyer, L.B. (1956) Emotion and Meaning in Music. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 
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emotions that are given these names”  (Pratt 1931: 7)12. This leads to 
his much-quoted sentence: “Music sounds the way emotions feel” 
(p. 203). As far as I know, this is the first time anyone made the 
connection between musical emotions and body movements. As it 
turned out, this idea would become a major theme. 
Pratt inspired Susan Langer who argued in Philosophy in a new key 
that music does not express, but merely mimics the time course of 
emotional experience (Langer 1942)13. With this we are back to 
representation. Langer used the term isomorphism (structural like-
ness). This likeness caused Langer to propose that music generally 
could be seen as an icon of emotional life, but not specifically that a 
certain piece of music could possess a certain feeling. In Feeling and 
Form Langer proceeded by claiming that music is a symbol of the 
particular feeling domain of transience (the experience of the pass-
ing of time) (Langer 1953)14. Langer saw tonally moving forms as 
iconic of the pattern of time. Music thus in her view presents “vir-
tual” time – a directly felt audible illusion or image of psychological 
time. 
Philip Alperson (2004)15, among others, questioned Langer’s view 
that music expresses ideas (iconically and symbolically) rather than 
definite emotions. Langer’s distinction between musical and psycho-
logical time was criticized. The critique can be summarized as a 
questioning of if listening to music “in effect is presented with ideas 
about something else” such as the life of feelings. 
We can see that the seemingly naïve question concerning the 
emotions whereabouts has turned out to propel theory development. 
I will come back to a list of the currently most influential theories, 
but first I will briefly present the current state of the research. Let 
me start this presentation with an observation by two neurophysi-
ologists: 
                                           
12  Pratt, C. (1931) Emotion and Meaning in Music: a study of psychological aesthetics. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., New York and London 
13  Langer, S. (1942) Philosophy in a New Key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, 
and art. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
14  Langer, S. (1953) Feeling and Form. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York 
15  Alperson, P. (2004) Music: formalism and beyond. The Blackwell Guide to Aesthet-
ics. (Ed. P. Kivy) Blackwell Publ., Malden, MA. 254–275 
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It is remarkable that any medium could so readily evoke all the ba-
sic emotions of our brains (and much more), coaxing us to con-
sider our innermost nature and to savour the affective dimensions 
of our minds. (Panksepp & Bernatzky 2002)16 . 
The present knowledge in the field is mirrored in the anthology 
Music and Emotion – theory and research (Juslin & Sloboda 2001)17. 
Contemporary research on music and emotion is also summarized in 
the overview Expression, Perception, and Induction of Musical Emo-
tions: A Review and a Questionnaire Study of Everyday Listening (Jus-
lin & Laukka 2004)18. 
Research within music psychology unambiguously shows that mu-
sic arouses emotions. This has been studied in physiological studies 
of ANS (Autonomic Nervous System) reactions (such as electro der-
mal response, blood pressure, breathing etc.) as well as in verbal 
self-reports. There is a correlation of up to 0.80 between subjects on 
what emotion they identify in an instrumental piece of music. The 
question now is not if, but how music affects us. Although Juslin’s 
and Sloboda’s book covers an enormous body of research, this ques-
tion is far from solved. One indicator of this is the disciplinary span 
of the theories. The contributing authors represent philosophy, musi-
cology, psychology, neurology, anthropology, sociology, music ther-
apy, film music, communication and medicine. The reason for this 
diversity of attempts is that emotion is a concept that can be dis-
cussed at all levels. So can music. 
I would like to emphasize one paper because it has bearing on 
the framework of this dissertation. In Strong experiences related to 
music: a descriptive system by Gabrielsson & Lindström Wik (2003)19, 
listeners were asked to write about their strongest music experi-
                                           
16  Panksepp, J. & Bernatzky, G. (2002) Emotional sounds and the brain: the neuro-
affective foundations of musical appreciation. Behavioural Processes.Vol. 60. No. 2. 
133–155 
17  Juslin, P.N. & Sloboda, J.A. (2001) Music and Emotion – theory and research. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford  
18  Juslin, P.N. & Laukka, P. (2004) Expression, perception, and induction of musical 
emotions: a review and a questionnaire study of everyday listening. Journal of New 
Music Research. Vol. 33. No 3. 217–238 
19  Gabrielsson, A. & Lindström Wik, S. (2003) Strong experiences related to music: a 
descriptive system. Musicae Scientiae. Vol. 7. No 2. 157–217 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
 
20 
ences. The conclusion of this article is that strong experiences de-
pend on three factors: the music, the listener, and the situation. 
Objective 
The objective of this work is to present a coherent theory of the 
perception and emotion of music. 
Theory 
This work relies on perception-action theory. This theory has been 
developed by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1907–1961) and his followers. I will present this theory and de-
velop a perspective model for music in Chapter 2. 
Material 
As mentioned the music-emotion question is cross-disciplinary. The 
material used here is scientific reports from the fields of neurophysi-
ology, animal navigation, psychology, musicology, communication, 
anthropology, and perception-action philosophy. 
I will exemplify theoretical statements with everyday observations. 
These examples are primarily taken from my experience as a pro-
fessional musician20. 
Delimitations 
This is to a certain extent a subjective investigation. Subjectivity fol-
lows from the perception-action approach. As I intend to show, 
every perspective of perception entails the integration of an egocen-
tric perspective. We cannot perceive without being subjective. This 
                                           
20  International Who is Who in Music (annual) Vol 2. Popular Music. (Ed. S. Tyler) 
Melrose Press Ltd., Cambridge, England 
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is indicated in the concept intersubjectivity. Some see subjectivity as 
a limitation, or worse – as unscientific. But I believe that it is impos-
sible to write about certain topics without using a subjective experi-
ence. Music and emotion is one of them. Thus I see it as an asset 
that I have a personal lived experience of writing, producing, ar-
ranging and performing music in ensembles as an artist and as a 
bandleader. I will use this. This will however be balanced by refer-
ences. 
The ambition is limited to presenting a theory of music perception 
and emotion. This does not mean that I claim to answer the mu-
sic/emotion question. I do not intend to prove the theory, just to 
propose it and present theoretical arguments, evidence and every-
day observations to support it. Some of the hypotheses underpinning 
this theory are supported by evidence whereas others are not. They 
just follow from the context they are a part of. And in some cases 
they follow from the coherence of the theory. 
The work has the limitations and advantages of cross-disciplinary 
research. I have tried to avoid mistakes through discussions with 
experts. One such forum has been SSKKII, a cross-disciplinary group 
where scientists gather to discuss topics of mutual interest concern-
ing language (in every aspect), semiotics, communication, cognition, 
information and interaction. This group has gathered scholars from 
the fields of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, acoustics, cognition 
and musicology. Other occasions for testing ideas have been Ph.D. 
courses and symposia. 
Since this work to a considerable extent relies on neurological 
evidence, we may ask what this type of evidence can tell us about 
the perception of music. Brain scanning enables us to take a glimpse 
into an area previously considered a black box. Now we do not 
have to settle with the documentation of the reactions to stimuli. We 
can actually look into the brain to see what happens when the brain 
reacts to the stimuli. 
But: We do not understand how music is perceived and felt just 
because we know what brain areas are involved in the process. 
Even if we knew everything that happens in the brain as we listen 
to music, the experience of music listening cannot be mapped. It is 
a vast step from the interpretation of images of the brain as it is ex-
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posed to music to the phenomenal experience of music listening. 
What biology can do is to provide guidelines. Biology can be used 
to understand pre-attentive processes – to peep behind the screen of 
consciousness. We need to do this, since, as I intend to show, such 
processes produce musical emotions. This is where this work be-
comes cross-disciplinary. The domain of philosophy and particularly 
phenomenology is traditionally limited to the meaning constituted by 
consciousness. But, the meaning of a stimulus, in the sense that we 
respond adequately, can and does arise on pre-attentive levels. For 
these reasons I will present a taxonomy of different levels of con-
sciousness and relate the discussion to these levels. 
Perception is not restricted to certain brain areas but is a process 
that involves the whole body. The fact that a specific area is acti-
vated in a perception can have a number of explanations: The area 
can be supporting or inhibitory; it can prepare other parts for proc-
essing, it can just be a relay station, it can add some necessary but 
overlooked piece of information, or it can be activated by something 
else than the stimulus under investigation. Processes in the brain are 
not exclusively located to specific areas but different areas contribute 
to the process. Instead we should talk about modules or circuits. 
Even so there is a risk of oversimplifications as these circuits are 
integrated. 
Contrary to most other activities, music listening activates the 
whole brain. This indicates the complexity of music. It is a web of 
rhythm, harmony, timbre and melody, and it is connected to rich 
associations. It elicits motor activity (Haueisen & Knoesche 2001)21, 
visual sensations (Körlin 2005)22, bodily sensations (Gabrielsson & 
Lindström Wik 2003) and emotions (Gabrielsson & Lindström 
2001)23.  It has the power to engage the listener at all levels. 
                                           
21  Haueisen, J. & Knoesche, T.R. (2001) Involuntary motor activity in pianists 
evoked by music perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Vol. 13. No 6. 786–
792 
22  Körlin, D. (2005) Creative Arts Therapies in Psychiatric Treatment – a clinical 
application of the Bonny Method of guided imagery and music (BMGIM) and creative 
arts groups. Doctoral dissertation. Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm 
23  Gabrielsson, A. & Lindström, E. (2001) The influence of musical structure on emo-
tional expression. Music and Emotion – theory and research (Eds. P.N. Juslin & J.A. 
Sloboda) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 223–248 
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The brain is not, as previously assumed, like a Swiss army knife, 
where every part has its separate function (Quartz & Sejnowski 
2002)24. On the contrary, it should be compared to an orchestra 
where all the sections conjoin. This calls for holistic approaches and 
top-down understandings. The functions of the brain areas involved 
in music processing are not clear. Although there are areas proven 
vital to music processing, there simply is no such thing as a “centre 
of music” somewhere in the brain. If a vital part is damaged and the 
ability to perceive music is lost, this just indicates that a link in the 
process is broken. 
The technique to sort out what is caused by a certain stimulus is 
called masking. A control picture is taken under test conditions with 
the stimulus to be tested excluded. This picture is used to mask ir-
relevant activity. Knowledge from research on the consequences of 
brain lesions as well as surgery and electrical stimulation of brain 
areas help interpreting the images. 
In addition, the plasticity of the brain has to be addressed. Plastic-
ity means that the brain is in a constant process of adapting its func-
tions to the environment. Living in the world literally helps build 
our brain (Qartz & Sejnowski 2002). The brain of the musician ex-
hibits several examples of this (Weinberger 2004)25. Training affects 
enlarges areas for tone detection and sensitivity to the sound of the 
instrument, coordination of hands, motor skills and the sensory and 
motor representation of the fingers used when playing. 
I think it is helpful to keep these reservations in mind, as the in-
terpretation of the presentation of findings otherwise may be too 
simplistic. Any finding in this complex area must be put in relation 
to a vast context of theory and findings. 
                                           
24  Quartz, S. & Sejnowski, T. (2002) Liars, Lovers, and Heroes – what the new brain 
science reveals about how we become what we are. HarperCollins Publishers, New 
York 
25  Weinberger, N.M. (2004) Music and the brain. Scientific American. Nov. 89–95  
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Theories on music and emotion 
The multidisciplinary character of the research of music and emotion 
is striking. These different levels, spanning from brain physiology to 
culture, have produced a range of theories. In these theories we can 
always spot a stance in the old philosophical question of whether 
music is representative or just form. 
Expectation theory 
Leonard Meyer can be described as a formalist in the sense that he 
discusses how the structures of music may affect us emotionally. The 
general idea is that the perception of music structure follows Gestalt 
laws (e.g. law on good continuation, law on closure). These laws 
generate expectancies. Emotions are generated by hindrance or ful-
filment of these expectations (Meyer 1956). The Gestalt approach is 
fruitful. We will come back to this in Chapter 1 and 4. 
A new version of expectation theory is presented by David Huron 
in Sweet anticipation (2006)26, where Huron draws on new findings 
in the psychology of expectation. These findings appoint expecta-
tions to be derived from learning (exposure) rather than from Ge-
stalt. The book presents a theory of music and emotion grounded in 
the effect of musical surprise (deviation from the expectation). 
Huron’s theory will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
The semiotic approach 
The semiotic approach is grounded in the assumption that music rep-
resents something – signifies something. Semiotics became widely 
used in anthropology and made its way into musicology via music 
anthropology in the 70s. Music was studied as a sign (artefact) of 
culture. From there on music semiotics took the huge leap to claim 
that music structures are semiotic signs of affective meaning (Tagg 
1979). Tagg argued that these signs developed during the course of 
                                           
26  Huron, D. (2006) Sweet Anticipation: music and the psychology of expectation. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts  
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music history. He adopted the concept museme, from Charles See-
ger. It corresponds to the linguistic concept morpheme. The 
museme is defined as “the basic unit of musical expression which in 
the framework of one given musical system is not further divisible 
without destruction of meaning” (p. 71). These smallest units of 
meaning could be defined by changing a note or two to see at what 
point the meaning is changed. This approach can be traced to the 
linguist Louis Hjelmslev’s commutation principle (Hjelmslev 1953)27. 
It was argued that the composer uses musemes to create affective 
meaning. In other words affective meaning is encoded as musemes 
and the listener is decoding these signs. This makes music a lan-
guage. 
Music semiotics has developed into a vast and diversified field. All 
kinds of semiotic possibilities have been explored: symbols, indexes, 
icons, structural approaches, gestures, syntactical approaches etc. For 
an overview see Monelle (1992)28. 
The semiotic approach could be criticized for being a somewhat 
unmusical bottom up theory where the meaning is derived from its 
entities – the musemes. As noted already by Christian von Ehrenfels 
in his paper Über 'Gestaltqualitäten' 1890 the perception of a mel-
ody cannot be derived from its single isolated notes but from a suc-
cession of notes combined in a meaningful way (Ehrenfels 1988)29. 
The Brunswikian lens model 
Brunswik’s model (from 1956) is originally a model of perception 
that has specifically been applied to the communication of emotion 
in prosody (the sound aspect of language). The model has been 
adapted to emotion in music (Juslin 2001)30. The performer is 
                                           
27  Hjelmslev, L. (1953) Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. Baltimore: Indiana 
University Massachusetts 
28  Monelle, R. (1992) Linguistics and Semiotics in Music. Harwood Academic Pub-
lishers, Edinburg 
29  Ehrenfels, C. von (1988) Foundations of Gestalt Theory. (Ed. and translation B. 
Smith) Philosophia, Munich and Vienna. 82–117  
30  Juslin, P.N. (2001) Communicating emotion in music performance: A Review and 
theoretical framework, in Music and Emotion – theory and research (Eds. P.N. Juslin 
& J.A. Sloboda) Oxford University Press, Oxford. 309–337 
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thought to encode her emotions into cues – bits of information (such 
as volume, timbre, and tempo) making up the music structure.  
These signs pass through an information channel and are then de-
coded by the listener who is judging the emotion. Even if each cue 
does not discriminate significantly between emotions, the cues sum 
up to a pattern indicating a certain emotion with significant probabil-
ity – the larger the number of cues, the more reliable the predic-
tion. Scherer (1986)31 observed that listeners have found it difficult 
to identify the acoustic cues behind their predictions. This is the rea-
son for studying patterns of cues rather than specific cues. The 
model does not account for how these signs have developed their 
emotional meaning or where/how this decoding takes place. 
Arousalism 
Arousalism states that art properties evoke emotions as good or ter-
rible news or events would arouse us (Matravers 1998)32. This the-
ory locates the emotion in the listener rather than in the music. The 
argument is that music cannot possess emotions since music is not a 
sentient being. For this reason the emotion must be aroused in the 
listener. Arousalism has been criticised since it does not consider 
expressiveness as a music property, but confuses it with the emo-
tions of the listener. It does not explain why this music makes us 
happy while that music makes us sad. 
Persona theory 
Persona theory connects music expressiveness to some imagined 
person. As we have already seen Carroll Pratt and Jean-Jacque 
Rosseau pointed in this direction. The persona theory was developed 
by Walton (1988)33 and it has many followers. The so called “strong 
                                           
31  Scherer, K.R. (1986) The vocal affect expression: A review and a model for future 
research. Psychological Bulletin. Vol. 99. No 2. 143–165  
32  Matravers, D. (1998) Art and Emotion. Clarendon, Oxford 
33  Walton, K.L. (1988) What is abstract about the art of music? Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism. Vol. 46. No 3. 351–64 
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position” is taken by Levinson (1996)34 who defines a musical pas-
sage as expressive, if and only if (as philosophers tend to say) it is 
heard as an expression of that emotion by an imagined human sub-
ject, the music’s persona. Levinson argues that the listener feels sym-
pathy (shares her emotions) with the persona, but that this persona 
in fact is a projection of the listener, resulting in sympathy for ones 
own feelings. This makes Levinson open to the same criticism as 
against arousalism – his theory does not explain the expressiveness 
of the music. 
Persona theory is an example of the perception of music as the 
other. “The other” is a concept in psychoanalysis as well as in phi-
losophy. In this thesis “the other” refers to the move-
ments/expression of another human being. We will discuss this in 
Chapter 3. 
Emotional contagion 
Emotional contagion is described as “the tendency to automatically 
mimic and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations postures and 
movements with those of another person and, consequently, to con-
verge emotionally” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson 1993: 5)35. The 
emotion is induced directly and pre-attentively in the listener by 
expressive performances (Juslin 2001). It is likely that we get 
aroused by the voice-like aspects of musical performances. 
This theory implies a low level of consciousness. The emotion is 
felt but not thought of. Different levels of consciousness will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 1. 
Metaphor theory 
In his essay Understanding Music (1983)36 philosopher Roger Scruton 
points out a crucial distinction between music and environmental 
                                           
34  Levison, J. (1996) The Pleasures of Aesthetics. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY 
35  Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J.T. & Rapson, R. L. (1993) Emotional Contagion.  Cam-
bridge University Press, New York 
36  Scruton, R. (1983) Understanding music, Ratio. Vol. 25, No. 2. 97–120  
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sounds. While sounds are material facts, music is an intentional con-
struct – a matter of the concepts through which we perceive the 
world. This is supported, Scruton argues, by the way music is talked 
about and analysed in terms of metaphors. Tone is the product of 
imagination, not material but an idea (Scruton 1997)37. 
Walton’s and Levinson’s persona theory could be seen as meta-
phoric. Metaphor theory is used by Nicholas Cook (1990)38 as a tool 
for music analysis and for a wide approach of discussing music and 
meaning. Zbikowski (1998)39 drawing on Lakoff & Johnson (1980)40, 
points out that metaphorical thinking is the structural bases of all 
cognitive activity. Lakoff & Johnson depict metaphor as a basic struc-
ture of understanding through which we conceptualize a complex 
and abstract target domain in terms of a familiar and concrete source 
domain. This is called cross-domain mapping. We refer our thinking 
to bodily experiences. Such a metaphor is called a conceptual meta-
phor to be distinguished from a linguistic metaphor, which is the 
verbal expression of a conceptual metaphor. In music a conceptual 
metaphor could be the map of sounds in space relative to the body. 
The corresponding linguistic metaphors are for example “high” and 
“low” pitch. Thinking about the underlying mechanism for cross-
domain mapping, Johnson proposed the image schema, which is not 
visual but rather something with the abstract structure of an image. 
The importance of this theory is that it provides music with mean-
ing. This theory can explain how music might produce the illusion 
of concrete reality. In other words cross-domain mapping might 
produce the object lost in Hanslick’s formalism. Although music is not 
a language that can refer to the external world, it could create illu-
sions of it. 
The distinction between sound and music is important. Animals 
hear the same sounds but do they hear music? Probably not. There 
                                           
37  Scruton, R. (1997) The Aesthetics of Music. Clarendon, Oxford 
38  Cook, N. (1990) Music, Imagination, and Culture. Clarendon, Oxford 
39  Zbikowski, L. (1998) Metaphor and music theory: reflections from cognitive sci-
ence. The Online Journal of the Society of Music Theory. Vol. 4. No 1 
40  Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980) Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 
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are other explanations of how musical meaning is created than cross-
domain mapping. We will look into this in the theory chapter. 
Cross-domain mapping is nevertheless an intriguing idea. I prefer 
to understand it in a more biological and less conceptualized sense: 
The target domain is a complex behaviour that cannot be explained 
in evolutionary Darwinian terms. This domain is based on source 
domains that do have concrete survival value. This might explain 
why we have music. We “just” have to find the source domains that 
underlie musical behaviour. This will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter. 
Trivedi’s conceptions 
The idea of the conceptual metaphor brings us to the music philoso-
pher Saam Trivedi. Trivedi develops the idea that music touches us 
because it triggers our fantasy to make conceptions (Trivedi 2003)41. 
Fantasy is propelled by iconic resemblances between musical sounds 
and sounds in our everyday environment, by resemblances between 
musical moods and our own state of mind, or by resemblances be-
tween music and human expressions. These conceptions are seen as 
perceptual or cognitive illusions. Music can resemble natural sounds, 
which we identify as sound sources and thus as objects. These ob-
jects can carry emotional value. Trivedi’s last point (music resembles 
human expressions) has an affinity with the persona theory. Trivedi 
makes the distinction that music does not resemble humans. What it 
resembles is rather the temporal structure of human emotional ex-
pression. This idea comes close to Daniel Stern’s vitality affect (Stern 
1985). Stern discusses the temporal contour of emotions, and he uses 
musical terminology to describe this (fading, accelerando, exploding 
etc.) Trivedi unites iconicity, arousalism and persona theory and 
treats them all as make-belief conceptions. 
                                           
41  Trivedi, S. (2003) The funerary sadness of Mahler´s music. Imagination, Philoso-
phy and the Arts. (Eds. M. Kieran & D. McIver Lopes)Routledge, London. 259–271 
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Enhanced formalism 
I will give the philosopher Peter Kivy extra space. The reason is 
that I, as a musician, like his so-called enhanced formalism. Apart 
from that, Kivy is provocative and fun to read although some of his 
ideas must be completely wrong. 
Kivy lustfully kills all semiotic claims of narration in music. In In-
troduction to a Philosophy of Music (2002) Kivy discusses the repeti-
tion element in music. This element would be impossible in a narra-
tive. “Suppose”, Kivy argues, “Hamlet was constructed that way. 
Then, instead of saying To be, or not to be…once, and then get on 
with his life, Hamlet would repeat every five minutes, To be, or not 
to be…” (p. 154). This indicates that music and narrative fiction are 
completely different art forms. Kivy criticizes every attempt to dis-
cuss narration in music and exemplifies with Susan McClary’s texts 
on narratives of gender in classical music. If, Kivy asks, this is the 
meaning of the piece, why then is she alone of that opinion? Thus, 
music cannot represent. The emotion in music must be perceived in 
the form. 
To Kivy music is form, although in an enhanced sense, which in-
cludes perceivable properties and qualities. One of these properties 
inscribed in the musical form is emotion. Emotion can be detected in 
the music pattern – or movement, just as it can be detected in hu-
man movement patterns. As we can see this comes close to Pratt’s 
and Langer’s view that music can possess the character of the body 
movements reflecting moods and emotions. In contrast to Langer 
though, Kivy does not treat music structure as iconic signs of emo-
tions. Rather he denies that music is about something else. Music has 
emotions “as a perceptual part of its structure”. The emotion is in the 
contour. We do not, as Walton or Levinson, have to imagine a per-
sona to be affected. We are just used to reacting to this kind of tem-
poral topography (Kivy 1989). 
Now let me exemplify where I believe Kivy goes wrong. There is 
something, he says, in sad music that is perceived as sad. This is not 
because the composer was sad when he wrote the piece and it does 
not arouse sadness in the listener. Kivy exemplifies with the sad 
look in the face of a dog. The dog was born that way. The sad look 
is not telling anything about the emotion of the dog. It appears that 
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way. Neither does this sad face affect us, because we know that as 
long as this creature is wagging the tail, she is happy. This expres-
sion-appearance theory has been quite influential (Davies 2001: 
32)42. In Kivy’s view we perceive emotion in music, but we are not 
aroused by it. This dubious reasoning paints Kivy into a corner, since 
he cannot deny that music affects us. It does affect us, he says, but 
for other reasons. The unfortunate result of this is that the promising 
approach called enhanced formalism loses explanation value. Kivy 
suddenly turns to another explanation: The old object – belief – feel-
ing formula. Although music cannot represent an object, it is an ob-
ject – an artefact – in itself. And it is an object for human beliefs. If 
we believe that the music is magnificent and possesses high aes-
thetical values we get a feeling of excitement and awe. 
I disagree. For one, we cannot rule out that the emotional state of 
the composer does affect the composition. Secondly, it is not self 
evident that the emotions we get from musical listening are based in 
object-belief-feeling. We can be moved by the perception anyway. 
Thus we do not need the explanation that the music is of high aes-
thetic value. Gabrielsson and Lindström Wik (2003) have shown that 
any music could produce awe. And: It is not self evident that emo-
tion from music is based on reason. Quite on the contrary the belief 
that the music is magnificent could to a large extent be based on the 
felt emotion. Kivy admits that some people can possess emotions that 
are not based in reason, but he dismisses them as “odd, some of 
them inexplicable, or downright abnormal” (Kivy 2002: 126). And 
so it seems, when people show emotional reactions for no obvious 
reason. However reason is not a condition for emotions. If some-
body is laughing, this makes me laugh. Automatically. I do not need 
a reason for it. Laughter can be contagious.  
Kivy is putting the listener in a dependent situation. Judgements of 
aesthetic value (such as stating the magnificence of a certain piece) 
are the judgements of the elite. It is the canon. Not until we believe 
in that judgement (and make ourselves part of that elite) are we 
allowed to be touched. This cannot be true. I think Kivy’s idea about 
                                           
42  Davies, S. (2001) Philosophical perspectives on music’s expressiveness. In Music 
and Emotion – theory and research (Eds. P.N. Juslin & J.A. Sloboda) Oxford Univer-
sity Press. Oxford. 23–44 
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magnificent music is a long shot to provide an object for the emo-
tion. 
Aside from these objections it is clear that we are able to perceive 
the emotion of somebody from facial expression, tone of voice and 
body movement patterns. I will argue that we do this without rea-
son. When we are involved in a conversation, we focus on the con-
tent of the message and are less conscious of the facial expression, 
the tone of voice, or the gestures of the other. These parameters are 
usually not attended to. Yet these expressions affect us. They auto-
matically affect our own feelings, our own tone of voice, our own 
facial expression and our own gestures. And what is more, they af-
fect our understanding of the message. Kivy’s important contribution 
is the notion that the emotion is expressed by the temporal topogra-
phy. In other words emotions can be perceived from the form. This 
does not imply that we have to make up a persona. This is right. We 
may very well listen to music without making up some imagined 
person; we may just react emotionally on the movement patterns the 
same way as we react on the bodily movement patterns of another 
being. 
Beside these theories I ought to mention the anthropologists Ellen 
Dissanayake (1992)43 and (2000b)44 and Judith Becker (2001)45. Both 
hint at interesting new ways to approach the question. We will re-
turn to the anthropological approaches in Chapter 5. 
Thesis overview 
This thesis is a music-philosophical discussion where I present a per-
spective theory of music perception and emotion. Each perspective in 
                                           
43  Dissanayake, E. (1992) Homo Aestheticus: where art comes from and why. Free 
Press, New York  
44  Dissanayake, E. (2000b) Art and Intimacy: how the arts began. University of 
Washington Press, Washington 
45  Becker, J. (2001) Anthoprological perspectives on music and emotion. In Music 
and Emotion – theory and research (Eds. P.N. Juslin & J.A. Sloboda) Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford. 135–161 
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this model has a specified landmark and a specified frame of refer-
ence. A perspective is thought of as a situation adapted program for 
neuronal music processing. Each program implies specific emotional 
reactions. 
Chapter 1 From Soundwave to Music presents perception-action 
theory and outlines the implications for music perception. Concepts 
such as the levels of consciousness, form & content, figure & 
ground, time & movement, imagery and perspective are discussed. 
This motivates the perspective theory. From there on the theory, 
which entails five principal perspectives of music perception, struc-
tures the dissertation. The implications for music perception and 
emotion of these perspectives will be discussed in chapters 2–6 
called Sound, Listening to the Other, Navigating in the Soundscape, 
Tribal Rites, and Contemplating Music. 
In each of these chapters I intend to discuss three overall questions: 
1. How is music perceived and processed in this perspective? 
2. How does perception connect to emotion in this perspec-
tive? 
3. What kind of emotion is connected to this perspective? 
In Chapter 7 the present state of research on emotions will be pre-
sented. We will discuss the connection between perception and 
emotion generally and compare this with what we have found out 
so far about music and emotion. I will make some observations that 
separate musical emotions from other emotions. This will lead to a 
hypothesis concerning musical emotions. 
The perspective theory of music perception and emotion will be 
summed up in the concluding chapter. The perspectives will be con-
nected to source domains, in order to discuss possible use aspects of 
musical emotions. The suggested perspective theory will be related 
to the theories presented in this introduction. 
 

35 
1 
 
From Sound Wave to Music 
Towards a Perspective Theory of Music Perception 
Merleau-Ponty presented in 1945 the basis for perception-action 
theory in Phénoménologie de la Perception (Phenomenology of Per-
ception, Merleau-Ponty 1996)46. Perception-action is not just about 
how perception leads to action but also about how action leads to 
perception. I will introduce some relevant ideas of this theory and 
apply them to music. Additionally I will introduce new brain science 
evidence that sheds light over this theory.  
This chapter aims to propose and motivate a perspective theory of 
music perception. I argue that the perspective steers the choice of 
content and that this selected content affects the perception of form. 
Thus the perception of form always entails meaning. Meaning thus 
does not have to be represented by form, but is perceived as an 
implicit understanding of the form. “Vision is”, as stated by Merleau-
Ponty, “already inhabited by a meaning (French: sens) which gives 
it a function in the spectacle of the world and in our existence” 
(p. 52). This is true for sounds as well. Meaning is implemented al-
ready in the perception of sound and of course even more so in the 
perception of music. The sensory input cannot be consciously per-
ceived. It is the perception process that produces the final percep-
tion. This process involves memories. This has direct relevance to 
the philosophical issue whether music is representative or just form. 
                                           
46  Merleau-Ponty, M. (1996) Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
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In this chapter I will introduce a theoretical understanding of impli-
cated concepts: perception, meaning, figure and ground, form and 
content, procedural knowledge, and imagery. 
Levels of consciousness 
The appraisal theory of emotion claims that emotional states result 
from appraisal judgements (judgements “to the effect that one is fac-
ing a predicament that matters”) of a perceived object or situation 
(Arnold 1960: 171)47. 
In this theory perception is considered conscious. The so called 
“appraisal dimensions” listed by Richard Lazarus, one of the architects 
of the theory, are: goal relevance, goal congruence, type of ego 
involvement, blame or credit, coping potential and future expec-
tancy (Lazarus 1991)48. Thus, the theory states that an observer be-
comes aware of an object and explicitly judges these dimensions. An 
appropriate emotion is supposed to result.  Is this so? 
Jesse J. Prinz takes a different stand as he claims that the judge-
ments are implicit “gut reactions” (Prinz 2004)49. Is it irrelevant 
whether we are aware of the music or not? This would be a rash 
statement. At least it is safe to say that musical associations, since 
they depend on memories, evoke emotion. Music obviously evokes 
strong emotions when associated with our nation, first love, home, 
childhood, parents etc. Can this association be implicit? That is, can 
the national anthem, say, touch the listener because it pre-attentively 
actualizes implicit memories of the nation? 
At this stage let us just agree that there is good reason to discuss 
how music is perceived before we attend to the question, how, and 
on what levels of awareness, music affects us emotionally. 
                                           
47  Arnold, M. (1960) Emotion and Personality. Columbia University Press, New York 
48  Lazarus, R. (1991) Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford University Press, New York 
49  Prinz, J.J. (2004) Gut Reactions – a perceptual theory of emotion. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York 
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To discuss perception we need to distinguish levels of conscious-
ness. This is a disputed topic. I am going to use the following prin-
cipal levels: 
1. Cognitive consciousness referring to the consciousness of 
facts. It is coded information that can be communicated di-
rectly or via media. This information can be unattended (e.g. 
we know that Sweden is a Scandinavian country but we are 
not addressing this fact for the moment). This is a) implicit 
cognitive consciousness. Or, we can attend to this fact. This is 
b) explicit cognitive consciousness. 
2. Phenomenal consciousness is the directly lived momentary 
experience. This can be unattended (e.g. the sensations of 
the mouth movements when we are involved in a conversa-
tion). This is a) implicit phenomenal consciousness. If we at-
tend to our mouth movements, we have b) explicit phe-
nomenal consciousness. 
The word “cognitive” will from here on denote cognitively con-
scious processes solely. Some scholars use this word for all mental 
activities, but in this investigation we need to separate the phe-
nomenal level from the cognitive level. 
Perception is often described in logical terms as if there were a lit-
tle man in the brain taking logical decisions. The appraisal theory of 
emotion is an example of this. This so called intellectualism was 
criticized by Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1996). There is no 
proof, he exemplified, that we draw conclusions about distances 
from lens accommodation, apparent size of objects, from disparity 
between retinal images, from the convergence of the eyes etc. How 
could we? This information does not reach the attention of the ob-
server. Merleau-Ponty firmly denied that associations, memories and 
judgements are involved in perception. But at a closer look it is ob-
vious that Merleau-Ponty treats these faculties in their explicit capac-
ity. His scientific territory was the phenomenally conscious. It was 
not fully recognized in the 40s that most mental activity is pre-
attentive. For example pre-attentive decision taking was shown 
1985 by Gazzaniga in his presentation of his split-brain experiments 
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(Gazzaniga 1985)50. According to Gazzaniga almost all decisions are 
pre-attentive and most logical explanations are rationalizations – 
logical reconstructions. 
The pre-attentive level has been studied with the ERP (event re-
lated potentials) technique. This technique registers brain reactions 
on deviances from expected outcomes. These are pre-attentive reac-
tions. They reveal information about the so-called “primitive intelli-
gence” (Näätänen et al. 2001)51 (for ERP overview, see Tervaniemi, 
2003)52. The studies show that we perceive, remember and compare 
(judgement) on a basic level without our knowing. “Primitive intel-
ligence” processes more information than we can handle con-
sciously. And, at a faster rate. These implicit activities are constantly 
going on under the surface of attention. Even action can take place 
at an implicit level as when we follow a path while focused on a 
conversation. In the following perception and perception-action will 
be treated as processes on any level of consciousness. 
Can pre-attentive levels create meaning? Yes, in the sense that we 
implicitly act according to the information. If we, to take a case from 
Merleau-Ponty’s collection of examples, perceive the intervening 
objects between ourselves and the object attended, these objects will 
make the distance to the attended object look longer. We act ac-
cordingly. We never try to reach for objects perceived to be far 
away. The intervening objects thus mean distance in the sense that 
they affect behaviour. There is no calculation on a cognitive con-
scious level behind this. It is implicit meaning. The distance is per-
ceived. Merleau-Ponty admits that this meaning exists. He calls it 
immanent meaning “which is not clear over itself”. 
By the same token there is meaning in music perception. This 
does not imply that the perception stands for – signifies – meaning. 
Music can signify, and if so, create explicit cognitively conscious 
                                           
50  Gazzaniga, M. (1985) The Social Brain. Basic Books, New York 
51  Näätänen, R., Tervaniemi, M., Sussman, E., Paavilainen, P. & Winkler, I. (2001) 
“Primitive intelligence” in the auditory cortex. Trends in Neurosciences, Vol. 24. 
Issue 5. 283–288  
52  Tervaniemi, M. (2003) Musical sound processing: EEG and MEG evidence. The 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Music. (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre) Oxford University 
Press, New York. 294–309 
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meaning. But the point here is that there is implicit meaning in the 
perception of music. 
Perception 
Perception is about how the world presents itself to us. A. D. Smith 
states in The Problem of Perception (2002)53 that perception places 
the object in three-dimensional space. I will argue that this can be 
generalized to the statement that perspective defines form. 
A first step is to show how meaning affects perception. This is an 
example of so called top down processing. According to Gestalt psy-
chology we perceive relations (Sundqvist 2003)54. This is especially 
true for the perception of music. The general principle in Gestalt 
psychology is the law of Prägnanz. This word means conciseness. 
“Prägnanz” refers to our tendency to choose the regular and the 
simple over the irregular and the complex. The most basic relation 
is the figure-ground constellation where the figure stands out from 
the background as a meaningful coherence. Other Gestalt principles 
governing perception are the law of closure, the law of similarity, 
the law of proximity, the law of symmetry, and the law of continu-
ity. The effects can been demonstrated in simple and convincing 
experiments. Let me take an example from music: 
If a melody contains large leaps every second tone, the brain 
tends to assume that the tones heard in the high register and the 
tones heard in the low register belong to two separate melodies 
(Bregman 1990)55. This illusory effect makes it possible for one flute 
to play two voices simultaneously. 
We are not aware of the sensory input as such. We can only be-
come aware of what we make of it. As can be seen from the follow-
ing quotes, perception can be amazingly rich: 
                                           
53  Smith, A.D. (2002) The Problem of Perception. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts 
54  Sundqvist, F. (2003) Perceptual Dynamics – theoretical foundations and philoso-
phical implications of Gestalt psychology. Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, Goth-
enburg 
55  Bregman, A.S. (1990) Auditory Scene Analysis – perceptual organization of sound. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass, and when, with a 
tinkling sound, it breaks, this sound is conveyed by the visible 
glass. (Merleau-Ponty 1996: 229) 
If I stick my finger into a pot of jam, the sticky coldness of this jam 
is a revelation of its sugary taste to my fingers. (Sartre 1958: 186)56 
The myth holds the essence within the appearance; the mythical 
phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine presence. The 
daemon of rain is present in each drop which falls after the incan-
tation, as the soul present in each part of the body. Every appari-
tion is in this case an incarnation. (Merleau-Ponty 1996: 290) 
The authors apparently mean that these cross modal experiences are 
not conscious associations but directly felt or experienced in the 
perception. In the last case even myth is implicated in perception. 
The presence of the daemon is actually experienced in the raindrop. 
The concept of perception has various implications depending on 
theoretical context. In neuroscientific literature it refers to the proc-
essing of sensory input leading to identification of objects; phenome-
nology treats perception as something momentarily lived; and 
perception-action theory sees perception as interaction between the 
world and the active body. This theory encompasses pre-attentive 
levels of perception. 
Several writers have proposed that the purpose of perception is to 
inform the organism about the use aspect of a certain object in a 
certain situation. Kurt Koffka, one of the fathers of Gestalt psychol-
ogy, called this the “demand character” of an object: Eat me! Drink 
me! Fear me! (Koffka 1935: 361)57. 
Close to this concept is James Gibson’s affordance indicating that 
the environment affords use-aspects. What we perceive is not the 
external world as such, but the affordances the external world 
“makes” us (Gibson, J.J. 1986)58. The living organism “picks up” vital 
information from the environment. The bodily state of the individual 
                                           
56  Sartre, J.-P. (1958) Being and Nothingness. Methuen, London 
57  Koffka, K. (1935) The Principles of Gestalt Psychology. Lund Humphries, London 
58  Gibson, J.J. (1986) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey 
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(hunger, thirst, fatigue etc.) is of course also important for the rec-
ognition of goals or affordances. 
Merleau-Ponty used the concept telos (Greek for goal) to desig-
nate intentional meaning of perception. 
All these attempts to understand perception entail that perception 
is an interaction between the perceiving subject and the environ-
ment. The use aspect can be seen in the light of evolution. Every 
species needs to know how to act to optimize a given situation. The 
perception apparatus is “designed” to make this possible. Thus differ-
ent species have a perception apparatus designed to meet species-
specific needs. The bat has an apparatus for hunting in the dark, fish 
can detect changes in water pressure, birds perceive directions for 
flying, flies like the smell of the cow’s derriere etc. Every species 
has a unique filter for olfactory perception that sorts out what is use-
ful from what is not (Buck 2004)59. It is the useable aspect of the 
world we perceive and this aspect is species specific. The bee 
would not perceive music from musical sounds as little as we would 
perceive the direction to nectar from the movements of a dancing 
bee. In sum: The needs steer perception, these needs are species 
specific and every species has a perception apparatus designed to 
detect the particular kind of information guiding the animal to satisfy 
the need. 
This is not to say that we perceive the use aspect of every situa-
tion. Music or art is not useful in any obvious Darwinian sense. But 
we perceive it through processes developed to discriminate use 
aspects. 
The situation thus produces meaning in the limited sense that it 
contains action “proposals”. Generally the brain prefers higher order 
perception: structures are perceived as Gestalts, as affordances, and 
as situation understanding. What then is a situation? I will treat the 
situation as the total impression of the present moment: sensory in-
put from the surrounding and from the body. This could be called 
the sensory field. The concept field is taken from Merleau-Ponty’s 
field theory categorizing information as: 
                                           
59  Buck, L. (2004) Nobel Minds, TV-interview. SVT/BBC  
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1. The sensory field, i.e. the sensory input from the surround-
ing as well as from the own body. 
2. The perceptual field, i.e. all perceptions (processed sensory 
input) at a certain moment on every level of conscious-
ness. 
3. The mental field i.e. memories, Gestalts, internal models. 
4. The phenomenal field, i.e. the figure/ground constellation 
(as in seeing an object in three dimensional space or hear-
ing a melody in a harmonic structure), which constitutes 
the phenomenally conscious perception. A phenomenal 
perception is a present now perception.  
The situation entails a context – a frame of reference – in the percep-
tion process. The frame of reference consists of information from the 
perceptual field and/or the mental field and/or the ground with rele-
vance to the figure. An important frame of reference is the own 
body. We implicitly “measure” the world with our active bodies. We 
do not only perceive what is immediately good or dangerous for the 
body but also instrumentally important features such as weights, di-
rections, speed, and distances. Something is heavy if we have trou-
ble lifting it; it is far away if we cannot reach it; it is fast if we can-
not catch it and so on. Merleau-Ponty called this frame of reference 
the body schema (Merleau-Ponty 1996). This includes the implicit 
feedback of the location of the body parts and the action potential of 
the body. It involves not only the body but also spatial directions 
(over/under, left/right, on/under and depth) for intended action. An 
important factor in the formation of the body schema is gravity, giv-
ing a subjective experience of the vertical, without which 
over/under and left/right would lose meaning. Animals are able to 
perform accurate movements in their environment. To perform these 
actions they must have a sophisticated system of commands and 
feedback involving the own body and the space around it. The idea 
of the body schema as the frame of reference is supported by ex-
perimental evidence: When, for example, a muscle is stimulated 
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with vibrations, the resulting reflexes depend on the position of the 
body (Berthoz 2000)60. 
The body schema also includes instruments and tools used in bod-
ily action. They become part of the habitual body. For example the 
stick of the blind man functions and is perceived as an extended 
limb. The instrument of the skilled musician, thus, is included in his 
body schema. Merleau-Ponty exemplifies this with the organ player. 
It is impossible to consciously calculate the coordination of hands 
and feet to bring out music from this highly complicated instrument, 
he argues. The body-organ connection must be automated. The 
movements generate bodily and musical feedback. This connects 
body movements with music. When, in a second step, the organ 
player adapts to an unfamiliar instrument, this is just like the auto-
matic adjustments we make to talk with food in the mouth, to adapt 
walking to the terrain, or to drive an unfamiliar car. This proves, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, that the instrument has become part of 
the body schema. 
The own body can thus be a frame of reference in the perception 
process. This can easily be shown with reversed goggles, so called 
because they reverse the up/down or the left/right direction. At first, 
subjects are confused, but after a while of probing the environment 
– moving around and touching – they regain normal sight. The brain 
re-reverses the perception. Another example is provided by Bach-y-
Rita. Bach-y-Rita placed a television camera on blindfolded subjects. 
The picture was transmitted to vibrations on the skin of the subjects. 
After a while of training how to navigate in the environment, 
guided by these signals, the subjects learned to “see” with their skin 
(Bach-y-Rita 1989)61 in the sense that the signals helped them to 
navigate. These experiments show that what we perceive is not the 
actual surrounding but the use aspect of it. We learn to implicitly 
interpret the sensory input in everyday situations. There is thus no 
one to one image of the environment in our brains. Not even tem-
poral processes have a one to one representation. ERP-experiments 
                                           
60  Berthoz, A. (2000) The Brain's Sense of Movement. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
61  Bach-y-Rita, P., Collins, C.C., Saunders, F., White, R. & Scadden, L. (1969) Visual 
substitution by tactile image projection. Nature. Vol 221. No. 5184. 963–964 
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indicate that the time is compressed in sound representation (Yabe et 
al. 2004)62. 
In order to use the own body as a frame of reference we need to 
move. This makes perception an active process. We “scan” the envi-
ronment with our bodies. What we perceive is not so much informa-
tion as changes of information. Pressure cannot be felt but the 
change of pressure is felt. A constant unchanging tone could in the 
long run not be heard and a picture could not be seen if our gaze is 
constantly locked in one direction (Boeree 2006)63. We need to 
move to experience change and thus to perceive. As we will dis-
cuss, body movement and music perception is an evident example 
of this. 
Another important frame of reference is the memory. We cannot 
even become aware of music as music without the involvement of 
memories (Snyder 2000)64. However there are different kinds of 
memories. We have long-term memories, short-term memories (or 
working memory) and sensory memories or buffers (Malmgren 
2004)65. 
Another categorisation is procedural memories referring to the im-
plicit memories of body movements (such as riding a bike), declara-
tive (or semantic) memories (such as facts taught at school) and epi-
sodic memories – which occur as short reminiscences of lived expe-
riences. 
Procedural knowledge is knowledge-how, as opposed to declara-
tive knowledge or knowledge-that (Ryle 1949)66. Merleau-Ponty de-
scribed a case which shows the difference (Merleau-Ponty 1996): 
A man, suffering from brain injury, could not, when asked to, put 
his hand on his head (although he clearly understood the instruc-
tion), but when a fly landed on his head, he smashed it. The conclu-
sion is that although he could not do it deliberately, his body knew 
                                           
62  Yabe, H., Matsuoka, T., Sato, Y., Hiruma, T., Sutoh, T., Koyama, S., Gunji, A., Kakigi, 
R. & Kaneko, S. (2005) Time may be compressed in sound representation as repli-
cated in sensory memory. Neuroreport. Vol. 16 No 2. 95–98 
63  Boeree, C.G. (2006) http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/genpsyperception.html 
64  Snyder, B. (2000) Music and Memory. MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 
65  Malmgren, H. (2004) Why the past is sometimes perceived, and not only remem-
bered. Philosophical Communications, Web Series    
66  Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
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how to do it, when the lived situation demanded so. Procedural 
knowledge is the knowledge how to walk, ride a bike etc. – actions 
we are normally not conscious of. It is the knowledge how to move 
the mouth to produce words but not the knowledge to understand 
what is said. It includes knowledge how to reach, catch and find our 
way in the terrain. Some procedural knowledge, like the newborn 
calf’s ability to walk, is inborn, some is learnt by imitation, and some 
is consciously learned (declarative) but becomes automated (proce-
dural) after practice. Most of these abilities are too complicated to be 
taught by communication of signs, or even to be consciously under-
stood. They contain too much information.  
These types of memories can be connected with the earlier pre-
sented levels of consciousness. Declarative memories are cognitively 
conscious, episodic memories are phenomenally conscious and pro-
cedural memories are unobtainable. Let me exemplify the last state-
ment. We cannot obtain the memory of how to ride a bike. The 
body knows how to ride, but asked to explain, we do not know 
how it is done. For this reason, procedural memory is not a memory 
in the sense that it can be recalled to consciousness. Bicycling is a 
sequence of movements where every movement is actualized by 
the preceding movement. And vice versa, even if the bicyclist is a 
physicist and knows everything there is to know about centripetal 
force (declarative knowledge), this would not help her on the bike, 
if she does not have the procedural memory. 
Playing music is procedural knowledge. Knowing everything in a 
declarative sense does not make a good performer. It takes practice. 
And when we know how to play the piece, it is in our fingers and 
we do not have to take conscious decisions how to play the next 
tone. Playing is a movement pattern and once it is established this 
memory is very robust. 
Eleanor Gibson introduced the concept perceptual learning, for 
pre-attentive adaptations to the environment (Gibson, E. 1953)67. 
This knowledge makes us perceive better. Perceptual memories are 
for the most part learned in early childhood. We develop the ability 
to perceive from day one, and in fact even earlier. Some of this 
                                           
67  Gibson, E.J. (1953) Improvements in perceptual judgments as a function of con-
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learning occurs at certain ages in so called “windows”. Eleanor Gib-
son listed six categories of perceptual learning. 
1. Attention weighting, which refers to our ability to uncon-
sciously direct our attention to features that are important 
to us. Example: faces. 
2. Stimulus imprinting. Through imprinting, detectors (or re-
ceptors) are developed to specialize for a certain stimuli. 
We are much better (faster) at identifying stimuli that we 
have been exposed to previously. 
3. Feature imprinting is the ability to select a crucial feature 
important to identification. 
4. Topological imprinting is the ability to recognize whole 
patterns and even to generalize between dimensions. 
5. Differentiation is much improved by exposure of stimuli. 
An example of differentiation of complex stimuli is that 
Caucasians identify Caucasian faces better than Chinese 
faces. 
6. Unitization. Parts that co-occur in a set of patterns will 
tend to be bound together. Evidence of this is our ability 
to read words as wholes instead of letter by letter, and that 
faces are immediately recognized without analysis of facial 
features. 
As can be seen from these categories they are relevant to music 
learning. Let me just briefly comment on feature imprinting and 
unitization. Feature imprinting is important for our ability to recog-
nize voices and instrumental sounds. Unitization is our ability to link 
this feature to everything else in the learning situations. A modern 
term for this is pattern completion. This mechanism makes us per-
ceive situations rather than details. 
It follows from the fact that perception implies action, that Eleanor 
Gibson’s definition of perceptual learning as a learning how to per-
ceive better, implies the learning how to act better to perceive, 
which to some extent makes this memory procedural. For example 
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the accommodation of the eyes is procedural knowledge which con-
tributes to the perception of depth. 
Thus declarative memories and episodic memories are accessible 
whereas procedural memories are not. This said, it is important to 
state that all kinds of memories can affect us implicitly. The fact that 
a memory is accessible does not imply that it is given attention in 
the perception process. Mostly it is not. If the memory processed in 
perception is not given attention it is impossible for the listener to 
separate it from the perception. The memory affects the perception 
but the listener is not aware of the association as such. 
Is this the explanation to the statement by Merleau-Ponty that the 
daemon can be present in the raindrop? Someone believing in dae-
mons senses the presence of something she “knows” to be there. 
This can be as vivid as a child’s experience of beasts under the bed. 
Parents know how hard it can be to assure a child that there is no 
beast in the dark. We light up the room and look under the bed 
with the child. We explain that the beast is a fantasy. In fact this is to 
make the implicit meaning explicit – to make the child aware of her 
own thoughts. It is a way to make phenomenal consciousness cogni-
tive. If we are not aware of the thought as a thought – we have no 
place to put the beast but in “reality”. The beast exists. 
Let me now give some examples of how referential meaning af-
fects perception: 
1. Last summer I was strolling along the seashore on Öland, 
an island in the Baltic. From a distance I saw pine trees at 
the cape. But on closer inspection I realized that it must be 
masts on a shipwreck. Even the “masts”, however, turned 
out to be an illusion. At closer range I identified these 
“masts” as poles for fish net drying. What happened here? 
We do not see the sensation (the input on the retina). The 
brain builds the image from all information actualized by 
the situation. Since there were pine-trees all along the 
shore the perceptual context included these trees. The pic-
ture produced by the brain was new pine-trees. Then new 
contextual information was added – a shipwreck. Now in 
an instant I saw the masts. This could theoretically go on 
for ever. The same input can generate different pictures as 
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the context is changing. As I became aware of the fishing 
nets I was presented with the image of poles. In this ex-
ample the frame of reference is the ground (in the fig-
ure/ground constellation). 
2. Example no 1 is an illusion. It never happened to me. I 
realized as I reread Merleau-Ponty that the example must 
have been inspired by him. In this example the frame of 
reference is the mental field (declarative memory). 
3. Seeing may be altered by suggestions by a suggestive per-
son (Raz, Fan & Posner 2005)68. This exemplifies that per-
ception can be changed by declarative information. 
4. We can see the moon as a flat object. Probably we learned 
to see the flatness in our childhood. But thinking about the 
astronomic fact that the moon is a sphere, we can suddenly 
see it in 3D. In this case the flat moon experience depends 
on perceptual memories and the round moon experience 
depends on declarative information. 
5. Children see Santa Claus, not a man in a mask. My three 
year old daughter therefore had an amazing experience 
when I offered Santa Claus a snifter. He had to remove his 
mask a little. “Daddy, there was a man inside Santa”. In this 
case mythology is the frame of reference. 
6. Gestalt psychology uses ambiguous pictures to show that 
we perceive totally different forms depending on what we 
take to be figure and what we take to be ground. The 
same line could be perceived as this or as that, depending 
on assumed content. 
7. The random ink-patches in Rorschach-testing are perceived 
differently by different subjects. This is comparable to our 
ability to see animals and faces in clouds. The variation is 
                                           
68  Raz, A., Fan, J. & Posner, M.I. (2005) Hypnotic suggestion reduces conflict in the 
human brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of the United States of America. 
Vol. 102. No 28. 9978–9983  
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due to the mental field (which is why Rorschach-testing is 
used to diagnose mental stages). 
Notably the change in perception of form is abrupt. We either see 
something as this or as that. There are no mediating stages. 
Now the reader might ask: If the same drawn line can be per-
ceived as the contour of a profile or the contour of a vase, is this not 
an example of different content and the same form? No, if we asked 
someone who perceived the line as a profile to draw it, it would 
most certainly come out differently than the same line perceived as 
the contour of a vase. Gestalt experiments show that meaning really 
changes the perception. The perceptual context can bend straight 
lines, make equally long lines unequal, change size and add details 
that are not really there. Or, to take a well known example: the 
moon is perceived as bigger when it comes close to the horizon. 
The ground, in this case the horizon, enlarges the moon. 
The neurological explanation is that the brain has developed asso-
ciative connections. We perceive things as this or that depending on 
which connections are used. These connections can be cross modal. 
For example lip reading cues to hearing (Pekkola et al. 2005)69. 
These are examples of top-down processing. There is a philoso-
phical problem of how we can have a top-down understanding. 
How can we understand the detail from the situation when we need 
the details to build up the situation? There are two possible explana-
tions to this question. One is using the concept internal models 
(Klapuri 2001)70. Do we have such models? Neurologically this is 
either inborn so called pre-wired connections or connections that 
have developed through priming (learning effects). As already dis-
cussed unitization (pattern completion) is a pattern of neurological 
reactions that connects specific features with situational circum-
stances. Thus if we are to talk about internal models it should be in 
the sense of potential chain reactions. These patterns connect situa-
tion relevant information to an understanding, which includes the 
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expected outcome of the situation. For this reason top-down proc-
essing is sometimes referred to as prediction-driven processing. Pat-
tern completion may however not be the only explanation. It has 
been shown that the perception of a face or an object as well as to 
the emotional expression of that face are not just assembled from 
many neuronal reactions putting the details together but also that we 
have single neuron representations (Fried et al. 1997)71. This indi-
cates the possibility that we might have “situation neurons” (single 
neuron that can detect a typical situation). 
Either way this is implicit situation understanding. In the case of 
music it would be the sense of a certain style. 
To sum up: 
1. The situation is the input of internal and external informa-
tion. This is the sensory field. 
2. The perceptual field consists of all perceptions on any level 
of consciousness. 
3. Situation understanding is basically expectations (derived 
from the frame of reference) and reaction tendencies. This 
is the implicit meaning of the situation. 
4. The figure attended to (or form) is a “proposal” by the 
brain of what we are facing based on situation understand-
ing (content). This figure belongs to the phenomenal field. 
The frame of reference thus provides us with information which 
affects perception of the perceived form. The point I want to arrive 
to is this: When the meaning is implicit, it cannot be separated from 
the phenomenally perceived object.  
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Application to music 
The presented theory entails that music is perceived differently be-
tween listeners. Depending on personal background, exposure (per-
ceptual learning), mood etc. some people hear things that others do 
not. It is sometimes said that we all perceive music the same way. 
But this is because all westerners are exposed to enormous amounts 
of Western popular music each day. If we were to listen to Viet-
namese classical music, would we perceive it the same way as a 
performer of that music? The listener rarely exposed to Vietnamese 
music has no internal model of it, no sense of the style, and thus no 
expectancies. To her the music has no meaning. This deteriorates 
the perception. She would recognize it as music because of some 
universal features, but if asked to repeat the melody, she would face 
a problem. 
Since most studies of perception treat visual perception, special at-
tention must be paid to the question if the findings are valid for 
audible perception. There are some fundamental differences be-
tween seeing and hearing. We can, to take a concrete example, 
hear but not see around corners. Thus the perception of space and 
perspectives is fundamentally different in hearing. We do, however, 
in other respects receive information about spatiality, directions and 
movements from audible cues. 
Hearing is more temporal than seeing. Sounds generally have 
shorter duration than images. Everything we do produces sounds. 
This is important to our sense of timing. Audible cues, such as the 
sound of the tennis ball, are important to our ability to time our own 
body movement to get a clean hit.  Even diminutive sounds as those 
produced as I type on my computer, are important to my sense of 
touch with reality. Out of sync experiences are very disturbing (as 
the delay in speech in intercontinental phone calls). 
The concept timing refers to how events are spaced in time. In a 
second step we can think of timing as the adjustment of body move-
ments to environmental events and environmental structure (as the 
timing of a downhill skier is adjusted to the gates). Obviously there 
is timing between the body and the music structure. Let me present 
some arguments that this is the case: 
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1. Music makes us move. One of the main functions of music 
is to produce and support body movement. We can see 
this from work songs to gym work out, from ancient rituals 
to break dance. 
2. Listeners move, not only to the rhythm but sometimes 
even to the melodic “gestures”. Although there is no obvi-
ous direction of melody movement, most listeners feel di-
rections in music. When the melody is moving “upwards” 
or “downwards” you get a feeling of spatial direction. 
3. We can perceive the contour of the gesture depending on 
how it is played: legato, staccato - as smooth or uneven. 
4. We can perceive the distance between the notes: “small 
steps” or “giant steps”. 
5. The music/movement connection is used in film music 
(Bryngelsson 2006)72. 
6. We use, as can be seen above, body metaphors in our de-
scription of music. This indicates that we can perceive mu-
sic with the body schema as a frame of reference. 
7. Most music, even classical, is derived from dance styles. 
There is a reciprocal relation between music and dancing. 
Not only are dance movements adapted to music but the 
music is adapted to dance movements. Thus music is 
adapted to the human body – to its moving potential. We 
sense this movement pattern when we hear a gavotte or a 
samba, even if we are just vaguely familiar with these 
dance styles. 
Why does music make us move? Music listening and even imagining 
engages pre-motor centres in the brain. Researchers of movement 
such as Berthoz (2000) take an interest in synergy effects – the cou-
pling of movement commands to perceived sequences.  
                                           
72  Bryngelsson, P. (2006) Filmmusik – det komponerade miraklet. Liber, Malmö 
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The other side of this coin is that music itself is movement. A mel-
ody moves upwards or downwards, moves in steps or as a gesture. 
Do we perceive music visually – as a spatial structure? Some people 
do. This question will be treated in Chapter 4. 
Are the demand/telos/affordance aspects applicable to music per-
ception? Can we talk about a situation understanding? At first sight 
we do not seem to have a strong case. Music, as well as other aes-
thetic art forms, does not have any obvious survival value. It is not 
in any obvious sense demanding anything from us; it does not afford 
any obvious use or present us to a situation with any obvious goal 
understanding. This problem is reflected in the variety of develop-
mental explanations of why we have music. If music is inviting us to 
anything, it is an “Aufforderung zum Tanz” (invitation to dance), or 
more generally an invitation to move. But what is the developmen-
tal explanation? 
There is a possible answer to this question. As stated in the intro-
duction, music can been considered a target domain – a composite 
of source domains. These source domains have survival value. This 
simply means that we enjoy music with a perception apparatus “de-
signed” for basic use purposes. 
Form & content 
As stated in the introduction, the formalism contra representation (of 
content) debate has been a watershed in the philosophy of music. In 
order to connect this thesis to the debate, I will make an effort to 
discuss perception and meaning in form/content terms. How do form 
and representation relate to perception and meaning? 
An influential understanding of form and content was presented by 
the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev in 1943 (Hjelmslev 1993). Lin-
guists separate the semiotic side from prosody in language. While 
semiotics in language is the symbolic relation between the words 
and their denotation, prosody is principally the melodic quality of 
the sentence – the expressive delivery. What is form and what is 
content here? Word sequences are forms and so is prosody. While 
words represent the content in the sense of what the speaker wants 
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to communicate, the prosodic expression carries information about 
identity, accent and background of the speaker. And what is more, 
prosodic expression reveals emotion, intention, style and personality. 
We even judge if the information is trustworthy by the way it is 
delivered. So, both word sequences and prosody carry information.  
Hjelmslev must have thought of this when he stated that content 
and expression generate two kinds of form in speech – form of con-
tent and form of expression. But, and this is the point, since a sen-
tence objectively can have only one form, Hjelmslev must have re-
ferred to form as the form subjectively perceived. Otherwise it is 
hard to defend that there would be two forms. 
If we take form to mean the form as perceived by a subject, 
Hjelmslev’s proposal can be interpreted according to what has previ-
ously been said about perception and meaning. If we try to under-
stand what someone is telling us, the word sequence will be at-
tended to, while the prosody remains unattended to. But, if we 
choose to focus our attention on the information carried by the ex-
pression, the prosody will be attended to while the sequence of the 
words will remain unattended to. The figure and ground will be 
reversed. Just as in the Gestalt pictures this is due to the information 
implied. Thus two different forms can be derived. Since there are 
two kinds of content here, Hjelmslev’s categorization is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. For this reason I would specify that form of content is 
form of semiotic content and form of expression is form of expressive 
content. I propose that this can be generalized to the statement that 
form is content dependent. This means that we do not only judge the 
content from the form, but also that we implicitly judge the form 
from the content. Form and content presuppose each other. 
A sign is something, which stands for something to somebody 
(Peirce 1931: Vol. 2 § 228)73. As stated before the meaning can be 
implicit or explicit in the perception. As I have already stated: If the 
information is implicit in the form, form and content cannot be sepa-
rated. The form cannot stand for something to the observer. Under 
these premises there is no representation – the content is perceived 
                                           
73  Peirce, C.S. (1931–58) Collected Papers. (Eds. C. Hartshorn, P. Weiss & A.W. 
Burks). Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass  
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as form. I intend to show that this is largely the case with music. 
This is, to talk with Peter Kivy, enhanced formalism. 
My understanding of form in music is a recognizable musical struc-
ture, since some sort of recognition is needed to perceive it. And 
the content in music is the implicit or explicit understanding that 
makes the musical structure recognizable. 
According to this theory the perception of music is not in every-
day listening an interpretative process where we draw conclusions 
about the content from the form. 
Imagery 
Imagery traditionally refers to the phenomenon that the brain can 
produce images or sounds without external input. It is a “quasi-
perceptual experience”, meaning that it resembles perception. Most 
people have this experience. As we take a walk, a melody can pre-
sent itself. It rings in your head. How does this work? 
Thomas (1999)74 offers an intriguing theory. Illusion, Thomas ar-
gues, can be said to be the same thing as imagination. Imagination 
is a wide term with a long history in the literature of philosophy. It 
has become a somewhat vague concept during this journey. 
Imagination can be triggered by events in our surrounding. We 
imagine what we see. This means that we take it to be this or that. 
We imagine consequences, and we imagine the intention of the 
other. It is a situation understanding. 
Imagination can also be triggered by memories. We stage situa-
tions and imagine: What if this or that would happen. It is a play 
with possibilities and possible outcomes. Imagination thus prepares 
us for eventualities. 
Thomas sees imagination as the production of imagery. His under-
standing of imagery entails a continuum from seeing as to clear-cut 
imagery. Seeing as is an implicit interpretation of the input whereas 
                                           
74  Thomas, N. (1999) Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? An active 
perception approach to conscious mental content. Cognitive Science. Vol. 23. No 2. 
207–245 
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clear-cut imagery is a “perception” right out of the blue. The idea of 
a continuum makes imagery an agent in the perception process. 
It has been experimentally shown that imagery actually intervenes 
with perceptive organs. Efferent (outgoing) fibres from the brain to 
the retina provoke retinal reactions (Repérant et al. 1989)75. The 
efferent fibres comprise about 8% of the optic nerve. Likewise effer-
ent fibres from the brain to the ear make the hair cells move (Dallos 
1992)76. This indicates that we actually experience imagery with our 
sensory organs. Predictions guide the attention and affect the sensi-
tivity of the auditory system (Klapuri 2001). 
Imagined objects thus may be quite real. In fact we handle im-
agery much the same way we handle real objects. Thus an inner 
image of a cube can be rotated (Shepard & Metzler 1971)77. An in-
ner image of a page can be scanned across (Kosslyn 1973)78. In-
specting mental images, subjects find large details quicker than small 
ones (Kosslyn 1975)79. The time required for performing imagined 
acts is correlated to the time required for performing these acts in 
vivo. Marc Jeannerod points out that the brain areas activated by 
perception and imagery overlap: 
[m]ental images, at least in the visual modality, rely on the same 
neural substrate as the perceptual images that are generated during 
normal perception. …motor imagery pertains to motor physiology 
in the same way as visual imagery pertains to visual physiology… 
motor images must also be considered to be functionally related to 
the imagined movement. (Jeannerod 1994)80 
                                           
75  Repérant, J., Miceli, D., Vesselkin, N.P. & Molotchnikoff, S. (1989) The centrifugal 
visual system of vertebrates: A century old research reviewed. International Re-
view of Cytology. Vol. 118. 115–171  
76  Dallos, P. (1992) The active cochlea. Journal of Neuroscience. Vol. 12. No12. 
4575–4585 
77  Sheppard, R.N. & Metzler, J. (1971) Mental rotation of three-dimensional objects. 
Science. Vol. 171, No. 972. 701–703 
78  Kosslyn, S.M. (1973) Scanning visual images: Some structural implications. Percep-
tion and Psychophysics. Vol. 14. No 1. 90–94  
79  Kosslyn, S.M. (1975) Information representation in visual images. Cognitive Psy-
chology. No 7. 341–370 
80  Jeannerod, M. (1994) The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention 
and imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Vol. 17. No 2. 187–245 
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A convincing example of the connection between imagery and mo-
tor functions can be fetched from the field of sport:  Yue and Cole 
(1992) compared the increase in muscular strength produced by 
actual training (repeated maximal isometric contractions) and by 
mental training (imagining the same effortful contractions). In both 
conditions, the maximal force produced by the trained muscles in-
creased significantly (by 30% and 22%, respectively). 
The perception-action theorist Ulrich Neisser has clamed that per-
ception can be thought of as a cyclical process (Neisser 1976)81. It 
has been suggested that this process is a “hypothesis fitting” of 
“proposals” made by the brain of what we are actually seeing 
(Marcel 1983)82. Seeing something as something then becomes 
following such a proposal. The idea is that the brain provides the 
subject with an idea – a hypothesis – and completes the lack of 
incoming information with its own information about this 
hypothetical thing. This theory can no doubt be criticized for 
intellectualism. Of course the brain does not in any conscious way 
test hypotheses or makes proposals. I propose another metaphor that 
describes this better. 
   Let us say that the police have secured a fingerprint at a crime 
scene and that this print is incomplete. The police will run the sam-
ple against a data bank of fingerprints. The computer comes up with 
a possible match. The screen shows the matching fingerprint and 
adds relevant data, such as the identity of the person and her crimi-
nal record. In this allegory the computer is the brain, the sample is 
the environmental input, the data bank is the memory, the program 
is the implicit processing and the screen is the consciousness. The 
information on the screen is the imagery. Contrary to the input and 
the program this information is user-friendly. This and only this is 
what actually will be experienced. Nothing else in this process is 
experienced. It is in this sense we can talk about a “proposal” or a 
“hypothesis”. And it is in this sense we can talk about imagery as a 
prediction. The fact that imagery, when more information is avail-
able, can be proven right or wrong shows that we are dealing with 
                                           
81  Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and Reality. Freeman, San Francisco 
82  Marcel, A.J. (1983) Conscious and unconscious perception: An approach to the 
relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes. Cognitive 
Psychology. Vol. 15. 238–300 
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implicit expectancies and predictions. Since we are not aware of the 
sensory input, there is no way to notice that the observation partly is 
made up of information that is not actually on the scene. 
Imagery thus presents us to an intelligible user-friendly world. 
This way of looking at imagery is somewhat contradictory to the 
definition that it is an image (sound) produced by the brain without 
external input.  But it is consistent with Thomas’ understanding of 
imagery as a continuum from clear-cut imagery to seeing as. If there 
is no external input the imagery usually gets weak but if there is an 
external input it becomes a strong imagination of what it is we are 
facing. Imagery thus fills out lacking information. This is called com-
plementary imagination. Let me give a few examples! 
1. When we listen to speech we do not pick up every sylla-
ble, yet these syllables are heard. The phenomenon is 
called auditory restoration (Warren 1970)83. 
2. Visual restoration can also be exemplified. In the eye we 
have a blind spot, where the optic nerve leaves the eye, 
but we are not aware of this blindness; the brain fills in 
predicted content. This is called illusory continuity. 
3. When a continuous sound is broken, the break, if short, 
will not be heard (Klapuri 2001). 
4. The missing fundamental. A tone from an instrument con-
sists of the tone played (the fundamental Fo) and the over-
tones, which gives the tone its timbre. Even if the funda-
mental is masked, listeners actually hear it. The explanation 
is that we are able to draw an implicit conclusion about the 
fundamental from the overtone series. 
The relevance of imagery to form now becomes obvious. The brain 
approaches the archive of stored information. Stored information 
(memories) can be retrieved by neuronal pathways from sensory 
input to association cortex. These pathways develop through priming 
                                           
83  Warren R.M. (1970) Perceptual restoration of missing speech sounds. Science, 23, 
Vol. 167. No. 3917. 392–393 
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(perceptual learning). Priming causes change in the firing potential 
of the neurons. 
If we have sensory input not fitting the suggestion, the librarian 
runs back to consult another archive. The chosen information is the 
“hypothesis” of what we hear. A form will appear. This means that 
Hjelmslev was right. Form in an absolutely concrete sense is made 
up by content. Imagery is content perceived as form. 
The difficulty with the concept form is the same as the with the 
concept internal model. It is too static. We have to include the time 
factor. This is exactly what Peter Kivy did when he suggested that 
enhanced formalism implies a temporal topography (Kivy 1989) – 
music as a moving or unfolding form. The brain has learnt from 
various situations that if this happens (cue) one of the allowed alter-
natives will follow (rule). As we move forward in a real time per-
ception the felt continuance becomes a new cue for the next rule 
governed continuance. Thus imagery unfolds like falling dominos. 
For this reason the concept sensory-motor schema (Deleuze 1989)84 
may serve as the neurological counterpart to the temporal topogra-
phy. 
Music imagery 
Even if imagery is involved in all perception and can be found for 
all modalities, music imagery is probably the most evident kind. It is 
a well known phenomenon experienced not only by anybody in-
volved in music, but by most listeners that we “hear” the expected 
outcome in music. Yet it is a new area of research. Pioneering work 
by Robert Zatorre and Andrea Halpern in the mid 90s has been fol-
lowed by others. 
The most obvious example of music imagery occurs when music is 
suddenly muted. We will still “hear” the expected continuation. A 
variant of this is that we feel the beginning of the next song on a 
CD as the foregoing song is ending. 
Some people can hear melodies in their heads even if there is no 
external source. Here are some examples of music imagery: 
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1. A musician can rehearse a concert in his mind, as Horowitz 
and Rubinstein are reported to have done (Meister et al. 
2003)85. This shows that it is possible to sequence and cue 
a whole concert to a real time inner performed and heard 
experience. The musician mentally moves through the 
piece, projecting herself into the music structure. Just as 
we can imagine following a geographical path, we can 
imagine following a piece of music sequence by sequence. 
Meistner found in an fMRI study that such rehearsal en-
gaged just about the same areas as the actual playing, with 
the exception of primary motor cortex (which could be 
expected since no actual movements are performed). Pre-
motor areas however are activated. 
2. The type of imagery described in the Horowitz and Rubin-
stein cases concerns a fixed material. But in my experience 
there is also another variant of imagery, a creative variant 
that makes people “hear” new melodies. The melodies 
heard are predictions and these predictions are cues to 
new predictions. This way, whole pieces of new music 
present themselves. Unknowingly I have always used this 
in my own composing. I work in real time. I follow the 
“proposals” from my inner hearing. When I come to a stop, 
I go back to the beginning and, so to say, start the mental 
tape again: “replay”. When I reach the stop, the continu-
ance usually presents itself. Musicians asked to explain how 
they compose often say: “It just comes to me”. Sometimes 
they refer to God or to some kind of antenna. A composer 
may perceive herself as a medium. They just pick up what 
is presented to them. Composing is to a large extent intui-
tive. 
3. We tend to group sounds into musical structures (Gestalts). 
When we listen to the ticking of a clock, we might start 
imagining a melody. If we hear random beats, our brains 
                                           
85  Meister, I.G., Krings, T., Foltys, H., Boroojerdi, B., Müller, M., Töpper, R. & Thron, 
A. (2004) Playing piano in the mind—an fMRI study on music imagery and perform-
ance in pianists. Cognitive Brain Research. Vol. 19. No 3. 219–228 
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suggest rhythmic groupings. Thus non melodic sounds and 
random sounds can be perceived as music because the 
brain “suggests” it is. 
4. There is a strong transfer effect between lyrics and melody 
(Ullén et al. 2005)86. Words cue for melody and melody 
cues for words. You can test this by reading Happy Birth-
day rhythmically and see if you “hear” the melody. Then 
sing the melody and see if you “hear” the lyrics. It is 
impossible to avoid this implicitly learned connection. 
5. Rehearsing the finger movements on a table, triggers music 
imagery (Repp 2001)87. 
6. Pietro Rizzo, Chief Conductor for the Gothenburg Opera 
says in an interview that when he reads the score, he 
hears the music in his head. The violins, the timpani, the 
trumpets – every instrument and all voices sound exactly 
as he wants them to – “…then, as I approach the orchestra, 
I listen to their playing and compare that to what I hear in 
my head. I register where it differs and try to change that” 
(Rizzo 2006)88. 
As we have seen from these examples music imagery can be clear-
cut imagination as when we “hear” music in our heads without an 
external source, it can be elicited by sounding music, by lyrics, 
movements, and in the case of experienced musicians it can be trig-
gered by music scores. 
                                           
86  Ullén, F., Bengtsson, S., Ehrsson, H.H. & Forsberg, H. (2005) Neural control of 
rhythmic sequences.  Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 1060. The 
Neurosciences and Music II: From Perception to Performance (Eds. G. Avanzini, S. 
Koelsch, L. Lopez & M. Manjo)Vol. 1060.  368–376 
87  Repp, B.H. (2001) Effects of music perception and imagery on sensorimotor syn-
chronization with complex timing patterns. The Biological Foundations of Music. (Eds. 
R.J. Zatorre & I. Peretz) Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 
Vol. 930, June. 409–411 
88  Rizzo, P. (2006) Göteborgs-Posten, October 14 
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Imagery is the only way we are able to grasp structure in music 
(Halpern 2001)89. We cannot embrace the whole structure in one 
thought, or jump directly from one place in the music to another. 
We can only imagine it as played – in the same time direction and 
in approximate real time. 
Music imagery implies activation not only of auditory centres but 
of motor centres such as the supplementary motor area (SMA) in-
volved in motor planning (Halpern 2001) and the sensorimotor cor-
tex (Schürman et al. 2002)90. This indicates that we not only imagine 
the sound of music but to some extent even the actual performing. 
Schürman, Raij, Fujiki & Hari (2001) provoked music imagery by 
having trained musicians read visual notes. Magnetoencephalography 
revealed that first occipital areas were activated and then the audi-
tory association cortex. Finally the sensorimotor cortex combined 
with the inferotemporal association cortex. A possible interpretation 
is that note reading leads to a complex temporal imagery including 
hearing these notes sound, followed (within milliseconds) by latent 
motor playing impulses and visual associations to the sight of the 
keys of the instrument. 
The observation that pre-motor centres are involved opens up for 
an interpretation of music imagery. Consider the following case: A 
subject whose oculo-motor muscles are paralysed sees objects mov-
ing to his left whenever she believes she is turning her eyes to the 
left (Merleau-Ponty 1996). This qualifies as imagery since she expe-
riences something that is not grounded in sensory input. My 
interpretation is that the pre-motor centre is activated by her 
intention to look to the left. The motor schema causes the imagery 
and makes her believe that she is moving her eyes. 
Can this be applied to music perception? Can imagery emanate 
from movement schemas triggered by actual or recalled music? As 
the music proceeds, the body takes part actively or latently. I am 
referring exactly to those pre-motor commands noted at brain scans 
                                           
89  Halpern, A.R. (2001) Cerebral substrates of musical imagery. The Biological Foun-
dations of Music. (Eds. R.J. Zatorre & I. Peretz) The Annals of the New York Academy 
of Science. Vol. 930. 179–192 
90  Schurmann, M., Raij, T., Fujiki, N. & Hari, R. (2002) Mind’s ear in a musician: where 
and when in the Brain. NeuroImage. Vol. 16.  No 2. 434–440  
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of music perception as well as of music imagery. This pre-motor 
activity can theoretically produce expectations that are perceived as 
actual sounds. If so, imagery is a procedural phenomenon. We 
would not have to remember how the music develops; we just have 
to follow the movement schema. Less strongly formulated I suggest 
that there is a reciprocal relation between imagery and pre-motor 
activity. This would explain why we can only remember music in 
real time sequences. This argumentation supports the suggestion that 
music memory is a sensory-motor schema. 
The connection to movement suggests that we latently imitate the 
movement of the music and that this makes us perceive form. Fa-
miliarity to the music might be a condition for our ability to imitate, 
since familiarity creates expectations (of the next tone/move). Fa-
miliarity demands perceptual knowledge and internal models. This is 
implicit content. This indicates that the link from content to per-
ceived form in music is movement. This theme will be developed 
further. 
Perspectives 
I have argued that the same form can be perceived differently de-
pending on the content (meaning). How is this information selected? 
There is an extraordinary amount of interconnectivity between the 
thalamus and the cortex that allows the cortex, particularly the 
forebrain, to regulate the flow of information to itself…, so that it 
can focus on what it needs to know about from moment to mo-
ment. (Sakharov, Davydov & Pavlygina 2005)91 
This quote expresses that the nervous system makes a situation-
adjusted selection of relevant information. This flow constitutes the 
frame of reference. The body seems to “strategically choose” a frame 
of reference depending on the task (Bertholz 2000). The frame of 
reference implies a perspective. In the concrete understanding a per-
spective is taken from a specified landmark. Depending on the 
                                           
91  Sakharov, D.S., Davydov, V.I. & Pavlygina, R.A. (2005) Intercentral relations of the 
human EEG during listening to music. Human Physiology. Vol. 31. No 4. 392–397  
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landmark, some information becomes relevant and some becomes 
irrelevant. This process creates a situation understanding. Every per-
ception thus depends on the perspective. 
The choice of perspective is mostly an implicit act, although it can 
be voluntary. For example we usually see the moon as a flat object, 
but we can purposely choose to perceive it in three dimensions. We 
do that by thinking of the fact that the moon is a sphere. Thus we 
actualize a frame of reference by will. But once we do that the flat-
ness totally disappears. We are just presented with one proposal at a 
time. The frame generates the proposal (imagery) of what we are 
facing. This explains the sudden shifts in perception. 
The own body is the landmark that constitutes the egocentric per-
spective. From this viewpoint we perceive objects in an egocentric 
space. The body schema is the frame of reference. Merleau-Ponty 
(1996) pointed out that the perception of distance is perspective 
dependent. From the perspective of the observer’s own body dis-
tance can be length, breadth and height. We have an implicit sense 
of the vertical, the horizontal and depth as separate entities. We use 
different muscles for eye movements and head movements to esti-
mate height, breadth and depth. From the egocentric landmark, 
these distances are not analogous dimensions. Thus the egocentric 
perspective creates a three dimensional room – the ground in which 
objects may be perceived. 
Allocentric perspectives (lat. lóco: place, Eng: allocate: place out) 
means as the name indicates that the landmark is allocated to a point 
in the environment. The allocentric perspective maps the terrain, 
since it relates points in the terrain to each other. This map becomes 
the frame of reference. 
Landmarks located in other persons constitute relative perspectives. 
The relative perspective implies the subject’s ability to project into 
someone else’s position. The subject imagines a situation from some-
one else’s landmark. The discovery of mirror neurons is relevant for 
the understanding of this perspective. The suggested mechanism is 
identification through implicit bodily imitation. We experience the 
other through our own bodies. We will come back to this. 
I intend to examine music perception from these perspectives. 
However I will divide the relative perspective into three parts: the 
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dyadic perspective implies a frame of reference consisting of the 
information space shared by two individuals, the tribal perspective 
implies a frame of reference shared by an interacting group, and the 
cultural perspective implies a frame of reference shared by a cul-
ture. In the last case the knowledge is coded. 
The tribal perspective is constituted by the interaction of the 
group. This creates a shared perception and thus shared experiences 
and a shared phenomenal field that is quite distinct from those of the 
individual perspectives. As the group interacts it co-perceives itself 
as an interactive identity. This is the tribe. When this group becomes 
big enough it can no longer interact but it can still communicate 
with cultural codes. I will discuss these two perspectives in the 
chapters called Tribal Rites and Contemplating Music. 
When we take a perspective we integrate it with the egocentric 
perspective. This means even if I take an allocentric perspective, 
e.g. the landscape as seen from a tree, I have to imagine myself 
standing at the tree. In the dyadic perspective, I imagine myself in 
the others position.  In the case of the tribal perspective I perceive 
myself as an interacting member of something bigger than myself 
namely the group. To take the cultural perspective is to relate 
events to cultural (declarative) knowledge. 
This is a rough classification. In fact each of these five perspectives 
entails a range of possibilities. For example any other person can be 
the other in the dyadic perspective; every choice of viewpoint in 
the terrain generates a specific allocentric perspective; any group in 
which we interact and any culture in a multicultural society provides 
specific perspectives. The perspectives listed are strictly speaking 
rather classes of perspectives than perspectives. However, I will not 
burden the text with this reservation unless necessary in the follow-
ing presentation. Thus we have the following definitions: 
1. The egocentric perspective: the landmark is the listener’s 
body and the frame of reference is the body schema and 
the perceptual ground. 
2. The allocentric perspective: the landmark is a point in the 
terrain. The frame of reference is the mapped structure. 
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3. The dyadic perspective: the landmark is the other and the 
frame of reference is the information space shared by two 
individuals. 
4. The tribal perspective: the frame of reference is the infor-
mation space shared by a group. 
5. The cultural perspective: the frame of reference is cultur-
ally coded knowledge. 
Needless to say the mechanism of taking perspectives is economiz-
ing. We do not have to address everything simultaneously. But also, 
and this is even more important, it structures our perception and 
makes it more useable, since a perspective is a selection of informa-
tion for the situation at hand. We can see how different perspectives 
make the world accessible. Let me just hint at some implications: 
The egocentric perspective entails what I perceive from my body. 
The allocentric perspective maps the environment. The dyadic per-
spective makes it possible to identify with the other. It opens up the 
possibility of spontaneous emotional connecting. The tribal perspec-
tive takes in the extended family. It is created in interaction with 
the group. And the cultural perspective depends on cognitive tools 
to communicate thoughts and knowledge. 
As we do these operations we see that the concepts “landmark” 
and “ground” are replaced. “Landmark” is replaced by “point of 
view” in a metaphorical sense and “ground” is replaced by “implying 
this contextual understanding”. If we were to define the word per-
spective it would be: as perceived in a frame of reference. The 
frame of reference may be the phenomenal ground but it could also 
be the mental field (memories and internal models) and the state of 
the body or combinations thereof. 
The chosen perspectives reflect that we can understand something 
with reference to our own bodily, to shared knowledge (as the 
shared experience of married couple), to the surrounding, to tribal 
knowledge (as the shared world of a football team) or to our culture 
with a common language and a common media.  
In the following I will discuss the implications of perspective for 
imagery, form & content, perception, figure & ground, time, space 
and finally – music. 
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Perspective & imagery 
Experimental evidence has shown that recognition of objects placed 
on a table is better if the subject has the opportunity to move around 
the table compared to if the table is rotated (Simons & Wang 
1998)92; (Wang & Simons 1999)93. This has been taken as evidence 
of a motor program, updating place from the active motion of the 
subject. But, the same results were achieved if the experiment was 
performed in virtual reality (Bülthoff & Christou 1999)94. The subjects 
were now shown film sequences from a subjective camera. In a 
following experiment the subjects just had to imagine that they were 
moving. Compared with the rotating table both subjective camera 
and pure imagination showed to be quicker and more accurate for 
recognition of the objects on the table. In this case there is no obvi-
ous motor component (Wraga, Creem & Proffitt 2000)95. 
I believe that this has to be understood in light of the fact that 
clear-cut imagery is neurologically close to perception. As men-
tioned before there are indications that pre-motor areas are active 
during imagination. If we see a film taken by subjective camera or 
just imagine that we move around the table, pre-motor activity 
ought to follow. This pre-motor program is activated as we recall the 
situation. The experiments imply that imagination is the integration 
of long-term memory of allocentric perspective (mapping of the 
environment) to egocentric perspective. It is as if I was moving in a 
remembered landscape, perceiving that landscape from my own 
body. 
                                           
92  Simons, D.J. & Wang, R.F. (1998) Perceiving real-world viewpoint changes. Psy-
chological Science. Vol. 9. No 4. 315–320 
93  Wang, R.F. & Simons, D.J. (1999). Active and passive scene recognition across 
views. Cognition, Vol. 70. No 2. 191–210 
94  Bülthoff, H.H. & Christou, C.G. (2000) The perception of spatial layout in a virtual 
world biologically motivated computer vision: First IEEE International Workshop, 
BMCV Seoul, Korea, May, Proceedings, Vol. 811. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. 10–
19 
95  Wraga, M., Creem, S.H. & Proffitt, D.R. (2000) Updating displays after imagined 
object and viewer rotations. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory 
and Cognition. Vol. 26. No 1. 151–68 
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It has been shown that hippocampal neurons indicating place are 
activated by imagined visual stimuli (Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 
2000)96. This supports the idea of allocentric integration in egocentric 
perspective. It is like moving in a dream in the sense that the dream 
consists of memories that are always perceived from an egocentric 
vantage point. In an overview of recent research, Neil Burgess 
(2006)97 concludes that “egocentric and allocentric representations 
exist in parallel, and combine to support behaviour according to the 
task”. Burgess speculates that the egocentric-allocentric division fol-
lows the neurological distinction between a dorsal and a ventral 
processing stream. Burgess then states that “the egocentric nature of 
perception and imagery” (meaning that we always perceive every-
thing and imagine everything from our own location) requires that 
input to and output from allocentric systems are mediated by tran-
sient egocentric representations. 
It should be noted that corresponding dorsal and ventral streams 
have been identified for hearing. For this reason I propose that Bur-
gess’ theory can be generalized to hearing and furthermore that it 
can be generalized to all perspectives. Imagination thus is to inte-
grate any frame of reference with the egocentric frame of reference. 
To put it simply: I live this information (perspective representations) 
as if I was there. This fits with Thomas’ theory. According to Thomas, 
imagination is an as if understanding. What I perceive in this frame 
of reference is imagery, because the situation is imagined. 
An example: Albert Einstein exercised the imagination what it 
would be like to travel on a beam of light. This means that he inte-
grated knowledge from physics (cultural perspective) with his ego-
centric (as seen from his own body) perspective. This led him to the 
theory of relativity, which considers the very fact that the world is 
perceived differently from different perspectives. It is relative. 
This calls for a specification of our understanding of perspective 
taking. To take a perspective is to integrate another perspective with the 
egocentric perspective. To take a dyadic perspective thus is to see the 
                                           
96  Kreiman, G., Koch, C., & Fried, I. (2000). Imagery neurons in the human brain. 
Nature. Vol. 408. No 6810. 357–361 
97  Burgess, N. (2006) Spatial memory: how egocentric and allocentric combine. 
Trends in Cognitive Science. Vol 10. No 12. 551–557  
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world as if I were in your shoes. But not quite, since I am aware of 
my own position and since I am able to separate the inner events 
from environmental events. I do not lose track of my original posi-
tion. Taking another perspective is therefore a co-perception of two 
perspectives – my own and that of the other’s. 
There are different levels of imagery. Sometimes imagery com-
pletes the perception with details that can be proved nonexistent 
and sometimes imagery is so vivid that it is confused with reality 
(hallucination). Thomas suggests a continuum. I suggest that we take 
one step further: Imagery is what we consciously perceive. Always. 
Perception, imagery and hallucination are just different degrees on a 
continuum of correspondence with environmental events. The in-
formation that appears on the screen of consciousness is the product 
of processed sensory input and implicit information selected by the 
perspective. I suggest that this is the function of imagery and the 
normal case. Clear-cut imagery is an astonishing side effect. In this 
case only, the inner world (clear-cut imagery) can be separated 
from the perception of the environmental world. Here we have two 
perspectives in conflict. Somehow we seem to recognize that. This is 
evident when we carry out an imagined conversation – an inner 
dialogue. If I lose track of my own landmark – the other becomes a 
real presence. This is a hallucination. 
Perspective, form & content 
The form of an island is different from different ships. And then 
again, the form is objectively constant. Objectivity expressed in per-
spective terms is intersubjectivity indicating the sum of several ego-
centric perspectives. If the information from the ships is integrated, a 
constant form of the island could be assembled. The same constant 
form would appear if one navigator moves around the island gather-
ing information from different viewpoints. According to perception-
action theory this activity of moving around as well as handling the 
object – picking it up and using it – is how we learn to perceive. As 
we view something, we implicitly know what it looks like from 
another direction. We have a sense of the hidden side of a cup, 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
 
70 
even if we cannot see it from where we happen to be. We feel that 
the hidden side is rounded. We can imagine this because we have 
picked up the cup and used it in the past. 
A ring can be seen both as an oval and as a circle. In fact we have 
a difficulty to see it is as an oval even if the retinal input is oval. If 
someone asks about the form, very few would say that it is oval. But 
consider this: The ring is oval from an infinite amount of perspec-
tives and round only from two. If somebody asks about the size of 
the ring, you would not say that it is smaller when it is seen from a 
distance. This is because the ring is perceived in a three dimensional 
space. The brain implicitly compensates for the smaller sensory in-
put. The use aspect is also relevant for the perception of form and 
size. In the case of the ring, we have memories of putting a ring on 
the finger. This is the use aspect afforded by the object. It cannot 
very well be oval if it is to fit on the finger, can it? Neither can it 
suddenly be small. In short: Probing expands the frame of reference 
and contributes to the constancy of the perception of the ring. In 
James Gibson’s terms the ring becomes invariant. 
 In some respects we can perceive from the very start. Newborns 
can imitate tongue and mouth movements (Meltzoff & Moore 
1997)98. They also spend more time watching pictures of faces than 
abstract pictures (Gelman & Opfer 2002)99. This indicates that babies 
actually have some kind of meaningful perception. Thus memory 
does not seem to be implicated in all perception. We are obviously 
pre-wired with a program for perception and then we develop this 
program for the rest of our lives. There are in fact a number of indi-
cations (in relation to the mother for example) that indicate that ba-
bies react to situations. Some of these fade away as the child grows 
older (such as the baby’s ability to keep the breath under water). 
                                           
98  Meltzoff, A.N., & Moore, M.K. (1997). Explaining facial imitation: theoretical model. 
Early Development and Parenting. Vol. 6. 179–192 
99  Gelman, S. & Opfer J.E. (2002). Development of the Animate-Inanimate Distinc-
tion. Blackwell Handbook of Cognitive Development (Ed. U. Goswami). Blackwell 
Publishing. Oxford, UK.151–166 
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Perspective & perception 
Merleau-Ponty was faithful to a subjective experience in his under-
standing of perception: This is how I perceive it from here. He 
treated perception as a here and now lived experience that could 
not be broken down in parts whereas his so called intellectualist 
opponents confused this direct experience with scientific declarative 
knowledge in their discussion of perception. Merleau-Ponty argued 
that all knowledge of the world originally emanates from this exact 
moment of direct perception. In a way, both sides were right. It 
takes a perspective theory to see this. Merleau-Ponty’s was right in 
his analysis of perception if we consider the conscious side of per-
ception. But if we consider the preconscious side, perception is im-
plicitly coloured by phenomenal as well as declarative memories. 
Merleau-Ponty and the intellectualists treated perception from two 
different perspectives and both sides failed to see it from the other’s 
point of view. 
My point is that perception is perspective dependent. As men-
tioned early in this chapter, A. D. Smith has argued that perception 
places the object in a three dimensional room. This connects to the 
statement made above that perspective defines form. But since the 
frame of reference encompasses not only the ground but also the 
mental field and the state of the body Smith’s conclusion could be 
seen as a special case, where the frame of reference is limited to 
spatial dimensions. 
The proposition that perception is perspective dependent is my 
motivation for a perspective theory of music perception. It is, I sug-
gest, the entrance to enhanced formalism. 
Figure and ground in perspectives 
As noted earlier in this chapter, imagery is a “proposal” by the brain, 
a “hypothesis” of what we are facing. The figure presented to con-
sciousness is the winning hypothesis: I see this. 
To shift the attention from the figure to something in the back-
ground is to shift perspective. The figure is attended whereas the 
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ground is unattended and becomes frame of reference. The line 
outlining a figure in a drawing is in fact the line separating attended 
information from unattended information. This coincides with invari-
ance (constancy) contra variance – the perception of a horse, say, 
against a moving background, if we follow the horse with our gaze. 
The figure is understood in relation to the ground. As already 
pointed out, figure and ground make up the phenomenal field. In 
this case the ground is the frame of reference. It makes us see the 
object as something situated in a three dimensional space. But since 
the three dimensional room is mental (the implicit understanding of 
the space as three dimensional) and since this mental representation 
is based on the body schema, the ground is just one aspect of the 
“frame of reference”. The frame of reference is all information con-
tributing to the perception of the figure. Whereas the figure/ground 
constellation belongs to the phenomenal field, we are not necessar-
ily aware of all the information in the frame of reference. Let me 
summarize: 
1. The sensory field is the input to the sensory organs. 
2. The perceptual field is made up by perceptual processes 
on any level of consciousness. 
3. The phenomenal field is the perception of figure/ground. 
4. The frame of reference consists of any information in the 
perceptual field and the mental field of relevance to the 
figure. 
5. The figure/frame of reference constellation is the perspec-
tive. 
If we could not change perspectives, we would be mentally locked 
in action. We would not be able to listen to the radio, while we are 
cleaning the house or follow a conversation, while we are driving. 
But these examples also show something else. The very fact that we 
can drive or clean the house while we focus on something else im-
plies that although we do not attend to the ground, we can still per-
form in it accurately. This means that the background is pre-
attentively perceived and acted on. For instance we are able to 
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walk and take part in a conversation at the same time. Even if the 
terrain is difficult, we do not have to think about this. We do not 
take conscious decisions about how to compensate for up-
hill/downhill variations, about stepping over a stone, about avoiding 
colliding with meeting people, or about following the turns of the 
path. If we are totally preoccupied with our thoughts, we make 
slight mistakes because we act totally absentminded (Where are my 
glasses?). But we can implicitly feel hungry, make a meal and eat it 
while talking about perception-action theory. 
Applied to the fingerprint allegory above, this means that the po-
lice, according to the situation, choose a program (choose a perspec-
tive) which selects relevant information (frame of reference) but at 
the same time there may be other programs running in the com-
puter such as downloading new info from the internet, scanning for 
virus, sending and receiving emails etc. These background activities 
have nothing to do with the search for the fingerprint match. 
As long as these background processes proceed as expected, we 
do not have to attend to them. It is the mismatch that attracts atten-
tion. We are alerted (a pop up window on the screen of conscious-
ness). This way our attention is directed to unexpected events. We 
are mentally where the testing takes place. This is the vital place for 
awareness to be. 
Perception is a simultaneous capacity. As we perceive something 
consciously, we are able to perform various tasks – walk, wash up 
the dishes, windsurf, ski, use the right muscles for talking, and even 
play music. As can be seen from these examples, we have a capac-
ity to perform procedurally without paying attention to it. Since we 
are able to act, we must have perceived environmental information 
to act on. These perceptions may not be the figure of the perception 
and it does not even have to be ground if it has no relevance to the 
figure. Still it is perceived; otherwise we would not be able to react 
to mismatches. 
Now we have four levels of perception: 
1. Figure (phenomenally attended object). 
2. Ground (phenomenally conscious but unattended space in 
which the figure is situated). 
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3. Frame of reference (the ground + any information affecting 
the perception of the figure). 
4. The perceptual field (the figure, the frame of reference + 
information of no relevance to the figure, which might af-
fect the subject and guide procedural action). 
This is a rough sketch, but it serves to help us in the analysis of mu-
sic perception. As we shift perspective the perceived information 
takes new roles in this schema. 
Perspective & time 
Can time be perceived? Is not time a cultural invention, an abstrac-
tion from movement? The fact is that we do perceive duration. We 
react to deviations of expected durations (Mustovic et al. 2003)100. It 
is just the name for this that is cultural. 
The perception of time is perspective dependent. The main dis-
tinction is between the subjective perception of the present moment 
and the cultural understanding of time. 
There is an intentional aspect of perception, the prediction of the 
situation, which in turn entails direction – a sense of temporality. 
Edmund Husserl labelled this the intentional arc (Husserl 1969)101. 
The present moment is not just the edge between the past and the 
future. Husserl argued that the perceived now contains retention 
(the immediate past), presentation (the edge), and protention (the 
immediate expectation of the outcome of the situation). Daniel Stern 
(2004)102 calls this the present moment. It is the time span framing 
perception. This is important because in perception-action theory, 
perception is treated in this sense – as the present moment experi-
                                           
100  Mustovic, H., Scheffler, K., Di Salle, F., Esposito, F., Neuhoff, J.G., Hennig, J. & 
Seifritz, E. (2003) Temporal integration of sequential auditory events: silent period in 
sound pattern activates human planum temporale. Neuroimage. Vol. 20. No 2. 
429–434 
101  Husserl, E. (1991) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. 
Kluwer, Dordrecht  
102  Stern, D. (2004) The Present Moment. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 
London. 
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ence. This includes an experience of what we just lived and an an-
ticipation and intention based on what just happened. Since the per-
ceived moment has some expansion in time, we can perceive 
movements and actions – life as a process. The usual span of the 
present moment has been estimated to 2–4 seconds – the length of 
a breath and thus the length of a phrase. This time span is our win-
dow to life. It is the dividing line between experiencing the world 
directly (“live” and “on-line”) and indirectly as the world symbol-
ized, talked about or thought about in linguistic terms (the cultural 
perspective). There is a difference between the experience of living 
for five minutes as a moment-to-moment succession and the experi-
ence of thinking about the duration of five minutes. The first is phe-
nomenal and the second is cognitive. These are two perspectives of 
time. 
When challenged in physical activity that demands full concentra-
tion, such as playing tennis, we have to focus on the present mo-
ment. We merge with the activity. It is a here and now experience. 
This state has been labelled flow to denote a “state in which people 
are so involved that nothing else matters” (Csikszentmihaly 1990: 
4)103. Examples of activities generating flow are play, art, ritual, pag-
eantry, sports, music and making love. The self (the conscious 
thoughts of the self) is forlorn and the subject merges with the ac-
tion-perception (the music, the mountain climbing, the computer 
game etc.). With the reservation for the highly intellectual activity of 
chess playing, mentioned as an example by Csikszentmihaly, I 
would say that most of his descriptions fit the descriptions of proce-
dural perception-action activities. We seek these activities because of 
the pleasure to get totally absorbed which comes from focusing on 
the challenge at hand. We lose ourselves in a task that challenges 
our skills. We merge with the perception and the flow of time. It is 
the pleasure of the football player to juggle the ball, of a long dis-
tance skier to consume the landscape in five giant steps, of the 
windsurfer to plane, or the flamenco guitarist to execute an explo-
sive farruca. 
                                           
103  Csikszentmihályi, M. (1990) Flow – the psychology of optimal experience. Harper 
& Row Publishers, New York  
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Perspective & movement 
If you sit on a train at a railway station and another train passes the 
window, you may feel that your train is moving. However, when 
the train has passed the window, you realize that the station is still 
there. Now you change the frame of reference. This decides who is 
moving. You are tossed from a speed of 60 km an hour, say, to zero 
in a wink. This is a concrete example of perspective dependent per-
ception of movement. How do our five perspectives affect the per-
ception of movement? 
1. Egocentric perspective: If I move I will bring the frame of 
reference with me. This will make me invariant and the 
surrounding variant. This is less obvious if I walk, and 
more obvious if I go by car. This is the perspective James 
Gibson is investigating in The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception (Gibson 1986). 
2. In the allocentric perspective the landmark is allocated to 
the church, say.  This means that I perceive myself as vari-
ant (moving) in an invariant (static) structure. The church 
has the same size wherever I go. 
3. In the dyadic perspective I have a tendency to imitate – to 
synchronize my own movement with those of the other. 
As we walk side by side, I tend to adjust to your walking 
rhythm automatically. 
4. In the tribal perspective I perceive myself as one of the 
members of a group. My movements and my intentions 
and my actions are integrated (conjoined) in this group ac-
tivity. I tend to contribute to the achievement of common 
goals. 
5. In the cultural perspective movement is something thought 
or talked about. 
The fact that movement is perceived differently from perspective to 
perspective in combination with the depiction of music as a sensory-
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motor schema supports the idea of a perspective theory for music 
perception. 
Perspective & music 
Since the perspective is critical to the perception of movement and 
time, it is critical to the perception of music. If we did not take per-
spectives in music, we would be swamped by the flow of informa-
tion. Janata & Grafton (2003)104 have estimated that a music passage 
may consist of hundreds of thousands of elements that can be readily 
memorized and remembered. Since we cannot attend to more than 
a tiny fraction of this information at the same time, the brain has to 
choose a perspective. 
The perception of music usually refers to the case when music is 
in the focus of attention (figure), but I think that the other levels of 
perception – music as ground, music in the frame of reference and 
music in the perceptual field – are worth consideration: 
1. Music as figure of perception. This is the fraction of music 
that we are capable of attending to (usually the melody). 
In this case we can apply the five perspectives listed 
above. 
2. Music as ground. This is everything in the sounding music 
that we do not attend to, but are phenomenally aware of. 
We have two cases: A) The object attended to is musical, 
i.e. the harmony and the rhythm as ground to the melody. 
B) The object attended to is not musical. This is in a sense 
to perceive the world as if it was music. Examples: Silence 
in a musical context is a pause. Music could animate the 
landscape: “The Hills are Alive with the Sound of Music”. 
Since our concern in this investigation is music perception 
and not about the perception of non-musical objects, this 
option (2B) will not be further discussed. 
                                           
104  Janata, P. & Grafton, S.T. (2003) Swinging in the brain: shared neural substrates 
for behaviors related to sequencing and music. Nature Neuroscience. Vol. 6. 682–
687 
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3. Music in the mental field (internal models, musical memo-
ries, familiarity with the style). This creates expectations in 
the musical development. 
4. Music in the perceptual field. This is when the music does 
not have relevance to the attended task at hand i.e. read-
ing a book with background music. But we are still in-
clined to interact with it. ERP experiments (c.f. p. 38) show 
that music can be pre-attentively perceived (as when we 
read a book and wiggle the foot rhythmically to music). 
The four options in the model can be reduced to three. Since level 
2 and 3 are both frames of reference, we could state that music can 
be figure, frame of reference, or irrelevant to the perception of the 
figure. The last case demands that the figure is not musical.  
Do we really interact with unattended music? Yes, it is even possi-
ble to sing and play and think about something else. I know this 
because I have experienced that I can be distracted by the audience 
without getting lost in the performance. The knowledge how to play 
is, once it is learned, procedural. It is the knowledge of the body. 
Therefore it is not at odds with thinking. I have seen musicians who 
go on playing while they answer complex questions. The perform-
ance might even in some respects improve when the music is out of 
focus: 
In the conscious movement, the velocity is slower and accuracy is 
poorer.  This means that you have lost the on-line control of the 
movement, which works automatically: instead, you have used a 
system that is slower and is not adapted to doing automatic 
movement. (Gallagher & Jeannerod 2002)105 
We do not necessarily bike or swim better if we concentrate on 
how to do it. The same can be observed in music, the autopilot 
takes you home. It is well known among musicians that too much 
thinking about what you are doing makes you lose timing. 
                                           
105  Gallagher, S. & Jeannerod, M. (2002) From action to interaction. Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies. Vol. 9. No 1. 3–26 
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How should we describe music in the perceptual field? Imagine 
that you are fully concentrated on a speech you are going to pre-
sent, while there is music in the background. The music has no 
relevance to the speech. Even in this case it can be observed that 
you move to the music. You perceive it but you are not aware of it. 
However if something unexpected occurred in the music such as a 
false tone or an unexpected chord, this could draw your attention. 
The fact that such mismatches can make you attend to the music 
proves that you did perceive it on a pre-attentive level. 
There are several possible ways of hearing movement in music. 
You can hear the sound source moving, as when the ice cream van 
passes you playing its tune. The same thing happens if the sound is 
moving from loudspeaker to loudspeaker. This is movement relative 
to the own body. It is an egocentric experience. 
But, since music changes over time, there is an experience of 
movement even if the source is stationary. There are two options: 
Either you perceive yourself as stationary and the music as moving, 
or you perceive yourself as moving and the music as stationary. 
The perspective theory of music perception 
I have tried to explain the difference between the sensory input and 
the perception of music. The former is not consciously perceived. 
Perception is dependent on the meaning provided by the perspec-
tive. Through genetic factors and learning we tend to perceive ho-
listically rather than particularly. If we have the information needed 
to perceive holistically, we will do so and the detail will be per-
ceived in that context. In music we perceive relations, Gestalts and 
movement. Procedural learning and perceptual learning is important 
in this process. 
What we consciously perceive is not the sensory input but what 
we make of it. Imagery is an important agent in this transformation. 
I am using a perception-action understanding of imagery, where 
imagery is a continuum from perception, via complementary im-
agery to clear-cut imagery. The perception process implies the fol-
lowing stages: 
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1. The situation (the sensory field) brings on a perspective 
[implicitly selecting task relevant information (the frame of 
reference)]. 
2. Imagination is to integrate the perspective selected infor-
mation (the content) with an egocentric frame of refer-
ence. It is a “suggestion”. 
3. The suggestion presents itself as a form or a figure (a per-
ception). 
4. If I act on the perception the situation will change and the 
process becomes cyclical. 
As can be seen from this, the theory states that perspective taking is 
pre-attentive, prior to imagination and prior to phenomenal percep-
tion. 
To sum up: Music as figure of perception is charged with meaning. 
The meaning is dependent on the perspective. This leads to a per-
spective theory of music perception: 
1. The egocentric perspective: the frame of reference is the 
listener’s body. In this perspective musical movements are 
perceived relative to the body: A passing ice cream van, a 
passing military parade, music moving from one loud 
speaker to the other etc. 
2. The allocentric perspective: the landmark is a point in the 
terrain. Does it have to be the terrain? Let us replace the 
world terrain with the more general word “structure” and 
ask: Can this perspective be applied on music? Let me ex-
emplify this with tonal music. I suggest that the allocentric 
landmark is the tonic and that the sense of tonality serves 
as a frame of reference. Music is perceived as hierarchi-
cally organized around a reference tone (the tonic). All the 
other tones are related to this reference point (Krumhansl 
1990)106. The tonic and the hierarchical surrounding space 
                                           
106  Krumhansl, C.L. (1990) Cognitive Foundation of Musical Pitch. Oxford University 
Press, New York 
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are implicitly perceived (Granot & Donchin 2002)107. The 
sense of tonality does not require musical training. From 
this landmark we can specify perceived locations in the 
music. Tonality allows chord progressions and melodies to 
lead to these allocentric landmarks which are felt as resting 
points in the music. In the allocentric perspective I per-
ceive my own movement in a fixed music structure as if 
moving in a landscape.  This is however not dependent on 
tonality. As soon as the music is organized along some 
principle that can be perceived the possibility of navigation 
in the music arises. This organizing principle is the frame 
of reference (the internal model). It is a set of musical 
rules. In the allocentric perspective the structure is static. 
But, when the allocentric perspective is integrated with the 
egocentric perspective I will perceive myself as moving in 
the music structure. 
3. The dyadic perspective: The landmark is the body of the 
other and the frame of reference is information space 
shared by two people. When I integrate this perspective 
with my own I perceive the situation from the other’s 
body. And feel the other’s movement in my own body. 
This is for example to perceive music as the movement of 
the musician as if it was me moving. 
4. The tribal perspective: the frame of reference is the infor-
mation space shared by a group. Joint action experience. 
Playing in groups. In the audience, I will interact with the 
performing group. So will the other individuals in the audi-
ence. Thus the band will create an interacting crowd. We 
take part of a ritual acting out movements together. When 
I integrate this perspective with my own perspective, I 
perceive myself and the world through the eyes of the 
group. 
                                           
107  Granot, R. & Donchin, E. (2002) Do Re Mi Fa So La Ti – constraints, congruity, 
and musical training: an event related brain potentials study of musical expectancies. 
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5. The cultural perspective: the frame of reference is declara-
tive (coded) knowledge available in the culture (context). 
The music is a sign of cultural knowledge. Such contextual 
knowledge about the composer, say, can be integrated in 
my perception of the music. For example, the declarative 
knowledge that Eva Cassidy died from cancer, just after 
having recorded Over the Rainbow108 affects my perception 
of the song.  It charges the words with additional meaning 
and this affects my perception of Eva’s voice and phrasing. 
This is a schematic presentation. It is just to give the reader a first 
idea. The depiction of the perspectives, the consequences of the 
perspectives for perception and the integration of the perspectives 
will be elaborated in the following chapters. The listener alternates 
between these perspectives. 
The principal motivation for this theory is thus that perspective 
shapes content to form. There is no representation in the four first 
perspectives. The form does not represent the content; it is the con-
tent. But, if the form is taken to mean something for the beholder, 
we have a representation – a sign. I will argue that only the cultural 
perspective permits semiotic analysis and that we have four addi-
tional perspectives where musical meaning is perceived directly. 
                                           
108  Eva Cassidy, CD: Over the Rainbow. Songbird. Blixtnet 
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2 
 
Sound 
The Egocentric Perspective 
Depiction of perspective 
The landmark in the egocentric perspective is the own body. The 
frame of reference for directions is the body schema, which involves 
the vertical and the horizontal through the body. From this landmark 
we perceive the direction and the distance to the sound source. It is 
the perception of the auditory scene (Mather 2006109; Bregman 
1990). 
We detect horizontal directions by interaural time difference. 
Depth is detected by a decrease in perceived volume. But the per-
ception of depth also has to do with the fact that the environmental 
surfaces reflect sounds more if the source is distant. Thus close sound 
sources are perceived as clear and dry (no reverb) and vice versa. 
The time frame is the present moment consisting of the sensory 
buffer of the immediate past and the anticipation of what will occur 
next.  This allows for short sequences to be heard. 
There is also a frame of reference for sounds consisting of internal 
models of sounds made up by memories of sounds and Gestalts of 
sounds. 
The egocentric perspective is about the identification of the 
source, the direction to the source and the movement of the source. 
                                           
109  Mather, G. (2006) Foundations of Perception. Psychology Press, Hove 
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Thus this comes close to the realm of acoustics and particularly to 
the branch within acoustics specifying human responses to sounds. 
The perception of sound has implicit meaning and sounds can af-
fect us emotionally. Sound, in the sense of timbre is sadly neglected 
in musicology, considering its importance in all music (Wicke 
2003)110. Maybe the reason is that music does not begin until the 
sounds are connected to structures. However, sound involves the 
production and tuning of instruments, the player’s technique, orches-
tration and arranging, the sound engineering technique – in other 
words, the whole process of music production. It has become in-
creasingly important for the identity of styles and groups. The sound 
colours the whole experience of music. 
The perception of sound 
Auditory discrimination is improved by perceptual learning (Wright 
& Fitzgerald 2003)111. Perceptual learning has two important aspects. 
The first is that perceptual learning is to learn directly and automati-
cally from the perception. The second aspect is that the knowledge 
learnt is the knowledge to perceive better. 
Perceptual learning is a pre-attentive adaptation to the environ-
ment (Gibson, E. 1953). Eleanor Gibson was opposed to the domi-
nant nativism of Gestalt theory. I will however use perceptual learn-
ing and Gestalt complementarily. To some extent our tendency to 
perceive certain Gestalts must have been learnt through perceptual 
learning; to some extent it is innate. 
One category of perceptual learning, discussed by Eleanor Gibson 
is differentiation – an ability improved by exposure to stimuli. This 
is not difficult to spot in music. The professional sound technician is 
the ultimate example of excellent music discrimination. To see a 
sound engineer at work is magical. Everyone who has been in-
                                           
110  Wicke, P. (2003) Popmusic in der Analyse. Acta Musicologica. Vol. 75. No 1. 
107–126 
111  Wright, B.A. & Fitzgerald, M. B. (2003) Sound – discrimination learning and audi-
tory displays. Proceedings of the 2003 International Conference on Auditory Dis-
play, Boston, MA, 6–9 July. 228–232  
Sound 
 
85 
volved in a recording and has experienced a sound engineer at 
work knows what a difference she can make. Everything she hears 
is connected to the controls on the sound board. With quick moves 
she is able to change the recording from a complete disappointment 
to the musicians to something they can be proud of. There are in-
numerable parameters to juggle: every instrument is picked up by 
one or several microphones, each leading to a channel, each chan-
nel is treated separately on volume, overtone register, reverb, 
sound effects, filters cutting frequencies and so on. A virtual acoustic 
scene is created through panning, creation of depth, and the separa-
tion of the soloist from the background.  Now you can hear where 
the players are situated in your living room as you listen to the mu-
sic. The first ambition is to get a clear picture that sounds nice. But 
in addition to this comes the sound ideal of the particular style and 
the particular group. An important part of this is the sampling tech-
nique – the recycling of loops from old recordings. 
To do all this, the sound engineer must have learned to differenti-
ate features in music unperceivable to others. This ability comes 
from the daily work, or “exposure to stimuli”, as Gibson said. 
A related category of perceptual learning is stimulus imprinting. 
Imprinting is exposure to a stimulus resulting in representations 
(neuron connection potentials). Through imprinting, neural structures 
are developed to specialize for a certain stimulus (Goldstone 
1998)112. The effect of this is recognition and familiarity with that 
stimulus. This is how we learn to recognize sounds. Feature imprint-
ing is the ability to select a crucial feature important to identification. 
As can easily be understood this mechanism has evolutional impor-
tance. It is vital to children to be able to identify parents by their 
voices. We have an enormous capacity to recognize voices. 
If a singer has a characteristically deviant style of singing, she will 
stand out and her songs will stick in our memory. Louis Armstrong’s 
singing is from the aspect of sound more deviant than his trumpet 
playing and thus, although the trumpet playing was excellent, and 
although he was originally an instrumentalist, the voice is more re-
membered. If a singer has a unique profile of voice or phrasing 
                                           
112  Goldstone, R. (1998) Perceptual learning. Annual Review of Psychology. February, 
Vol. 49. 585–612  
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(Stevie Wonder, M. A. Numinen, Bob Dylan, Björk, Billy Holliday, 
Mrs Miller) he/she has an advantage in his ability to reach out to a 
mass audience. 
Pop music makes good use of stimulus imprinting of sound. The 
subtlest reason that pop music is so flavourful to our brains is that it 
relies strongly on timbre (Levitin 2007)113. Sound is an identification 
factor for styles, groups, and even particular songs. Popular perform-
ers or groups, Levitin argues, are pleasing not because of any par-
ticular virtuosity, but because they create an overall timbre that re-
mains consistent from song to song. Groups have identifiable sounds. 
We know from a fraction of listening what it is. The sound works as 
a signal or a trademark: Here I am again, the music says. Just think 
of guitar riff in the intro of Satisfaction by the Rolling Stones. You 
can identify the tune from the first chord. 
Visual parts that co-occur in a set of patterns will tend to be bound 
together. This is when one part makes us perceive the whole pat-
tern. Through unitization (or pattern completion) (see Chapter 1), 
we tend to see wholes instead of parts, situations instead of details, 
affordances instead of objects etc. The implicit meaning is induced. 
The brain, as we have seen from the neurological evidence, auto-
matically combines relevant information to create a situation under-
standing. In music we perceive sounds as their sources (the instru-
ments, or the singers). The sound of an acoustic guitar may act as a 
cue to perceptive memories in all modalities of a guitar such as 
shape and colour, and even the smell of spruce wood, as well as the 
feeling of holding it and playing it, not to mention all the memories 
from former listening. This unified perception, multi-modal in char-
acter, creates invariance. The sound of a Les Paul guitar holds a uni-
verse of implicit understanding for the jazz guitarist. 
When famous artists sing in medleys such as We are the world, 
each artist is imposing his or her character by means of voice to the 
extent that you feel: “Oh it is a Stevie Wonder song, ah no it is a 
Bruce Springfield song, ah no Bob Dylan must have written it” and 
so on. Thus the perception of the composition changes with each 
artist just because of this one feature. Styles can be detected from 
the mere sound of a typical instrument such as the wa-wa-guitar 
                                           
113  Levitin, D.J. (2007) http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/03/features/music.php? 
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pointing to funk music, Les Paul guitars for jazz, Spanish guitars for 
flamenco etc. And, if sounds can be associated with music styles, 
they can also be associated with music tribes (the bebop tribe, the 
metallica tribe, the indie tribe etc.) 
These unifying effects should be distinguished from our ability to 
perceive Gestalts. Gestalts are not in the same sense resulting from 
pattern completion. Gestalt mechanisms are certainly unifying too. 
We perceive timbres rather than the separate frequencies in the 
overtone spectra, chords rather than the separate tones which make 
up the chords, and orchestral sounds rather than the separate instru-
ments producing this sound, and melodies rather than isolated tones. 
Egocentric emotions 
In this context “egocentric emotions” does not mean: I am the most 
important person in the world, but merely emotions emanating from 
egocentric perspective perception. Behaviourist theory of emotion is 
useful in the egocentric perspective context. This is a basic under-
standing of emotion. It does not demand higher order perception. 
Edmund T. Rolls states: 
Emotions can be defined as states elicited by rewards and punish-
ers. (Rolls 2005: 11)114  
A reward is anything for which an animal will work and a punisher 
is anything it will avoid. Rewards and punishers are called rein-
forcers because they reinforce animal behaviour. Rolls distinguishes 
primary reinforcers from secondary reinforcers. Primary reinforcers, 
such as food and sex and snakes, are gene specified reinforcers. The 
genes specify the goals for the action. This means that there is a 
fixed response to stimuli. Secondary reinforcers are objects that we 
have implicitly learned to associate with primary reinforcers. The 
reward/punishment is an operant in this learning. This is for example 
action/outcome learning. 
                                           
114  Rolls, E.T. (2006) Brain mechanisms of emotion and decision taking. Interna-
tional Congress Series. Vol. 1291. June. 3–13 
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How can we think of music as a primary reinforcer? Any sound 
loud enough is frightening. The amygdala (usually and primarily 
associated with fear reactions) seems to react to sound intensity (vol-
ume and pitch) more than to identity (LeDoux 2003). Thus loud 
sounds are, as we all know, frightening irrespective of source.  
In addition to that it seems that the quality of the sound has emo-
tional valence. One of the very first brain scanning tests for emo-
tional responses to music (Blood et al. 1999)115 examined brain acti-
vation for consonant/dissonant chords. The evidence that orbitofron-
tal cortex and the limbic system were activated indicates that disso-
nances and consonances are emotionally felt. In other words, this 
confirms what we already know – there are pleasant sounds and 
there are unpleasant sounds. The study also showed that this was not 
the result of any conscious understanding of the perception. 
This can be compared with the perception of surfaces. Some things 
are nice to touch because they are soft and some are unpleasant 
because they are uneven. Sounds are thus in themselves rewarding 
or punishing. They are primary reinforcers. This means that we do 
not explicitly (consciously) judge the sound to be pleasant or un-
pleasant; we experience this directly. 
In a study of emotion processing in passive listening to major, mi-
nor and dissonant chords (Pallesen et al. 2005)116 found that the 
amygdala, the retrosplenial cortex (BA26), the brainstem and the 
cerebellum were critical areas. The authors conclude: 
1. The areas were activated even by single chords. 
2. Emotional processing is enhanced even in the absence of 
cognitive requirements. 
3. Musicians and non musicians do not differ. 
                                           
115  Blood, A., Zatorre, R.J., Bermudez, P. & Evans, A.C. (1999) Emotional responses 
to pleasant and unpleasant music correlate with activity in paralimbic brain regions. 
Nature Neuroscience. Vol. 2. No 4. 382–387 
116  Pallesen, K.J., Brattico, E., Bailey, C., Korvenoja, A., Koivisto, J., Gjedde, A. & 
Carlson, S. (2005) Emotion processing of major, minor and dissonant chords: an fMRI 
study. The Neurosciences of Music. Annals of the New York Academy of Science. Vol. 
1060. 450–453 
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An example of a primary reinforcer is the music in the murder 
scene in Hitchcock’s Psycho. The sound is produced by sharp violin 
attacks in the top register. This has an alarming effect on the listener. 
It creates fear, panic even, which is bodily and acute. Many alarms 
sound somewhat like this and they cannot be misinterpreted. The 
sound is dissonant, high in pitch, loud and repeated. 
There is an interesting relation between harmony in music and 
environmental sounds. Any sound consists of a combination of over-
tone frequencies (a spectrum). When a string is hit, not only the full 
length of the string will vibrate, but also several subdivisions of the 
string length. These subdivisions produce subdivisions of sound 
waves. The length of the wave is related to the frequency. Thus 
when a string is hit, we do not just hear the frequency of the full 
length string but all the frequencies emanating from ratios of the 
string. These sound waves are the overtones. Instruments are de-
signed to pick up different overtone spectra of frequencies (reso-
nance). The resonance is heard as the timbre of the instrument. 
Timbre is thus a spectrum of overtones. 
If a vibrating string is divided, this results in the double frequency 
– the octave. The simple ratios were discovered by Pythagoras. 
They are 1/1 string length (prime), 1/2 (octave), 1/3 perfect fifth, 
1/4 (octave no 2), 1/5 (major third). A triad consisting of the prime, 
the major (or minor) third, and the perfect fifth is considered conso-
nant. These tones thus happen to be the first (and strongest) tones in 
the overtone series. Higher up in the overtone series, and much 
weaker than the octave, the fifth and the major third, we find the 
smaller fractions. These intervals are used in chords as colourings 
and as lead tones. They make the chord sound dissonant. Consonant 
chords sound pure, smooth and clear. It is a pleasant sound. Disso-
nant chords are perceived in the opposite way (unpleasant, unclean, 
rough etc.) 
As any musician knows, we tend to get used to dissonant chords. 
A major 7th chord is not dissonant to a practicing musician today. If a 
chord is perceived as dissonant or not consonant, depends on the 
listener, the era, the style, and the harmonic context. A chord might 
sound dissonant in one context but consonant in another. This has to 
do with the function of the chord and how the voices in the preced-
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ing chords prepare for the chord. If the “dissonance” is caused by 
rule-governed voicing it will not be unpleasant and thus not so dis-
sonant. The same chord in another context might sound terrible. 
There is thus a top-down processing of harmony. 
But in this perspective we are not making these considerations. 
We are only interested in the isolated sound impact. The point here 
is that the tones in consonant chords are the strongest frequencies in 
most natural sounds and voices. There is thus an expectancy factor in 
consonance, whereas dissonant sounds are unexpected and thus 
more alarming. In a dissonant chord we hear the distant overtones 
(the seconds) much louder than in normal environmental sounds. 
“Dissonance” can be defined by its tone content. However it is 
also a depiction of phenomenal experience. This pleasantness/un–
pleasantness is how the amateur would perceive consonance/disso-
nance. Thus we do not have to be aware what tones the chord con-
sists of to tell if it is consonant or dissonant. Blood’s study shows that 
we feel the difference between consonance and dissonance on a 
direct emotional level (Blood et al. 1999). We detect this as directly 
as we detect the difference between a smooth and a rough surface.  
Sounds can also be secondary reinforcers. Since the unitization ef-
fect makes us perceive sounds, not just as sounds but as holistic multi 
modal situation understandings, there is a meaning right in the per-
ception that can be emotionally experienced. The mere sound of the 
guitar creates emotions for guitarists and afinados because this sound 
is linked (pattern completion) to pleasant experiences. Music is, as 
are tastes and smells, a trigger of episodic memories. A well known 
episodic memory from literature is the taste of a piece of Madeleine 
biscuit soaked in lime blossom tea in Marcel Proust’s Remembrance 
of Things Past. This taste was the cue that threw the author back to 
childhood. The whole situation including other senses, intentions and 
emotions is actualized – as if we were there. A short sequence of 
entire situations including the emotional aspect is replayed. For mu-
sic this means that a tune could trigger an imagination of a place 
where it was first heard. We live the event anew. The phenomenon 
has been labelled the “Darling they are playing our tune – dimen-
sion” (Davies 1978)117. 
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Karin Johannisson gives a range of examples of how strong such 
musically evoked nostalgic reminiscences can be. Since music is not 
verbal it can go beyond cognitive memories and connect the lis-
tener to her pre-linguistic world as a child – to “a space of inno-
cence” – (Johannisson 2001)118. This space is an undivided whole, a 
world in which the child does not ascribe emotions to itself but per-
ceives the world as emotional and alive. It is a magical world. It is 
in a Freudian sense The Mother.  
I will leave this theme now since it is speculative, but my per-
sonal opinion is that music really can evoke strong oceanic longing 
to a paradise lost. We will come back to this in the final discussion.  
Major/minor 
Although many authors have written about the perception of ma-
jor/minor chords and scales (Hindemith 1941119; Deutsch 1999120), it 
still remains a riddle why major chords are felt has happy and minor 
chords are felt as sad. The fact that the same brain areas (the 
amygdala, the retrosplenial cortex, the brainstem and the cerebel-
lum) are critical to major/minor as well as to dissonance (Pallesen 
2005), suggests that minor chords are perceived as slightly dissonant. 
The minor chord, named so because the major third is replaced by 
a minor third, could be said to be somewhat more dissonant just 
because the minor third appears later in the overtone series than the 
major third. This alone makes the minor chord slightly more disso-
nant than the major chord, according to the principle suggested 
above that late tones in the overtone series appear as more odd. 
However the minor triad is not considered dissonant among musi-
cians. I think there is an additional factor that might be considered. 
If you play an A minor triad – A, C, E – an additional C# will arise 
because C# is an early overtone to the fundamental A. There are 
chords where both the major and the minor thirds are played. In 
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these cases the minor third is on top (higher in pitch) as a + 9 col-
ouring of a dominant chord (e.g. E7+9 could be E, G#, B, D, G). 
These are clearly dissonant chords. But the case we are discussing is 
a chord where the major third would be on top of the minor third. 
This is too horrible to exist in common harmony. This dissonance 
can hardly consciously be heard, because the major third resonance 
is too weak for identification, but it is there in all minor chords and 
it cannot be ruled out that we react to this on a pre-attentive level. 
After all, the processing of consonance/dissonance according to 
Blood is pre-attentive. There is thus a possibility that although we 
cannot hear dissonance in the minor chord, we might react to an 
extreme dissonance strong enough to be perceived but to weak to 
be consciously identified. 
Even if we for one reason or other react directly to minor and ma-
jor, it is not as simple as that. Minor chords are not always sad. Dm 
chords and melodies in a C major key are perceived as using the C 
major scale and are thus not as sad as Dm chords in a Dm key which 
are perceived as using the Dm scale. Although the chords are iden-
tical, the tonal reference differs. It all depends on where the tonic is 
perceived to be. There are numerous variants of this but the simple 
rule is that the musical context affects the direct emotional percep-
tion of the chord. 
Conclusion 
The mere musical sound triggers emotions in the listener. It does so 
as a primary reinforcer (loud sounds, consonant or dissonant sounds), 
and as secondary reinforcers depending on the unitization effect in 
perceptual learning which connects the sound to implicit associations 
or explicit associations such as episodic memories. Most emotional 
reactions to sound are direct and pre-attentive. Such emotional reac-
tions on the sound cannot be explained by the appraisal theory of 
emotion which suggests that we judge the perception and then react 
to it, unless we allow judgement to mean implicit judgement (see 
Chapter 1).  Rather it is the other way around, we react directly 
emotionally to the sensory input and this emotion colours the per-
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ception of the sound as smooth, uneven, pleasant, unpleasant, calm-
ing, alarming etc. 
This means that the figure in this perspective is not relevant. We 
react emotionally to sounds even if the sound is not the focus of our 
attention. It is the pre-attentive processing, the process that might or 
might not lead to attended perception of sound that produces the 
emotion. 
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3 
 
Listening to the Other 
The dyadic perspective 
Mirror neurons make us copy the movement of the other “on-line”. 
They are supposedly involved in the understanding of the other’s 
intentions and emotions. In 2004 Helge Malmgren and I proposed 
that mirror neuron theory explains why music moves us physically 
and emotionally (Vickhoff & Malmgren 2005). 
Recently there has been an accelerated activity in neuro-imaging 
the brain to study the connection between music and mirror neuron 
activity (cf. Molnar-Szakacs & Overy 2006)121. In this chapter I will 
present new evidence and develop the theory further. 
Depiction of perspective 
To copy the movements of another human being, we need a com-
mon neural format (Gallese 2003)122. This format is embodied simula-
tion. Such simulation is possible through mirror neuron reactions to 
the movements of the other activating a pre-existing body represen-
tation in the brain – the body schema. According to mirror neuron 
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theory, we automatically copy the movements of the other. We do 
this on-line with the other – in synchronization with the other. This 
has philosophical implications outlined by Metzinger & Gallese 
(2003)123. The authors distinguish a phenomenal first person perspec-
tive, which allows for the representation of a phenomenal second 
person perspective. In other words the second person perspective is 
integrated in the first person perspective. This is the dyadic perspec-
tive. 
The dyadic perspective is taken from the other and the frame of 
reference is the information space shared by two individuals. 
In this chapter I will argue that we can perceive music from a dy-
adic perspective. This means that the music is perceived as the other 
– as the emotional expression of a musician, say, and that we take 
the perspective of this other being. How can we do that? I claim that 
we feel the movement in the music and that this movement affects 
us. A beautiful example of this is the fact that patients with Parkin-
son’s disease not only walk better if someone walks along with 
them, but also when they walk to music, even if the music is just 
imagined (Sacks 1990: 282)124. 
The dyadic perspective entails that we synchronize our move-
ments with the other’s movement through immediate implicit imita-
tion. However strange this may sound, it is easy to exemplify. Let us 
say that we are watching a high jumper on TV. We wish that she 
can make 2.04 m and win the Olympic gold medal. As she passes 
the bar, we find ourselves lifting a leg to make sure that we will go 
clear. The synchronization of movement shows that we in that mo-
ment are not in the sofa at home but actually up there with her. We 
share motivation, situation understanding and emotion with the 
jumper. We perceive the situation as if we were there. We integrate 
her perspective with our own. Thus we do not just mechanically 
imitate but the whole perception of the situation is shared. In one 
experiment a preverbal infant was watching an experimenter unsuc-
cessfully trying to undo a dumbell-like object. When the child was 
given the opportunity, it immediately tried to and succeeded in un-
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doing it and seemed pleased at the result (Stern 2004). This is obvi-
ously more than just imitation. The whole intentional complex of 
motivation and emotion is transferred. This is situation understanding. 
It relies on implicit procedural knowledge and takes place without 
conscious effort. We automatically perceive movements as intentions 
related to goals. This is done by co-producing these move-
ments/actions in our own body, living the intention of the other. 
Do we take the dyadic perspective listening to music? Music trig-
gers (as we all know) movements (Fraisse 1982)125. There is obvi-
ously some kind of imitation going on. When we listen to music 
from a dyadic perspective, the other (e.g. the musician) will be in 
the frame of reference. This means that the music will be perceived 
as the other. This other (artist, musician) is what we implicitly imi-
tate. 
Music moves us physically, but does this imply that it moves us 
emotionally? The phenomenological psychologist Franz From con-
cluded from various experiments that when we have to describe a 
behaviour sequence, we generally do so by indicating a perception 
of some psychological state in the behaving person (From 1971)126. 
We perceive, he stated, “the sense”, a mental factor – an intention, a 
purpose, a meaning. 
Our case will however be stronger if movement triggers emotion. 
This is, as we will see, the case. 
To sum up, the conditions for dyadic emotions in music are: 
1. We can imitate (explicitly or implicitly) 
2. We can imitate immediately 
3. We take dyadic perspectives listening to music 
4. Movement triggers emotions 
In the following I will discuss these conditions one by one. 
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Implicit imitation 
We can see how important imitation is in the animal world. The 
young imitate their parents and thus learn how to hunt, where to 
hide, where to find, what to fear and so on. Imitation can be volun-
tary, but in the case of animals we have to assume that there is no 
rational decision behind it. The fact that the offspring imitates must 
be ascribed to the ability to take the perspective of the parent. This 
is how the offspring learns how to cope with situations. The child 
maps the parent’s body and body actions to reproduce them imme-
diately or later in similar situations (Blandin et al. 1999)127. This is 
how procedural knowledge is acquired. 
Babies imitate their caretakers. There is evidence of such imitation 
tendencies just minutes after birth. Neonates (30 minutes!) have 
been proven to imitate mouth movements (Meltzoff & Moore 
1987)128. Needless to say, the infant cannot think: “My mother is 
smiling. She must be using her mouth muscles. I want to respond. 
Now, where are my mouth muscles?” It is thus reasonable to assume 
that we are all born with the capacity to feel the other’s face in our 
own. 
Imitation is the first sign of dialogue. The early pre-linguistic 
communication between child and caretaker is called protoconversa-
tion. This conversation is an exchange of facial expressions and, 
when vocal, it is the melody (prosody) of speech that is communi-
cated. For this reason researchers on child development refer to this 
early exchange as a duet (Stern 1985129; Trevarthen 1992130). This 
duet develops emotional bonds between child and caretaker. The 
capacity of implicit imitation thus is vital in child development. 
                                           
127  Blandin, Y., Lhuisset, L. & Proteau, L. (1999) Cognitive processes underlying 
observational learning of motor skills. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human experimental psychology, 52(A). 957–979 
128  Meltzoff, A.N. & Moore, M.K. (1987) Imitation of facial and manual gestures by 
human neonates. Science. Vol. 198. 75–78 
129  Stern, D. (1985) The Interpersonal World of the Infant. Basic Books, New York, 
130  Trevarthen, C. (1992) An infant's motives for speaking and thinking in the cul-
ture. The Dialogical Alternative. (Ed. A.H. Wold.) Scandinavian University 
Press/Oxford University Press, Oslo and Oxford. 99–137 
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Musical elements participate in the process of communicative de-
velopment very early. “They pave the way to linguistic capacities 
earlier than phonetic elements” (Papousek 1996)131. Trevarthen has 
found temporal characteristics communicated through body-imaging 
based on “intrinsic motive pulse” integrating attention, learning and 
self-regulating physiology. To a large extent the beginning of com-
munication starts with a sharing of patterned time (Trevarthen 
1999)132. Imitation is seen as a condition to start information ex-
change before any kind of language is developed. It is the basis of 
social interaction. 
Studying patients with prefrontal lesions, Lhermitte found that these 
patients compulsively imitate gestures or even complex actions per-
formed by an experimenter (Lhermitte et al. 1983)133. This behaviour 
has been explained as an impairment of the inhibitory control nor-
mally exerted by the prefrontal areas. This indicates that if we were 
not inhibited, we would imitate constantly. We always have an imi-
tation tendency, but it is not always displayed (Baldissera et al. 
2001)134. 
Other evidence for implicit imitation has been presented by Dim-
berg, Thunberg & Elmehed (2000)135. The authors measured the 
activity in face muscles for subjects watching pictures of smiling and 
angry faces. Facial mimicry reactions are measured by EMG (elec-
tromyographic activity). The pictures were presented for 30 milli-
seconds and were then replaced with neutral faces. The results show 
muscular activity after 50 ms for smile and anger expressions. Both 
the time for exposure of the target and the reaction time are too 
                                           
131  Papousek, H. (1996) Musicality in infancy research: biological and cultural origins 
of early musicality. In Musical Beginnings (Eds. I. Delíege & M. Sloboda.) Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
132  Trevarthen, C. (1999) Musicality and intrinsic motive pulse: evidence from human 
psychobiology and infant communication. Musicae Scientiae. Special issue. 155–215 
133  Lhermitte, F., Pillon, B. & Serdan, M. (1986) Human autonomy and the frontal 
lobes: Part 1. Imitation and utilization behaviour: A neurological study of 75 patients. 
Annals of Neurology. Vol. 19. 326–34 
134  Baldissera, F., Cavallari, P., Craighero, L. & Fadiga, L. (2001). Modulation of spinal 
excitability during observation of hand actions in humans. European Journal of Neu-
roscience. Vol. 13. 190–194 
135  Dimberg, U., Thunberg, M. & Elmehed, K. (2000) Unconscious facial reactions to 
emotional facial expressions. American Psychological Society. Vol.11. No 1. 86–89 
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short for conscious processing of the stimuli. The conclusion is that 
there is an immediate and pre-attentive muscle reaction imitating the 
faces on the target pictures. It has been shown that subjects rating 
high in empathy (the ability to have the emotion of the other) show 
stronger EMG reactions (Sonneby-Borgström 2002)136. 
Zatorre (2003)137 has shown that music activates hand function rep-
resentation for musicians. Convincing evidence of implicit imitation 
in music perception is provided by Lahav et al. (2005)138. Non-
musicians were instructed to learn a simple piece. When presented 
with the piece again they showed involuntary finger movement 
tendencies (in a specially designed glove) for heard tones. One sin-
gle learning session is enough to establish the sound-motor connec-
tion. 
Many areas implicated in music performance and music perception 
overlap: Cerebellum (generally associated with motor commands) is 
activated by harmony, melody and rhythm (Zatorre 2003). Other 
examples are the temporal and frontoparietal regions (Koelsch et al. 
2005139; Tillmann et al. 2003a140) including Broca’s area (Lahav, 
Salzman & Schlaug 2007)141. 
The lateral pre-motor cortex is critical to perceptual sequencing 
(Schubotz et al. 2004)142. Even when musicians just imagine playing, 
                                           
136  Sonneby-Borgström, M. (2002) Automatic mimicry reactions as related to differ-
ences in emotional empathy. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. Vol. 43. No 5. 
433–443 
137  Zatorre, R.J. (2003) Neuronal specialization for tonal processing. In The Cognitive 
Neuroscience of Music. (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre) Oxford University Press, New 
York. 231–236 
138  Lahav, A., Boulanger, A., Schlaug, G., & Saltzman, E. (2005) The power of listen-
ing: auditory-motor interactions in musical training. Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences. Vol. 1060. The Neurosciences and Music II: From Perception to Perform-
ance (Eds. G. Avanzini, S. Koelsch, L. Lopez & M. Manjo) 189–194 
139  Koelsch, S., Fritz, T., Schulze, K., Alsop, D. & Schlaug, G. (2005) Adults and chil-
dren processing music: an fMRI study. NeuroImage. Vol. 25. 1068–1076 
140  Tillmann, B., Janata, P. & Bharucha, J.J. (2003a) Activation of the inferior frontal 
cortex in musical priming. Cognitive Brain Research. Vol. 16. 145–161 
141  Lahav, A., Saltzman, E. & Schlaug, G. (2007) Action representation of sound: 
audiomotor recognition network while listening to newly acquired actions. Journal 
of Neuroscience. Vol. 27. 308–314 
142  Schubotz, R.I., Sakreida, K., Tittgemeyer, M. & von Cramon, D.Y. (2004) Motor 
areas beyond motor performance: deficits in serial prediction following ventrolateral 
pre-motor lesions. Neuropsycology. Vol. 18. No 4. 638–645 
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the pre-motor cortex and the supplementary motor areas are acti-
vated (Meidell et al.)143; (Halpern 2001). 
In singing there is evidence of interaction between a heard mel-
ody and the production of the same melody (Hickok et al. 2003)144. 
Mirror neurons 
We can implicitly understand a situation and act accordingly. Neuro-
logical evidence for this is piling up. An important step was the dis-
covery of so called mirror neurons in 1992 (Di Pellegrino et al. 
1992)145.This finding provided a neurological substrate for implicit 
imitation. Studies on monkeys revealed mirror neurons in the frontal 
lobe, so named since the very same neurons fired when the mon-
key was watching movements related to hand and mouth as when it 
performed the same movements.  
When the monkey observes hand movements that are part of its 
repertoire, the seen action is automatically retrieved (without having 
to be executed) in parts of the motor system. Mirror neurons pre-
pare us for imitating motor sequences (Rizzolatti et al. 2001)146. Imi-
tating by means of mirror neurons is referred to as resonance behav-
iour. 
These findings have caused extensive research on mirror neurons 
and in the prolongation the development of mirror neuron theory. 
This theory in turn can be classified as a perception action theory, 
since it states that we perceive the other through action (imitation). 
                                           
143  Meidell, K., Gaab, N., Halpern, A. & Schlaug, G. Neural correlates of performance 
in a motor imagery task: an fMRI study with professional pianists. 
http://208.164.121.55/hbm2003/abstract/abstract1086.htm 
144  Hickok, G., Buchsbaum, B., Humphries, C. & Muftuler, T. (2003) Auditory-motor 
interaction revealed by fMRI: Speech, music, and working memory in area Spt. Jour-
nal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Vol. 15. No 5. 673–682 
145  Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. & Rizzolatti, G. (1992) Under-
standing motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research. 
Vol. 91. No. 1. 176–180 
146  Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L. & Gallese, V. (2001) Perspectives – neurophysiological 
mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Re-
views/Neuroscience. Vol. 2. Sept. 667–668 
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There is strong evidence that mirror neurons exist in humans (for 
a review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004)147. When imitation and 
observation tasks were compared, the researchers found a complete 
spatial overlap of activation between imitation and observation. The 
only difference was the magnitude of the response. The location is 
the “frontoparietal architecture for sensory-motor integration” (Rizzo-
latti net)148. 
Are there mirror neurons processing sounds? Single unit responses 
for listening and oral repetition have been found in the Sylvian fis-
sure, the cleft at the parietal-temporal boundary between Broca’s 
area and Wernicke’s area (Hickok et al. 2003). The authors also 
found frontal areas that combined listening and rehearsal, consistent 
with the claim that auditory processing is part of a larger sensorimo-
tor integration circuit. 
In October 2003 the discovery of audiovisual mirror neurons was 
reported. They represent actions independently of whether these 
actions are performed, heard or seen (Keysers et al. 2003)149. 
These findings propelled several neuro-imaging studies on music 
and mirror neurons. Musical experience or expertise can modulate 
the activity within the fronto-parietal mirror neuron system (Haslin-
ger et al. 2005)150. Dancing experience has the same effect (Cross et 
al. 2006)151. 
In an fMRI study (Lahav, Salzman & Schlaug 2007) non-musicians 
learned to play a non-familiar piece by ear. Then they were played 
the music (not performing any movements). This activated the areas 
associated with mirror neurons: the frontoparietal motor related net-
work, including Broca’s area (known to be involved in sequence 
                                           
147  Rizzolatti, G. & Craighero, L. (2004) The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience. Vol. 27. 169–192 
148  Rizzolatti, G. interviewed by Maddalena Fabri Destro on the net. 
http://scholarpedia.org/article/talk:mirror_neurons 
149  Keysers C., Kohler E., Umiltà, M.A., Nanetti, L., Fogassi L. & Gallese V. (2003) 
Audiovisual mirror neurons and action recognition. Experimental Brain Research. 
Vol. 153. 628–636 
150  Haslinger, B., Erhard, P., Altenmuller, E., Schroeder, U., Boecker, H. & Ceballos–
Baumann, A.O. (2005). Transmodal sensorimotor networks during action observation 
in professional pianists. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Vol. 17. 282–293 
151  Cross, E.S., Hamilton, A.F.D.C., & Grafton, S.T. (2006). Building a motor simulation 
de novo: observation of dance by dancers, NeuroImage. Vol. 31. 1257–1267 
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processing in speech and music), and the pre-motor region. A 
presentation of the notes in a different order activated the same 
network but to a lesser degree. Listening to motorically unknown 
music did not activate this network. The authors conclude that the 
findings support the hypothesis of a “hearing-doing” system 
comparable to the seeing-doing previously observed. This means 
that as we listen to music, we latently perform the movements 
required to play it, provided we have played the music before. Such 
a system, the authors speculate, “may have been developed to 
protect the survival of all hearing organisms, allowing the 
understanding of actions even when they cannot be observed but 
can only be heard (for example, the sound of footsteps in the dark)”. 
In this experiment the neurons carry out the same function and have 
the same location as the mirror neurons in the first experiments. 
In order to entrain the movement of the other it takes more than 
imitation. We have to be able to predict the movements of the 
other. Umiltà (et al. 2001)152 showed that mirror neurons react to 
predictions. Seeing someone with the intention to grasp an object 
releases a neurological grasping reaction in the observer, even if the 
actual grasping was never observed. This was confirmed by evi-
dence indicating that viewers not only imitate but even show motor 
activation in advance of the observed action (Kilner et al. 2004)153. 
This leads to the question: How do we perceive the intention and 
emotion of others? Mirror neuron activation would not suffice to ex-
plain this. We have to look for a circuit which implies the limbic 
system. It has bee suggested that the anterior insula mediates be-
tween mirror neuron areas and the limbic system. The frontoparietal 
circuit which is reported to have mirror neurons is connected to the 
insula which has a 
                                           
152  Umiltà, M.A., Kohler, E., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., Fadiga, L., Keysers, C., & Rizzolat-
ti, G. (2001). I know what you are doing: A neurophysiological study. Neuron. 
Vol. 32. 91–101 
153  Kilner, J.M., Vargas, C., Duval, S., Blakemore, S.J. & Sirigu, A. (2004), Motor activa-
tion prior to observation of a predicted movement. Nature Neuroscience. Vol. 7. 
1299–1301 
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[k]ey role in affect generation and serving as a relay between fron-
tal cortices and limbic structures, thus representing a possible 
pathway for empathic resonance. (Iacobini and Lenzi 2002)154  
In a beautifully designed fMRI experiment Iacobini and colleagues 
showed that pre-motor mirror neurons are involved in understand-
ing the intention of others. This finding made the authors conclude: 
To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming goal, and this is an 
operation that the motor system does automatically. (Iacobini et al. 
2005)155  
In 2006 evidence was attained that the insula is the interface be-
tween mirror neurons and the limbic system (Dapretto et al. 
2006)156. The involvement of the insula is interesting since this area 
has been reported to be involved in music perception and in the so 
called “song circuit”. We will come back to this. Since the insula 
connects the mirror neuron area with the limbic system, “the mean-
ing of the imitated or observed emotion is directly felt and under-
stood” (Dapretto et al. 2006). Thus we can understand this as a mir-
ror neuron system. 
A prerequisite for prediction is that the movement is simple, 
stereotyped or familiar (Wilson & Knoblich 2005)157. These condi-
tions are largely fulfilled in musical movements. In fact the authors 
use music as one of their examples. 
But there is one more condition for prediction and this is that the 
observed individual has a motor program similar to the observer 
                                           
154  Iacobini, M. & Lenzi, L.L. (2002) Mirror neurons, the insula, and empathy. Behav-
ioural and Brain Sciences. Vol. 25. 39–40 
155  Iacobini, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J.C. & Rizzolatti, 
G. (2005) Grasping the intentions of others with ones own mirror neuron system. 
PlosBiology. March. Vol 3. No 3. 529–535 
156  Dapretto, M., Davies, M.S., Pfeifer, J.H., Scott, A.A., Sigman, M., Bookheimer, S.Y. 
& Iacoboni, M. (2006) Understanding emotions in others: mirror neuron dysfunction 
in children with autism spectrum disorders. Nature Neuroscience.  Vol. 9. No 1. Janu-
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157  Wilson, M. and Knoblich, G. (2005) The case for motor involvement in perceiving 
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(Knoblich et al. 2002)158. On a rough level this means that it is easier 
to predict the movements of a conspecific, but on a more fine-
grained level it means that it is easier to predict the movements of 
some people than of others. This can be due to similar training. A 
bicyclist is better in predicting the movements of another bicyclist, 
and a pianist can predict the movements of another pianist. 
In 2007 we were reached by the sensational finding that that mir-
ror neurons are more engaged in complementary action (how to 
contribute in a situation) as compared to imitation (Newman-Norlund 
et al. 2007)159. Perhaps “mirror neurons” is not the most adequate 
name for these neurons? The finding could explain complementary 
emotions such as fear as a response to rage and tenderness as a re-
sponse for sadness. In fact it becomes increasingly evident that mir-
ror neurons are implicated in a range of behaviours. Rizzolatti does 
not talk about one mirror neuron system but of several mirror neu-
rons systems. 
To sum up, the mirror neuron systems are involved in the follow-
ing phenomena: 
1. Imitation 
2. Implicit understanding of the other’s intentions 
3. Situation understanding including goals 
4. Prediction of movement 
5. Entrainment 
6. Complementary action 
                                           
158  Knoblich, G., Seigerschmidt, E., Flach, R., & Prinz, W. (2002). Authorship effects in 
the prediction of handwriting strokes: Evidence for action simulation during action 
perception. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental 
Psychology. Vol. 55. No 3. 1027–1046 
159  Newman-Norlund, R.D., van Shie, H.T., van Zuijlen, A. & Bekkering, H. (2007) 
The mirror neuron system is more active during complementary compared with 
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Do we take dyadic perspectives listening to 
music? 
Arguments for the connection between music and sociability can be 
found in literature studying the interest in music of patients suffering 
from syndromes affecting their social ability. Patients suffering from 
William’s Syndrome, a genetically caused disorder characterized by 
strong social interest and empathy, are generally interested in music, 
while patients with Asperger’s Syndrome (low social interest) are 
less inclined to music activity. 
Patients suffering from Williams Syndrome have been described as 
mentally asymmetric. The frontal lobe, the temporal lobe and 
cerebellum are enlarged in the few brains examined so far. This is 
at the cost of other areas. I.Q. rates around 60 (Levitin 2005)160. This 
group show a relatively spared ability in four cognitive domains: 
face processing, sociability and empathy, language, and music. They 
show “exaggerated prosody”, they tend to talk about musical instru-
ments and, surprisingly, even their motor abilities seem to be musi-
cally domain specific. Some individuals can play the clarinet or piano 
but cannot button their shirts or tie their shoes. 
Inquiries prove that people diagnosed with Williams Syndrome 
show high sensitivity to sounds, show earlier musical interest, spend 
more time playing and listening to music, and are more emotionally 
affected by music than others (Levitin 2005). The musical capacity 
proves to be average. From this we can conclude that this groups 
stands out musically not because of capacity but because of interest. 
They live in a musical-emotional world. The brain scanning revealed 
higher amygdala and cerebellum activation by music for WS indi-
viduals than for controls (Levitin et al. 2003)161. 
                                           
160  Levitin, D.J. (2005) Musical behavior in a neurogenetic developmental disorder – 
evidence from Williams Syndrome. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
1060. The Neurosciences and Music II: From Perception to Performance. (Eds. G. 
Avanzini, S. Koelsch, L. Lopez & M. Manjo) 325–334 
161  Levitin, D.J., Menon, V., Schmitt, J.E., Eliez, S., White, C.D., Glover, G.H., Kadis, J., 
Korenberg, J.R., Bellugi, U. & Reiss A.L. (2003) Neural correlates of auditory percep-
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Because of the evident connection between sociability and music 
interest in this group, which can be contrasted to the disinterest in 
music for autistic people, it has been suggested that musical and so-
cial interest are genetically interlinked (Huron 2001a)162. 
What do we imitate in music? Let us break down this question into 
two parts: Do we imitate performers? And: When no performer is 
present, do we imitate the music as if a performer was implicated? 
The first question can be answered affirmatively just from the fact 
that we imitate each other generally. But this can be developed in 
the case of music. Anthropological studies confirm what child psy-
chologists have found. Music creates social bonds. This starts in in-
fancy, not only by means of nursery songs, but by all the musical 
features in mother-child communication (Dissanayake 2000a)163. Mu-
sic is, as a feature of communication, lived from a dyadic perspective 
from the very start. 
In a concert situation, we see the musicians in action. Musicians 
show their interpretation to the audience with their bodies. 
The sight of the gestures and movements of the various parts of 
the body producing the music is fundamentally necessary if it is to 
be grasped in all its fullness. (Igor Stravinsky 1936: 122)164  
A musician cannot move others unless he too is moved…for re-
vealing of his humour will stimulate a like humour in the lis-
tener…Those who maintain that all of this can be accomplished 
without gesture will retract their words, when owing to their insen-
sibility, they find themselves obliged to sit like a statue before their 
instrument…fitting expressions help the listener to understand the 
meaning. (C. P. E. Bach 1949: 152)165  
                                           
162  Huron, D. (2001a) Is music an evolutionary adaptation?  The Biological Founda-
tions of Music, Vol. 930. (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre) Annals of the New York Acad-
emy of Sciences. 43–61 
163  Dissanayake, E. (2000) Antecedents of the temporal arts in early mother infant 
interaction. The Origins of Music (Eds. N. Wallin, B. Merker & S. Brown). The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Mass. 389–410  
164  Stravinky, I. (1936) Cronicle of my Life. Victor Gollancz Ltd., London 
165  Bach, C. P. E. (1949) Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments. W. 
W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York 
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This communication could be intentional, but in most cases it is 
spontaneous. I say this from my experience as a performing musi-
cian. 
We can see body communication between the conductor and the 
orchestra. The pronounced purpose of conducting is to show the 
musicians when and how to play, but anyone who has seen a maes-
tro in action (e.g. Sergiu Celibidache) knows that this is just a part of 
it. The bodily expression is enormous. The unpronounced effect of 
this is that it inspires the musicians and shows them what this music 
emotionally is about. The conductor acts out the musical emotion 
with his bodily and this emotional expression in turn is played by 
the musicians. 
This is just as important to the audience. In symphonic perform-
ances the conductor takes on the soloist’s role to impersonate the 
music. The movements of the conductor are connected to the music. 
The movements of the music and the emotion of the music are in 
this case not only heard but seen by the audience. 
Dancers have made it their profession to express music with their 
bodies. Most styles of music have their own body expression. In 
many cases the music has evolved from body movement patterns 
just as much as the movements have evolved from the music. It is 
certainly true in the case of contemporary music that the music may 
be composed to the choreography. The Pilobulus Dance Theatre 
often works this way. But I think this is in some sense true for any 
dance music. Some music becomes popular because it is nice to 
move to and this popularity will make other composers try to make 
music like that. So there will be a selection in an almost Darwinian 
sense that will favour the survival of the fittest (the music that fits 
bodily expression). 
Artists capture their audiences with their expression. In popular 
music, particularly, we have the phenomenon of idolization – a 
strong identification force. We can see how audiences, as they be-
come absorbed by the performance, tend to forget about themselves 
and, seemingly unaware, move their lips in accordance with the 
song. 
* * * 
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Now let us address the case when there is no performer present. 
What happens when we listen to the radio or the CD player at 
home? 
We have a frame of reference where music is connected to body 
movement from the type of experiences exemplified above. We 
have seen musicians, artists, conductors and dancers move with the 
music. If you have seen Elvis Presley in the movie Jailhouse Rock, 
you will most likely have a sense of his dancing moves whenever 
you listen to the song. 
Now consider this: Even if music is not movement in a spatial 
sense, something is moving, namely the musician. Music is produced 
by bodies in motion. The sound mirrors the musician’s movements 
vis-à-vis the instrument. Musicians move their entire bodies to sing, 
or to blow wind or brass instruments. In fact, if we were to invent a 
device to register in sound how a person is moving her fingers over 
a table, we would end up with something like the piano. The piano 
registers the attack, the direction (left-right), the intervallic leaps, 
number of fingers used, the spread of the fingers and the speed as 
sounds. Every subtle nuance in tempo and touch is heard. Every 
heard change in pitch and dynamics corresponds to a movement by 
the player. There is a determinate relation between music and body 
movement. This goes for any instrument including the voice. Thus 
we can state that music is, in a concrete sense, heard movement. 
Movement is immanent in the heard information. We hear the per-
former in action. In this respect there is no difference from seeing 
the musician; it is just another modality. It is just routine-thinking to 
presuppose that movement must be seen. We can hear someone 
walk over a floor. The dyadic perspective implies that we are imitat-
ing the musician rather than the music. This has consequences for 
the analysis of perception. Let me point to three implications: 
1. In perception-action theory perceiving is interacting with or 
even enacting the object. As we have seen from the neuro-
logical evidence, we interact not only when we play or 
dance, but even when we listen to music. How can, one 
might wonder, we interact with something as abstract as mu-
sic? And how can abstract sounds evoke human emotions? But 
consider that we in the dyadic perspective interact with the 
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musician rather than with the music. This suddenly makes the 
interaction concrete. 
2. As discussed in the theoretical chapter situation understanding 
(Koffka’s demand, Merleau-Ponty’s telos, and Gibson’s affor-
dance) is the implicit meaning of perception. What is situa-
tion understanding in the perception of music? This problem 
is solved if we, again, consider that it is the musician rather 
than the music that is perceived. The dyadic perspective un-
doubtedly opens up for the possibility to perceive intentions, 
emotions and goals. Even if there is a difficulty in stating that 
we can perceive intentions in music, there is certainly no 
problem with perceiving the intention in a person expressing 
herself through music. 
3. As we perceive the musician through the music, we experi-
ence her grace, perfection and good technique. Technique is 
about achieving a goal with a minimum of effort. In music 
this can be heard as a relaxed precision in timing and pitch. 
It is a world of difference between listening to a singer who 
can hit the tones and one who has difficulties. As we implic-
itly imitate the other her lack of technique becomes our 
trouble. We suffer when the singer has difficulties in hitting 
the tones. The skilled and talented musician makes this with-
out effort. To experience this could in some sense be com-
pared to watching the Brazilian soccer star Ronaldinho with a 
ball.  It is pure joy. 
Professional instrumentalists can listen to a tune and then play it. 
They are duplicating the movement pattern of the first performer just 
from the sounding music. Music is choreography. 
Do non-musicians imitate this movement? Yes, to a certain extent. 
An obvious feature in music is that it propels movement. We jog, 
dance, run, pump weights, play air guitar, and mime in skipping-
ropes to music (some of us). Rap music is largely a way to move, 
even to the extent that there is a fashion of lose cloths to go with 
this lax rhythmic pattern. It is quite hard to sing a song by a famous 
artist (e.g. karaoke) without impersonating the voice as well as the 
moves. 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
 
110 
In fact one of the basic functions of music is to guide movement. 
Let me remind of the working songs of seamen (shanties), railroad 
workers, and the slaves. 
So music makes us move, but is this really to be compared to cho-
reography? We could expect that a dancer who has once learned to 
dance to a piece of music, would, in accordance to the experiments 
on musicians, latently perform the dance movements when she lis-
tens to the music. But this movement pattern would be different 
from the conductor’s movement and the conductor’s movement 
would be different from the movements of the musicians. And one 
musician does not move as the other does since the movements are 
adjusted to the instruments. Thus we cannot claim that there is gen-
eral relation between music and movement. Music is choreography, 
but it is not the same choreography for every category of listeners. 
However there is a certain resemblance between these different 
patterns. Directions are often sensed as the melody “moves” from 
low to high registers and vice versa. Timing and the intensity plus an 
amount of structural features such as legato, leaps, and syncopations 
– are felt and imitated. 
To sum up: We can take dyadic perspectives as we listen to music. 
According to the theory presented in Chapter 2 this means that we 
integrate the perspective of the other in our egocentric perspective. 
It is as if we were playing. If the musician is present this is no prob-
lem. If the musician is not physically present her movements are still 
heard and can to some extent be imitated. 
The persona and the metaphor theories sketched in the introduc-
tory chapter imply that the perception of music is associated with 
human movement. But what I suggest here is that what we perceive 
in the dyadic perspective is not the music, but the musician. This has 
consequences for the analysis of interaction, situation understanding 
and the perception of technique. The music is the expression of the 
other. Seen this way, we are confronted with a situation – someone 
is expressing herself intentionally and emotionally. The answer to 
the question, how something as abstract as music can move us, is: It 
is not the music but the musician that moves us. 
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Immediate imitation 
Imitation can be overt or latent, immediate or delayed. Latent imita-
tion, which always is immediate, can be seen only in the neuronal 
pattern (Rizzolatti et al. 1999)166. There is proof of immediate imita-
tion of music (Lahav et al. 2007). I suggest that immediate latent 
imitation paves the way for delayed imitation. In other words, this is 
how imitation is learned. 
Immediate imitation demands action prediction. The superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS) seems to be involved in action prediction, and in 
particular in the updating of predictions after a violation has occurred 
(Saxe et al. 2004167; Greeze et al. 2004168; Bosbach et al. 2005169). 
Haueisen & Knoesche (2001) performed neurological studies on 
pianists listening to music and found statistically significant increase of 
activity in primary motor cortex and the supplementary motor area. 
The authors found that finger-related motor cortex activation in re-
sponse to a particular note in a familiar sequence occurred 300 ms 
before the note could be heard. There is thus a continuous motor 
anticipation and activation as the music unfolds. If this anticipation 
did not exist, it would be impossible to play together with other 
musicians. 
But not only fellow musicians share the time dimension, so does 
the audience. 
This means that we must make a specification: We do not, as we lis-
ten to music, imitate the movements of the other, but the anticipation 
of the movement of the other. The word imitation becomes problem-
atic as we become totally synchronized in sequences. Perhaps en-
trainment is a better word for this? 
                                           
166  Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L. & Gallese, V. (1999) Resonance behaviors and 
mirror neurons. Archives of Italian Biology. May. 137 (2–3). 85–100 
167  Saxe, R., Xiao, D.-K., Kovacs, G., Perrett, D.I. & Kanwisher, N. (2004) A region of 
right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to observed intentional actions. 
Neuropsychologia. Vol. 42. No 11. 1435–1446 
168  Grèzes, J., Frith, C.D. & Passingham, R.E. (2004) Inferring false beliefs from the 
actions of oneself and others: an fMRI study, Neuroimage. Vol. 21. No 2. 744–750 
169  Bosbach, S., Cole, J., Prinz, W., & Knoblich, G. (2005). Understanding another's 
expectation from action: The role of peripheral sensation. Nature Neuroscience. Vol. 
8. No 10. 1295–1297 
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Entrainment theory is in fact not only about how we adapt our 
movement to each other, but about any movement adjustment. A 
person tends to move her limbs in ratios of 1/1, 1/2, 1/3 or 2/3 
(Port et al. 1996)170. This is referred to as self-entrainment. It is a 
possible explanation for the ratios in musical rhythms and for the 
discrete time values. This is how we naturally move our limbs when 
we play and dance. Rhythmically complex music like flamenco re-
veals that the skilled musician is able to coordinate highly complex 
ratios. 
Models for entrainment started to emerge in the mid 90s (Large & 
Kolen 1994)171, (McAuley 1995)172. Entrainment was described as a 
form of prediction that may help establish what information in a pat-
tern should be processed, as well as when that processing should 
occur. When sensory rhythmic input stops, sustained cortical activity 
continues to be observed at the conditioned frequency. Also, if 
pulses of the rhythmic stimulus are left out, the entrained neurons 
will fill in the missing beats. This connects to the complementary 
imagery theory (see Chapter 3). The mechanism is not thought to 
depend on any particular kind of stimulus. Rather it is a general ca-
pacity of the central nervous system to reflect temporal patterns in 
the environment. 
J. Devin McAuley states in his thesis Perception of time as phase: 
toward an adaptive model of rhythmic pattern processing (1995) that 
time has three levels: 
1. The ordinal scale (the order of events) 
2. The interval scale (duration between events) 
3. Tempo – a pattern of intervals constituting the beat 
                                           
170  Port, R., Tajima, K., & Cummins, F. (1996) Self-entrainment in animal behaviour 
and human speech. Online Proceedings of the 1996 Midwest Artificial Intelligence 
and Cognitive Science Conference. http:// 
www.cs.indiana.edu/event/maics96/Proceedings/Port/port/.html 
171  Large, E.W. & Kolen, J.F. (1994) Resonance and the perception of musical meter. 
Connection Science. Vol. 2. No. 6. 177–208 
172  McAuley, J.D. (1995) Perception of Time as Phase: Toward an adaptive-oscillator 
model of rhythmic pattern processing. Technical Report No. 151 (Doctoral disserta-
tion), Indiana University Cognitive Science Program 
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McAuley distinguishes two kinds of intervals: Filled intervals are the 
intervals filled with a sounding tone, whereas empty intervals are 
the intervals between onsets of tones. McAuley focuses on the latter 
type. Empty durations create the theoretical problem that there is 
nothing to be perceived, yet they are perceived. We can perceive 
time itself as durations. I believe that these intervals are empty only 
in the sense that there is an empty duration between events as fo-
cused figures. However there is a flow of external and internal 
background events constituting a frame of reference where the fo-
cussed events are allocated. If we for example take the own body 
as a frame of reference, the duration heard can be compared to own 
movement even if this is just eye movements or breathing. 
In his thesis McAuley developed an adaptive oscillator model of 
entrainment. The concept adaptive oscillator emanates from the idea 
of the coupling of oscillators, which anecdotally is associated with 
the Dutch physicist Christiaan Huygens who 1665 observed from his 
bedside during an illness that two clocks hanging side by side were 
synchronized in the motion of their pendulums. He assumed that the 
clocks “communicated” through vibrations in the wall. And, as he 
moved one of the clocks to another wall the effect ceased to appear. 
McAuley: 
The adaptive oscillator internalizes a beat, retaining a memory of 
that beat after the pattern stops. This creates expectancy for the 
occurrence of future inputs. (McAuley 1995: 12) 
In the case of “missing” inputs, as well as when the rhythmic pattern 
stops, the adaptive oscillator continues to predict future inputs. In 
essence, the adaptive oscillator internalizes a beat, retaining a mem-
ory of that beat after the pattern stops. 
Unfortunately this does not mean that McAuley or Large & Kolen 
have come up with the final scientific explanation of entrainment. 
The theory is mainly a mathematical model that can make computers 
“swing”. The oscillator models do not show how this can be ex-
plained on a neuronal level. 
The most salient feature in popular music is the beat. We know 
exactly when the next beat is going to happen – creating this “now-
trance”, which is such a typical musical experience. All the other 
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events are ratios of durations between these beats. We feel the six-
teenth notes clicking, even in the breaks. Not approximately but 
exactly. Entrainment can be pre-attentive, but if we focus on the 
music, the effect can be a desymbolization, where the past and fu-
ture is lost in the intensification of the present. Paradoxically, the 
sense of time is lost. We are in the present moment – in the very 
beat. It creates authenticity: The experience of the unique moment 
lived here and now. Sublime experiences in music are often re-
ported as a loss of the sense of time (Gabrielsson 2001)173. 
The listener is moved by the music from cognitive consciousness 
to phenomenal consciousness or even so called alternate states of 
consciousness such as trance and hypnoses. Such states heighten the 
suggestivity. 
In the dyadic perspective the “living horizon of the now” (Husserl 
1991: 16) contains the other as the frame of reference. Time is a 
shared dimension. 
…when people move synchronously or in temporal coordination, 
they are participating in an aspect of each others experience. They 
are partially living from the others centre. (Stern 2004: 81) 
Emotional expression 
“The emotions perceived to be expressed in musical stimuli are ca-
pable of evoking corresponding affective reactions in the listener” 
(Bruner II 1990)174. This simply states that music expresses the emo-
tions we would expect it to express. If it is lively, it expresses live-
liness and so on. But this argument is circular since it is lively be-
cause that is how we perceive it to be. We need a deeper under-
standing. 
The mere fact that emotions can be expressed by music is a won-
der. Music can express emotions just as faces, bodies and prosody 
                                           
173  Gabrielson, A. (2001) Emotions in strong experiences with music. Music and 
Emotion – theory and research (Eds. P.N.Juslin & J.A. Sloboda). Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
174  Bruner II, G.C. (1990) Music mood and marketing. Journal of Marketing. Vol. 54. 
No 4. 94–104 
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can. The whole register of emotions can be expressed. For this rea-
son the key to understand music and emotion must be the under-
standing of emotional expression. 
I am going to discuss vocal expression and body movement, but 
leave out facial expression. This is not because facial expression is 
unrelated to singing. I believe it is. But as yet there is no research 
on this. 
Singing is obviously more basic than performing instrumental mu-
sic, maybe with the exception of drumming. While playing an in-
strument usually involves declarative learning, singing is entirely 
procedural. Practically anybody can imitate a melody. We do not 
have to consciously learn how to move the body to produce a cer-
tain tone or sound.  We can step up to the piano, hit a random key 
and then sing the tone, without testing. There is an automated con-
nection between a heard tone and the motor production of this tone. 
A choir leader can give the voices tone and the whole choir starts 
singing at commando. Almost anyone can imagine a tone and then 
sing it. We can impersonate voices and accents. The body knows 
how, but we are not aware of this knowledge. 
The most basic intention in vocal expression is to connect (Pank-
sepp 1998)175. It is emotional before there is symbolical content. And 
when there are words, there is still always an emotional underpin-
ning – the prosody. Is the vocal expression of emotion a common 
source for music and speech (emotional prosody)? This idea is far 
from new. As pointed out in the introduction Rousseau exercised this 
idea in Essay on the origin of languages 1761 (Rousseau 1986). The 
English philosopher Herbert Spencer stated 150 years ago in an arti-
cle called The origins and function of music that there is a “general 
law that the feeling is a stimulus to muscular action” (Spencer 1857: 
400)176. “Spencer’s law” is still influential. There are several exam-
ples of involuntary connections between emotion and voice such as 
laughter, crying, sobbing, and the terrible experience of losing one’s 
voice when in presence of authorities. How does this affect prosody 
                                           
175  Panksepp, J. (1998) Affective Neuroscience – the foundations of human and 
animal emotions. Oxford University Press. New York 
176  Spencer, H. (1857) The origin and function of music. Fraser’s Magazine, 56. 367–
408 
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and singing? Do we perceive sad music as sad because of the reso-
nance with our own crying? 
Laughter and crying is spontaneous. So is prosody. The emotion 
just comes out as behaviour. For the most part we are not even 
aware of it. And when we are, we have trouble hiding it. The ex-
pression reveals our state. 
The topic of vocal expression in speech and music is a field of re-
search. A review of recent literature is presented by Juslin & Laukka 
(2003)177. Laukka concludes in his dissertation (2004: 55)178: 
1. Vocal emotions are understood cross-culturally (although 
there is an “in-group advantage”) 
2. Distinct patterns of voice cues correspond to discrete emo-
tions (basic emotions such as anger, fear, disgust, happi-
ness, sadness and tenderness). 
3. The idea of an evolutionary perspective on vocal expres-
sion is supported. 
Since voice cues are universally understood, there is no need to 
account for them here. They sound as we expect them to sound. It 
is enough to give an example. Sadness is, according to Laukka, ex-
pressed by 
[l]ow mean Fo, little Fo variability, low maximum Fo, falling Fo 
contours, little jitter, low voice intensity, little voice intensity vari-
ability, little high-frequency energy, low mean F1, wide bandwidth 
of F1, slackened articulation, rounded glottal waveform, slow 
speech rate, much pauses, and microstructural irregularity. (Laukka 
2004: 56) 
This simply states that sadness is expressed when the melody of 
speech is held in a low register, is not moving much and when it 
does, it is falling in small steps. The tempo of the sad voice is slow 
with pauses. The timbre is rounded and soft. 
                                           
177  Juslin, P.N. & Laukka, P. (2003) Communication of emotions in vocal expression 
and music performance: different channels, same code? Psychological bulletin. 
Vol. 129. No 5. 770–814 
178  Laukka, P. (2004) Vocal Expression of Emotion – discrete-emotions and dimen-
sional accounts. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala 
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Intuitively we already know this. Furthermore the description fits 
with the expression of sad music (Gabrielsson & Lindström 2001). 
Chromatic (small second interval) falling movement is particularly 
characteristic of sad music. In fact all Laukka’s findings about emotion 
in prosody are paralleled in the Gabrielsson & Lindström examina-
tion of emotional expression in music. 
It does not take much fantasy to imagine the survival value of vo-
cal expression of emotion and intention. I add intention here, be-
cause I believe that the mere intention to connect is vital. The urge 
of wanting something is typically expressed by inarticulate vocal 
expression (as any parent who has tried to pass the cash register in a 
supermarket with a five year old would subscribe to). 
Recently the concept “the song system” or “the singing system” has 
appeared in neurological reports (Brown et al. 2004a179; Zarate & 
Zatorre 2005180). Does this imply that there in fact is a special song 
system in the sense that nature has designed a system for singing in 
human beings? We have, as with music, these two options: 
1. “The song system” is an inherited system with direct sur-
vival value. 
2. Singing is a target domain, a capacity depending on a 
composite of subsystems each with survival value devel-
oped in source domains (earlier developed capacities). 
The first option is supported by the fact that singing is a universally 
distributed skill. It is, as stated, embodied procedural knowledge; 
and we have an inherited capacity to develop this skill. The second 
alternative entails that vocal emotional and intentional expression is 
the basic survival ability and that this ability together with other ca-
pacities has developed to the art form music. 
Singing generally activates auditory cortices, primary motor corti-
ces, the supplementary motor area (SMA), the insula, the cingulate 
                                           
179  Brown, S., Martinez, M., Hodges, D., Fox, P. & Parsons L. (2004a) The song sys-
tem of the human brain. Cognitive Brain Research. Vol. 20. No 3. 363–375 
180 Zarate, J.M. & Zatorre, R.J. (2005) Neural substrates governing audiovocal integra-
tion for vocal pitch regulation in singing. Annals of the New York Academy of Sci-
ences. Vol. 1060. The Neurosciences and Music II: From Perception to Performance. 
(Eds. G. Avanzini, S. Koelsch, L. Lopez & M. Manjo) 404–408 
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sulcus, the thalamus, and the cerebellum (Perry et al. 1999181; Brown 
et al. 2004a; Zarate & Zatorre 2005). Additionally the inferior frontal 
gyrus is activated by singing (Riecker et al. 2000)182. This area is 
critical for pitch (Hyde et al. 2006) 183. 
The insula and the cingulate cortex are not only activated by sing-
ing but also by music perception generally, (Koelsch et al. 2005; 
Tillmann et al. 2003a) and by pleasurable music specifically (Blood 
& Zatorre 2001184; Griffiths et al. 2004185; Brown et al. 2004b)186. 
These two brain areas emerge consistently in the reports of music 
production and perception. What do we know about them? Let me 
present some findings. 
The insula and the cingulate cortex are generally known to be in-
volved in the monitoring and control of bodily processes such as 
breathing. Together they constitute an area for perception and regu-
lation of various bodily states including sexual feelings, appetite, 
taste, and the anticipation of potential gain (Davidson 2005)187. 
The insula is a large area situated behind the lateral sulcus. It con-
nects the neocortex, the thalamus and the amygdala together. The 
general function is believed to be the production of emotionally 
relevant context for sensory experience. The frontal part called fron-
tal operculum, also known as Broca’s area, is important for sequenc-
                                           
181  Perry, D.W., Zatorre, R.J., Petrides, M., Alivisatos, B., Meyer, E. & Evans, A. (1999) 
Localization of cerebral activity during simple singing. NeuroReport. Vol. 10. No 18. 
3979–3984 
182  Riecker, A., Ackermann, H., Wildgruber, D., Meyer, J., Dogil, G. & Heider, H. 
(2000) Opposite hemispheric lateralization effects during speaking and singing at 
motor cortex, insula and cerebellum. Neuroreport.  Vol. 11. No. 9. 1997–2000 
183  Hyde, K.L., Zatorre, R.J., Griffiths, T.J., Lerch, J.P. & Peretz, I. (2006) Morphometry 
of the amusic brain: a two-site study. Brain. Vol. 129. No 10. 2562–2570  
184  Blood, A. & Zatorre, R.J. (2001) Intensely pleasurable responses to music corre-
late with activity in brain regions implicated in reward and emotion. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences. Vol. 98. No 20. Sept. 25. 11818–11823  
185  Griffiths, T.D., Warren, J.D., Dean, J.L. & Howard D. (2004) “When the feeling’s 
gone": a selective loss of musical emotion. Journal of Neurology Neurosurgery and 
Psychiatry, 75. 344–345 
186  Brown, S., Martinez, M. & Parsons, L. (2004b) Passive music listening spontane-
ously engages limbic and paralimbic systems. Neuroreport. Vol. 15. No 13. 
September 15. 2033–2037  
187  Davidson, R. (2005) http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2005–08/uow-
sbs082605.php 
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ing speech and music (Lahav, Salzman & Schlaug 2007). This area 
receives projections from tongue nerves (Ogava, Ito & Nomura 
1985)188. It has been pointed out as an area containing mirror neu-
rons (Iacobini & Lenzi 2002). For this reason Iacobi & Lenzi have 
proposed that the insula is involved in empathic emotions. 
The cingulate gyrus has been implicated in the mediation of social 
motivation – the desire to communicate (Panksepp 1998). This area 
is activated by music generally, and by rhythm specifically (Parsons 
2003)189 and as already pointed out by pleasant music. The anterior 
part is activated in singing. When electrically stimulated in this part 
subjects (squirrel monkeys) start involuntarily vocalizing (Muller-
Preuss 1980)190. There is a feedback connection from the cingulate 
gyrus to the auditory cortex. Thus auditory cortex activity is altered 
by cingulate activity. 
Both the insula and the cingulate cortex have been pointed out in 
an fMRI study of romantic love (Bartels & Zeki 2000)191. The stimuli 
were pictures of loved ones. As control, pictures of friends were 
shown. The romantic love foci overlap, according to the authors, 
with areas activated by drugs such as cocaine. 
The insula and the cingulate gyrus overlap with the extrapyramidal 
motor system. For this reason Bartels & Zeki raise the question of 
whether the activity is related to motor planning or imagery associ-
ated with the loved person. These areas have not been reported 
before as activated in motor imagery tasks. An argument for the mo-
tor imagery stressed by the authors is that these areas, via the pu-
tamen, are part of the dopamine system for movement. 
As can be seen from this brief survey the findings are quite dispa-
rate. But I think it is safe to state that the insula and the cingulate 
                                           
188  Ogava, H., Ito, S. & Nomura, T. (1985) Two distinct projection areas from tongue 
nerves in the frontal operculum of macaque monkeys as revealed with evoked 
potential mapping. Neuroscientific Research. Vol. 2. No. 6. August. 447–59 
189  Parsons, L.M. (2003) Exploring the functional neuroanatomy of music perform-
ance, perception and comprehension. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Music (Eds. I. 
Peretz & R.J. Zatorre) New York University Press. Chap. 17 
190  Muller-Preuss, P., Newman, J.D. & Jurgens, U. (1980) Anatomical and physiologi-
cal evidence for a relationship between the “cingular" vocalization area and the 
auditory cortex in the squirrel monkey. Brain Research. Vol. 202. No 2. 307–315 
191  Bartels, A. & Zeki, S. (2000) The neural basis of romantic love. NeuroReport. 
Vol. 11. No 17. 3829–3834 
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gyrus are both implicated in the registration of bodily states as well 
as in the activation of vocal expression.  
In this context it is interesting to recall that Panksepp emphasized 
that the cingulate cortex is activated by the urge to communicate. 
This implies what most singers and listeners feel: Singing is activated 
by the urge to express oneself socially – to communicate intentions 
and emotions. 
I conclude: The insula and the cingulate cortex transform body 
states to emotions and emotions to vocalizations in the singer – and 
transform heard vocalizations to emotions in the listener. We know 
that these two areas are activated in the registration of 
1. The own body (through feed back systems) 
2. The other’s body (through the mirror system) 
3. Faces (loved ones) 
4. Music 
The connection between the neural registration of loved faces and 
vocalization in the same area is intriguing. I would say that the ma-
jority of all songs are about love. And that this is the best selling 
theme: love in every respect, but perhaps above all lost love. The 
imagined loved other. 
This neurological exposé hints a possible understanding of 
Spencer’s law. There is something in common not only in music and 
speech. Music is, as is prosody, after all heard movement. Let me 
remind the reader that the insula connects pre-motor areas with the 
limbic system. To some extent there is a common factor that effects 
vocal expression, body movement and music the same way – a 
general emotional effect on the body which propels movement pat-
terns manifested in movements, prosody and music. 
Emotional contagion 
There is a difference between listening to somebody telling us she 
is happy and being affected by her smile. Sadly, we can be quite 
Listening to the Other 
 
121 
indifferent when somebody tells us about her happiness. This tells us 
that the information that the other is happy can be communicated on 
two different levels: As a semantic cognitive understanding emanat-
ing from the fact that someone is telling us about her state, or as so 
called emotional contagion defined by Hatfield et al. (1994: 5) as 
“the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expres-
sions, vocalizations, postures and movements with those of another 
person and, consequently, to converge emotionally”. 
Applied to music the distinction means that either we can explic-
itly draw a conclusion about the emotion: “This must be sad because 
it is in a minor key and the tempo is slow”. This is a cognitive un-
derstanding. The mode minor and the tempo signify sadness. If we 
on the other hand just feel the sadness, without considering why, it 
is emotional contagion. 
In the case of egocentric emotions we used the behaviourist 
model proposed by Edmund Rolls. Emotions according to this model 
are the result of rewards or punishment. In the dyadic case the 
emotion is not caused by a reinforcer. It is caused by another person 
contaminating us with her emotion. It is an emotion communicated. 
For this reason the behaviourist theory is not apt to describe dyadic 
emotions. 
The emotional contagion theory is supported by evidence that we 
have special-purpose brain modules, which automatically and sub-
cortically process acoustic stimuli, resulting in immediate emotional 
response (Juslin & Laukka 2004). The authors present the following 
list of evidence: 
1. Modules are domain specific: There is brain dissociation 
between judgements of musical emotion and musical struc-
ture. (Peretz, Gagnon & Bouchard 1998)192. This implies 
that the emotion does not emanate from judgement of the 
structure. 
                                           
192  Peretz, I., Gagnon, L. & Bouchard, B. (1998) Music and emotion: perceptual de-
terminants, immediacy, and isolation after brain damage. Cognition. Vol. 68. No. 2. 
111–141  
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2. Modules are quick: Judgements of musical emotions are 
quicker than cognitive judgements.  (Peretz, Gagnon & 
Bouchard 1998). 
3. Modules are innately specific: The ability to perceive emo-
tions develops early. (Cunningham & Sterling 1988)193 
4. Modules are autonomous: The processing in the perception 
of emotional expression is primarily implicit. (Niedenthal & 
Showers 1991)194 
5. Modules are hardwired: It is impossible to relearn how to 
associate expressive forms with emotions. (Clynes 1977: 
45)195 
6. Modules are automatic: Emotional induction through music 
is possible even if listeners do not attend to the music. 
(Västfjäll 2002)196 
Let me exemplify emotional contagion: If a person is thirsty and 
drinks – we need to drink, if she vomits – it makes us nauseous, if 
she urinates – we want to urinate, if she yawns – we have this sud-
den urge to yawn, if she cries – it brings tears to our eyes, if she 
laughs – she makes us laugh, if she gets angry – we might have a 
slight tendency to get angry too, if she sings a song – we tend to 
fall in, if she loves us and gives us a hug – it is easy to love her 
back, and if she is sexually aroused – we feel the urge. 
Charles Darwin listed six categories of communicable emotions: 
disgust, fear, anger, sadness, tenderness and happiness (Darwin 
                                           
193  Cunningham, J.G. & Sterling, R.S. (1988) Developmental changes in the under-
standing of affective meaning in music. Motivation and emotion. Vol. 12. No.4. 
399–413 
194  Niedenthal, P.M. & Showers, C. (1998) The perdeption and processing of affec-
tive information and its influences on social judgement. In Emotion and social 
Judgements (Ed. J.P. Forgas) Pergamon Press, Oxford, England. 125–153  
195  Clynes, D.M. (1977) Sentics: The Touch of Emotion. Anchor Press/Doubleday, 
New York 
196  Västfjäll, D. (2002) A review of the musical mood induction procedure. Musicae 
Scientiae. Special Issue. 173–211 
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1872)197. There are as Darwin proposed vital functions in emotional 
communication between conspecifics. If the other shows 
1. disgust, you fear eating the same food. 
2. fear of something, you get scared or you take advantage. 
3. anger, you prepare to fight or to flee. 
4. sadness, you tend to be sad or you might experience love 
and concern. 
5. tenderness, you love her back. 
6. happiness, you feel that everything is OK. 
Since these emotions can be communicated it is enough that one 
individual discovers the danger; it is enough that one individual 
finds out that this can be eaten but not this etc. This is the evolution-
ary aspect of the benefits of communication of emotions.  These 
emotions are expressed in a way that makes them communicative. 
As can be seen from the examples complementary emotions are 
sometimes aroused. The concept of emotional contagion is for this 
reason not optimal to describe direct and unmediated communication 
of emotion. 
Empathy 
Empathy (from the Greek , “to suffer with") is commonly 
used in the sense of the direct experience of the emotion of the 
other – to “put oneself into another's shoes". As the reader may re-
call, imagination was described as the integration of a perspective 
into the egocentric perspective. The formulation “put oneself into 
another’s shoes” catches this. Empathy thus depends on your ability 
to imagine that you are the other. 
The Germans use the related word Einfühlung in the psychology 
of aesthetic experience, to denote the relationship between an art-
                                           
197  Darwin, C. (1872) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. J. 
Murray, London. 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
 
124 
work and the observer, who imaginatively projects herself into the 
contemplated object (Gallese 2003a)198. Theodor Lipps extended the 
concept of Einfühlung to the domain of intersubjectivity, which he 
characterized in terms of inner imitation of the perceived move-
ments of others. When I am watching a tightrope dancer, Lipps 
noted…” ich fühle mich so in ihm” (Lipps 1903)199. 
The ability to take the perspective of the other is crucial for empa-
thy. The importance of imitation to empathy is stressed by the notion 
that expression, and recognition of expression and gestures are im-
paired in individuals with autism. And, even more, by the observa-
tion that autistic infants lack in coordination of activity with their 
caregiver. Bråten observed that when a mother holds up her palms, 
children usually put their palms so that the palms touch. But children 
diagnosed as autistic tend to put their hands with their palms facing 
themselves (Bråten 1999)200. They imitate from an egocentric per-
spective! This indicates that the condition for empathy as the ability 
to take the other’s perspective could be taken literally – not only 
metaphorically. 
In 2002 Stephanie Preston and Francis de Waal published an arti-
cle on empathy introducing the PAM – model (perception-action 
model) for empathy. The authors are influenced by the findings of 
mirror neurons. The article treats empathy as a communication of an 
emotion from one person to the other so that the emotion evoked in 
the subject is the same as the emotion of the other. The authors ar-
gue 
[that] attended perception of the object’s state automatically acti-
vates the subject’s representations of the state, situation, and ob-
ject, and that activation of these representations automatically 
primes or generates the associated and somatic responses, unless 
inhibited. (Preston & de Waal 2002: 4) 
                                           
198  Gallese, V. (2003a) The roots of empathy: The shared manifold hypothesis and 
the neural basis of intersubjectivity. Psychopathology. Vol. 36. No 4. 171–180 
199  Lipps, T. (1903) Einfühlung, innere Nachahmung und Organempfindung. Archiv 
für gesamte Psychologie. 1. 465–519  
200  Bråten, S. (1999) Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early On-
togeny. Cambridge University Press 
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The authors present a list of catalysts facilitating empathy: 
1. Similarity 
2. Familiarity 
3. Cue salience 
This article caused a storm. Psychologists argued that empathy is 
caused by cognitive awareness of the other’s situation and thus that 
empathy is more than an implicit feeling.  Researchers in the field of 
mirror neurons on the other hand were generally more in agree-
ment with the article. 
The emotion-movement connection 
The communication of empathy thus depends on the automatic two-
way connection between emotions and movements. Proprioceptive 
feedback (feedback informing the brain of the positions of body 
parts) is involved in this process. This can be exemplified: When we 
scratch a dog behind her ear, she starts kicking. And just by per-
forming a facial expression mechanically, we get affected. This feed-
back from the manifestation of an emotion to the emotion itself is 
one of the keys to the understanding of the communication of emo-
tions. This adds to an understanding how a perceived manifestation 
of an emotion in another person can evoke that same emotion in the 
beholder – without any intermediaries in the form of conscious rep-
resentations. The model suggested by Preston & de Waal suggests 
that imitation explains how we are emotionally contaminated by the 
other’s actions. The action of the other triggers a spontaneous ten-
dency to imitate, and this tendency makes us feel the emotion, they 
claim. 
The connection movement-emotion has been suggested before. 
William James presented the idea that emotions emanate from 
movements in 1884 in an influential paper called What is emotion? 
(James 1884)201. 
                                           
201  James, W. (1884) What is emotion? Mind. 9. 188–205 
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Using the technique of Johansson (1973)202, with point-light dis-
plays placed on people in dark environments in order to capture 
pure movements, Cutting & Kozlowski (1997)203 found that we are 
not only capable of recognizing the identity of a walking person, but 
also the emotion of this person from pure movement observation 
(cheerful or depressed and sad). 
As mentioned above, developmental psychologists have taken in-
terest in imitation. Intuitive motherese (the way mothers address 
their babies) is universal. There is, says Daniel Stern, a focus in this 
conversation on the time course of the feeling intensity, the tempo-
ral feeling shape (Stern 1995)204. The temporal feeling shape of the 
observer will correspond to that of the observed, resulting in affec-
tive attunement – shared affective states. Daniel Stern calls this emo-
tion the vitality affect, captured by kinetic terms: crescendo, decre-
scendo, fading, exploding, bursting, elongated, pulsing, wavering, 
effortful and easy (Stern 1993)205. As can be seen these terms partly 
correspond to the Italian terms for musical articulations. 
The vitality affect adds a dynamic, cross-modal aspect to the under-
standing of empathy. It is, as is empathy, a dyadic emotion. It re-
quires shared “almost identical capacities for temporal discrimination” 
between the participants. Stern shows how emotions are cross 
modally evoked, shared and regulated. The inner subjective qualities 
of feeling are displayed as form, intensity and timing, observable 
and directly perceived as a physical expression of emotions. For 
instance, the child smiles to her mother, the mother intuitively an-
swers y-e-a-h in a smoothly arched pitch form showing the rise and 
fall of the smile of the baby, meaning –  “Oh! This is pretty much 
how you must have felt, and I am showing you I know by matching 
the temporal contour of my activity to yours” (Stern 1993). 
                                           
202  Johansson, G. (1973). Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its 
analysis. Perception & Psychophysics. 14. 201–211 
203  Cutting, J.E. & Kozlowski, L.T. (1977) Recognizing friends by their walk: Gait 
perception without familiarity cues. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society. 9. 353–356 
204  Stern, D. (1995) The Motherhood Constellation. Basic Books, New York  
205  Stern, D. (1993) The role of feelings for an interpersonal self. The Perceived Self 
(Ed. U. Neisser). Cambridge University Press 
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This “vitality affect” is empathetic. Stern’s contribution is that he 
makes this emotion dynamic and multimodal (the contour of the 
smile is imitated with the contour of the voice). 
Since the mirror neuron system is not only causing imitative action 
but also complementary action, we may suspect that this action leads 
to complementary emotions by means of proprioceptive feedback. 
But this intriguing possibility has up to now not been observed or 
examined. 
* * * 
How does the Preston & de Waals PAM theory fit with musical emo-
tions? Research in music psychology shows that listeners reliably 
discern emotional categories from musical features such as: 
1. amplitude – round/sharp 
2. articulation – staccato/legato 
3. harmony – simple/complex and consonant/dissonant 
4. volume 
5. dynamics – range in volume 
6. melody – pitch, range, direction and intervallic steps 
7. mode – major/minor 
8. rhythm – regular/irregular, smooth/rough, com-
plex/varied/firm, fluent 
9. tempo – fast/medium/slow 
10. timbre – soft/sharp 
11. tonality – tonal/atonal 
12. musical form 
The richness of variables studied (multivariate analysis technique) 
gives us a hint of how many variables we “weigh together” in our 
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perception of music without being conscious about it. Still these are 
very rough measures. By varying these variables different kinds of 
emotions can be perceived since every emotion has its own profile. 
But, when we take a closer look at these musical parameters, we 
find that most of them could be analysed as movements. Intervallic 
leaps are the size of the movement. Legato is a description of the 
smoothness of the motion. Volume is, as pitch, and speed related to 
intensity of the motion. Dynamic change is the vitality contour of 
motion, and so on. The same could be said about prosody and of 
course body language. From this point of view Spencer’s law seems 
to be correct. 
We can now see the importance of immediate imitation – the syn-
chronization of movements. In fact we have to share the present 
moment to be able to apprehend the change in intensity. We per-
ceive each other directly. Let us review Hatfield’s definition! Emo-
tional contagion is described as “the tendency to automatically mimic 
and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures and 
movements with those of another person and, consequently, to con-
verge emotionally”. Read literally, synchronizing leads to emotional 
contagion. Although radical, the statement fits with the feedback 
connections between emotions and their manifestations, described 
above. The importance of the time factor is verified by Stern’s video 
experiments of mothers presented on screen to their babies. When a 
short time displacement between the baby’s utterance and the 
mother’s reaction was made, the baby lost interest. Even if there is 
much more to explain in this process, we cannot ignore that in a 
broad field of research immediate imitation (synchronization, en-
trainment) is a condition for communication of emotions. It is the 
common factor. 
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Neurological support for the PAM model? 
Koelsch (et al. 2006)206 detected “a motor-related circuitry for 
pleasurable music comprising the ventral striatum, the insular cortex, 
the Rolandic, and possibly the frontal operculum”. This circuit served 
the formation of pre-motor representations for vocal sound produc-
tion during the perception of the pleasant musical excerpts. This 
indicates a specific perception-action network for music listening and 
vocal production. 
This interpretation is supported by a study reporting activation of 
the Rolandic operculum during the processing of intonation contour 
while listening to spoken sentences (Meyer et al. 2004)207, suggest-
ing that pre-motor programs for the production of prosodic signals 
(such as speech melody) are already formed when we are perceiv-
ing prosodic signals produced by other individuals. 
According to Koelsch the activation of the Rolandic operculum was 
observed during the perception of the pleasant, but not of the un-
pleasant musical information, “presumably due to the appetitive qual-
ity of the pleasant excerpts (the unpleasant excerpts rather evoked 
avoidance behaviour)”. At first sight this seems to be an interesting 
thought. It underlines the emotional (empathic) aspect of implicit 
imitation. Empathy is embodiment. But this argument comes danger-
ously close to being circular. If imitation causes pleasure, pleasure 
cannot cause imitation.  If the appetitive quality is caused by imita-
tion, it cannot be the reason for it. I would suggest another interpre-
tation: If we imitate the music, we like it. What then decides if we 
imitate or not? I will come back to this in the concluding chapter.  
This study supports the idea that music emotions imply mirror neu-
rons, the insula and the limbic system, but it is noteworthy that it is 
not supportive of the PAM model. The emotion described by 
Koelsch is not empathy in the sense that the same emotion is 
                                           
206  Koelsch, S., Fritz, T., v. Cramon, Y., Müller, K., & Friederici, A.D. (2006) Investigat-
ing emotion with music: An fMRI study. Human Brain Mapping. Vol. 27. No 3. 
239–250 
207  Meyer, M., Steinhauer, K., Alter, K., Friederici, A.D. & von Cramon, D.Y. (2004) 
Brain activity varies with modulation of dynamic pitch variances in sentence melody. 
Brain and Language. Vol. 89. No. 2. 277–289 
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evoked in the beholder as in the other. Rather he describes a gen-
eral positive emotion. If so mirror neurons could not explain why 
different kinds of music elicit different emotions. But it could explain 
the general good feeling elicited by music even when the music is 
recognized as sad. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter 1 I argued that perceptual learning is based on action 
and thus that it implies a movement pattern. The knowledge of 
sounding music is procedural. We called this pattern a sensory-motor 
schema. In this chapter we have discussed a mechanism implied in 
action imitation and completion – the mirror neuron system. This is a 
pre-motor-insula-limbic circuit. There is thus neurological support for 
the theory that movement and emotion are reciprocally connected. 
In the dyadic perspective, the listener imitates the emotional expres-
sion of the other (e.g. the musician) manifested in the music. This 
imitated movement causes the emotion.  
The fMRI study of Koelsch supports the theory to some extent, but 
it stresses that mirror neuron activity causes a general positive emo-
tion and that there is no mirror neuron activity if the music is not 
liked. If so mirror neuron could not explain the variety of emotions 
in music listening and the PAM theory could not be applied to mu-
sic. The research is however in a virginal state. I foresee that we 
will have clarifying evidence within a few years. 
Discussion 
Mirror neuron theory explains implicit imitation and completion. This 
is a prerequisite for communication and learning. It makes us sense 
the intentions, the goals and the emotions of the other directly and 
implicitly. 
These points could preferably be combined. The emotional bond is 
vital for learning and it is vital to have an emotional understanding 
of the situation to see the purpose of action. Thus it has been argued 
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that covert imitation plays a role in our ability to understand other 
people’s actions, so called action understanding (Gergely & Csibra 
2003)208, which involves the intentions and predicted goals behind 
actions (Buccino et al. 2004)209. The most full-blown theory suggests 
that the observer, in her reproduction of the other’s movements, 
reproduces the sensory consequences of those actions (Hesslow 
2002)210. Wilson and Knoblich (2005) suggest that we use our own 
bodies to track the other person’s actions in real time and that this 
produces a sense of top-down understanding (I suggest imagery) 
filling our blanks in the sensory information and suggesting predic-
tions. It actually means that we transpose what we see in others to 
action tendencies in our own bodies and that this triggers imagina-
tion of intentions and outcomes. This produces top-down expecta-
tions and predictions of the unfolding action. 
In Vom Musikalisch Schönen Eduard Hanslick stated: 
Was kann also die Musik von den Gefühlen darstellen, wenn nicht 
deren Inhalt? Nur das Dynamische derselben. Sie vermag die Be-
wegung eines physischen Vorganges nach den Momenten: schnell, 
langsam, stark, schwach, steigend, fallend nachzubilden. Bewe-
gung ist aber nur eine Eigenschaft, ein Moment des Gefühls, nicht 
dieses selbst (Hanslick 1986: 26). 
As we can see Hanslick’s concept “Moment des Gefühls” is close to 
Stern’s vitality affect. Hanslick did not and could not know about the 
connection between the perception of “den Momenten: schnell, 
langsam, stark, schwach, steigend, fallend nachzubilden” and emo-
tion. I suggest that one dimension in music is the vitality affect and 
that this affect is picturing the composer’s and the artist’s sensorimo-
tor schema. This can be captured in a music score or a phonogram 
and brought to life later and act on the sensory motor schema of the 
listener. To be contaminated by music therefore does not necessarily 
                                           
208  Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological reasoning in infancy: The naive 
theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 7. No 7. 287–292 
209  Buccino, G., Binkofski, F., & Riggio, L. (2004). The mirror neuron system and 
action recognition. Brain and Language. Vol. 89. No. 2. 370–376 
210  Hesslow, G. (2002). Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and percep-
tion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 6. No. 6. 242–247 
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demand the presence of the other, even if this helps as additional 
information and action understanding. When we listen to a record 
the artist is absent, so is the composer, still we are entrained by the 
flow. 
As we have seen the perception process is to a large extent pre-
attentive. This means that we do not have to be aware of the other 
to be emotionally affected. It is thus not critical that we perceive the 
other in the music consciously. In other words we do not have to 
think or experience the music as the expression of the other to be 
affected by it – the movement of the other affects us anyway. The 
emotion does not result from the appraisal of the other; it does not 
result from conscious judgements. 
A lot of work remains to be done to confirm this theory. The evi-
dence is, as we have already seen, not unambiguous. Let me pro-
vide one more example. In the 2007 as well as the 2005 investiga-
tion of auditory mirror neurons, presented above, Lahav and his col-
leagues found that the subjects did imitate the music implicitly, pro-
vided they had rehearsed the piece and had the procedural knowl-
edge to play it. 
Although this seems to confirm the hypothesis, it does in fact con-
tradict it. Lahav’s test shows that we have to learn how to play the 
music for the activation in the mirror system to occur. This is the 
problem. It means that the mirror system is not activated in most 
cases. It has been said that Rachmaninov’s four piano concertos are 
very emotional, but how many in the audience knows how to play 
them? 
On the other hand Zatorre (et al. 2007)211 report that “even when 
listeners do not have explicit sound-movement associations, such as 
when passively listening to rhythms in a naive condition without 
foreknowledge about any motor task, they still show recruitment of 
pre-motor cortices and the SMA”. 
The last finding undoubtedly opens up for the possibility that we 
imitate unrehearsed pieces. We could imagine that even if we do 
not know how to play a song, we might know how to sing it and 
                                           
211  Zatorre, R.J., Chen, J.L. & Penhune, V.B. (2007) When the brain plays music: 
auditory– motor interactions in music perception and production. Nature Reviews. 
Neuroscience. Vol. 8. No 8. 547–558 
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beat the rhythm without rehearsal. ERP-experiments have shown 
that we can predict music if we are familiar with the type of struc-
ture. We will come back to this in the following chapter. 
This calls for further investigations. Here are some questions that 
have to be answered: 
1. Is the activation of the mirror system a condition for musical 
emotions? This demands a test where mirror system activation 
is correlated to physiological responses. 
2. Can the mirror system be activated by songs that we know 
how to sing, dances that we know how to dance or sympho-
nies that we know how to conduct? 
3. Can the mirror system be activated by music that we do not 
know but that is easy to predict (pop music as compared 
with atonal music)? 
4. How is imitation and prediction related? Are these two sepa-
rate processes? If so can we feel the mismatch when we imi-
tate some thing we did not predict? 
5. How is the rather mechanical theory of entrainment related 
to imitation and prediction? 
Let us weave the proposals made in this chapter together in one 
example! You are listening to Mozart’s Ein Weib ist das herrlichste 
Ding212. Now let us put the composer in the frame of reference. The 
phenomenologist Alfred Schütz once wrote: 
Although separated by hundreds of years, the latter (the listener) 
participates with quasi-simultaneity in the former’s (the com-
poser’s) stream of consciousness, by performing with him step by 
step the ongoing articulation of his musical thought. The beholder, 
thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to 
both. (Schütz 1964: 171)213  
                                           
212  Mozart, W.A. CD: Piano Variations. Vol. 3. Naxos  
213  Schütz, A. (1964) Collected papers: studies in social theory. Vol 2. (Ed. A. Broder-
sen). Martinus Nijhoff, Hague 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, imagery is the only way we are able to 
grasp structure in music (Halpern 2001). Thus composers must work 
in real time when they create music. Imagination elicits implicit 
movements. In other words, the composer, having the procedural 
knowledge of music, starts a real time imagery of music. You entrain 
the music and thereby the real time implicit movement of Mozart as 
he wrote the piece in 1791. You follow his imagination of the 
unfolding music and you share his bodily sensations (latent 
movement tendencies). You embody him. You are, in this sense, 
Mozart. This is an experience that separates music from other art forms. It 
depends on the temporal topography of music (Kivy 1989). 
And, this chapter argues, this is the reason why you momentarily 
share Mozart’s emotion. 
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Navigating in the Soundscape 
The Allocentric Perspective 
There is a resemblance between following a path travelling through 
a landscape and following a melody as it meanders through the mu-
sical topography. The structure unfolds. In this respect the listener 
can be compared to a the wanderer on a path, the rat in a maze, the 
driver on the highway, or the player passing through a virtual land-
scape in a computer game. 
Do we perceive music structure the same way we perceive other 
structures? For a structure to appear we need fixed landmarks in that 
structure. The perception of the topography in a landscape demands 
allocentric landmarks. 
The chapter consists of two parts. In the first part the perception of 
music structure is discussed. In the second part I will point out the 
parallels between the perception of music structure and the percep-
tion of structure in the landscape - navigation. I will argue that we 
have allocentric representations of music structure in the brain.  
Depiction of perspective 
The allocentric perspective is taken from a landmark situated outside 
the body. This has consequences for our perception of topography 
and our ability to navigate. 
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Examples: 
1. The location of the shop on my way to work can be per-
ceived either as “on my left” or opposite the church. In the 
first case I take an egocentric perspective using my own 
body as a landmark and in the second case the perspective is 
allocentric since the landmark is allocated to the church.  
2. When you walk in your home village you have a sense of 
direction. This is because you relate to some allocentric land-
mark such as the church, the nearest town, the cost etc. Your 
movement is defined in relation to this landmark. 
3. When you turn, the egocentric perspective changes. What 
was on your right is now on your left and vice versa. But 
the allocentric perspective remains the same, because you 
are on the same side of the church however you may turn. 
4. In the egocentric perspective the world is variant (changing) 
as you walk. This is the consequence of carrying the land-
mark with you. In the allocentric perspective the world is 
invariant (stationary), provided the landmark is stationary, 
and you are moving in the world. Direction and speed are 
related to the landmark. From an allocentric landmark a fixed 
structure, a topography, appears. 
The music structure consists of heard events on a temporal dimen-
sion. We must be able to identify places in the music for the struc-
ture to appear and relate musical events to these places. I will dis-
cuss the possibilities that the tonal centres and the sense of temporal-
ity in music produce allocentric landmarks. 
This discussion raises the question in what sense we can talk about 
place in sounding music. As stated in Chapter 3, spatial dimensions 
must not be seen. They can be heard. This was discussed as the per-
ception of the auditory scene. We can point out directions and tell 
the distance to the different instruments in an orchestra. This is how-
ever not what we are discussing in this perspective. Our concern 
here is the soundtrack as presented from one loudspeaker. It is the 
temporal stream of music, not a composite of sounds distributed in 
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space. Even so, we perceive place. In this respect the sound-track is 
to the listener what the scent-track is to a dog. The question about 
the perception of place in music will be illuminated in this chapter. 
The perception of music structure 
All music is structured along some organizing principle. If not, we 
would just experience chaotic noise. The organizing principle varies 
with music culture and styles. 
How is music structure perceived? On a basic level structure is 
perceived as reactions to the unexpected. The expected is seldom 
noted. If a tooth is missing in a smile, this is the tooth we will no-
tice. The missing tooth indicates that we were mistaken about the 
structure and that we have to reconcile.  Thus we do not hear every 
instrument in an orchestra. But if one of them is playing out of tune, 
it will be heard. The fact that mismatches direct our attention makes 
us remember mismatches easier than matches. The matches are so 
called redundant information that does not draw our attention. Since 
mismatches are attended to, there will be an effect on the previ-
ously presented feature imprinting (perceptual memory). 
Structure is thus perceived indirectly. The mere fact that we react 
to the deviance (the inappropriate chord, the false tone, the mis-
placed drumbeat) shows that we have an expectancy of structure 
and thus some kind of representation (memory) of music structure. 
In order to perceive structure, the allocentric perspective must be 
integrated with the egocentric perspective. The quasi-spatial dimen-
sions are lived as events in the narrow window of time called the 
present moment. The time window limits the perceived structure to 
a few seconds. Do we feel longer structures? If we did not, music 
form would not affect us. The sonata form, to take an example, can 
be discussed theoretically, but is it felt by the listener? Would it mat-
ter to a listener not educated in music form? This has to my knowl-
edge not been tested. 
The question is: How far ahead can we anticipate? My experience 
tells me that musicians feel at least 16 bars. In order to play by ear 
in a group, musicians must know where they are. If they are expe-
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rienced, they do not have to count bars to know this. I imagine that 
conductors need to have an intuitive “grip” of the music - the 
breathing of the entire structure. Gunnar Eriksson, conductor of 
Gothenburg Chamber Choir, aims for the subdominant. When he 
arrives there with the choir the rest of the phrase will unfold by 
itself. And this aim for the subdominant is what he tries to communi-
cate to the choir (Eriksson 2008)214. Likewise, in order to compose 
by ear or improvise, musicians must be able to feel the structure far 
ahead. It has happened that I have woken up with a 16 bar melody 
clear and ready. The question is however tricky since, as I intend to 
show, we perceive structure on a preconscious level. It is thus hard 
not to confuse cognitive knowledge of the piece with perceptual 
anticipation. The first kind is declarative and the second is probably 
procedural. If we are to feel these longer structures in the present 
moment then unitizing mechanisms are needed. I will discuss five 
main organizing principles: gestalt, perceptual learning, sequencing, 
chunking and music rules (of discrete pitch and time, tonality and 
periodicity). 
Gestalt 
Leonard Meyer was the first musicologist to systematically explore 
Gestalts in music. In his classical book Emotion and meaning and 
music (Meyer 1956) Meyer argued that the listener would react 
emotionally to fulfilments and violations of expectancies emanating 
from the sense of Gestalt. 
It has been demonstrated that the Gestalt principles act as organiz-
ing factors in music perception (Bregman 1990). However, since 
Gestalt laws are universal, we would perceive unfamiliar music just 
as well as we perceive familiar music, if this was the only structur-
ing principle. This is not the case at all. We have to look for learned 
effects.  
                                           
214  Eriksson, G. (2008) Personal information. 12/1 
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Perceptual learning 
From exposure to melodies, we learn how a heard melody is likely 
to develop. We have, according to David Huron, learnt to expect 
small melodic leaps rather than big leaps in Western music. Large 
intervals are more likely to ascend than small intervals; whereas 
small intervals are expected in descending melodies. If the melody 
is falling in small steps, we expect it to continue to fall. Large leaps 
are likely to be followed by a change in melody direction. A phrase 
is likely to have the shape of a bow. The end of a phrase is ex-
pected to fall (Huron 2006). 
This type of learning exemplifies a category of perceptual learning 
called “topological imprinting” (c.f. Chapter 2).  
We should separate perceptual learning within one piece of music 
from generalization between pieces. Learning one piece is to learn a 
sequence. When the knowledge from one piece is applied to an-
other piece, musical rules (sense of style) are formed. 
Sequencing 
How can we explain that jazz and rock musicians can play entire 
concerts without music scores? The information processed is so im-
mense that we can rule out that the whole structure is remembered. 
The speed of the soloist is too fast for conscious decision taking. We 
must assume automated chains of sequences and a set of cues to start 
these chains. There is only place for conscious considerations on a 
large scale. This is like remembering a telephone number. The 
number is at the same time individual digits and an entity. When we 
hear the first digits, we know the rest. Sequences are thus learned 
through the uniting chunking mechanism in perceptual learning 
(Smith 1999)215. 
Bob Snyder has applied the theory of chunking to music learning 
(Snyder 2000). Chunking make us perceive separate musical ele-
                                           
215  Smith, G.J. (1999) Teaching a long sequence of behavior using whole task train-
ing, forward chaining, and backward chaining. Perceptual and Motor Skills. Vol. 89. No 
3. 951–965 
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ments as parts of larger entities. These entities can be short themes, 
ostinatos, funky riffs, vamps of chords, or a repeated base line as in 
the passacaglia. Music is in fact a map of sequences. It is based on 
repetitions of limited material. Let us say that a vamp of four chords 
is four bars long and that this vamp is felt as one unit. Does this 
make it possible to perceive 16 bars of music? 
Sequences are basic structures in music. A sequence is a definite 
structure. When we hear the first notes we know what to expect. 
However the sequences adjust to the harmonic context, but let us 
leave that for the moment. 
Sequences vary along a “What” and a “When” dimension. In music 
the dimensions time and pitch are reflected in the musical score, 
which can be seen as a rough diagram where events are plotted in 
frequency-time space. There are however many parameters in music 
such as harmony, timbre, volume etc. This calls for a multidimen-
sional understanding of music sequences. Let us simplify this by call-
ing music sequences a fixed repeated order of sound events along a 
temporal dimension. 
Time has three aspects: The order of events, the duration between 
events, and tempo – a pattern of intervals constituting the beat of 
time (c.f. Chapter 3). In speech the order is critical for understand-
ing but the duration between events is not as important and not as 
precise as in music. Music sequences differ from speech sequences 
in this respect. If the tone values (duration) are changed, the iden-
tity of the song is changed, while such a manipulation would not 
affect a spoken sentence as much. This is reflected in the fact that 
musical scores have time specifications and written language has not. 
The dimensions of a sequence can be studied one dimension at a 
time (e.g. the same tone in the ordinal dimension or an even beat 
in the temporal dimension). However, there is a strong transfer ef-
fect – one dimension supports the other (Ullén et al. 2005). Timing 
has a role in the perception of pitch. We are better at judging pitch 
if we know when the tone will appear (Huron 2006). The cerebel-
lum is activated by pitch determinations (Parsons 2003). Since the 
cerebellum is involved in rhythm processing, this finding may sup-
port the transfer effect. 
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Musical rhythm is not just a division of time. It is a sequence – re-
peated sound events distributed over time. Drums and percussion 
instruments have different timbres and different volume. Drummers 
tune their drums to get the right pitch. Furthermore the drummer 
varies attack and place where the drum is hit. There is already in 
the musical rhythm a variety of sound events. Musical rhythm thus is 
multidimensional. In fact it is quite difficult to beat a drum without 
grouping the beats into subdivisions, marked by differences in vol-
ume. Even as we walk, we tend to feel one-two, one-two-three or 
one-two-three-four where the “One” is a little heavier. 
We can keep short musical sequences in our working memory for 
a while. In order to remember an entire song a row of sequences 
have to be connected to each other and the whole thing must be 
stored in long term memory. Our ability to learn sequences has 
been studied in the serial reaction-time task (Clegg et al. 1998)216. In 
this test subjects are told to point out dots on a screen when they 
appear. If there is a repeated pattern of the appearance of the dots, 
the subjects become faster in their performance, even if they are not 
aware of the sequence (Shin & Ivry 2002).217 
Sequences thus can be perceived and learned, although the sub-
jects are not aware of the existence of the sequence. The confirma-
tions of expectances are called matches (between mapped represen-
tations and the perceived environment). When the information does 
not fit the expected structure, we have a mismatch. The mismatch 
triggers a neurological reaction. Such reactions are automatically 
retrieved. But the mismatch as such often directs our attention to the 
event. It is an indication that unforeseen information is at hand. 
We can see this mechanism in dogs and horses. They react 
strongly when something unexpected appears along a familiar path. 
They do not react to the object as such. It could be something harm-
less as a bike thrown in a ditch. It is the mere fact that this thing 
was not here before that is alarming. In this respect we do not differ 
                                           
216  Clegg, B.A., DiGirolamo, G.J. & Keele, S.W. (1998) Sequence learning. Trends in 
Cognitive Science. Vol. 2. No 8. 275–281 
217  Shin, J.C. & Ivry, R.B. (2002) Concurrent learning of temporal and spatial se-
quences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 
Vol. 28. No 3. 445–457 
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from the animals on a pre-attentive level. The unexpected is always 
somewhat alarming. 
We can pass a city driving a car, while we listen to the radio or 
talk to a passenger. We take hundreds of decisions automatically. 
The flow of the traffic is unattended. But when the unexpected hap-
pens, we are immediately directed to the situation at hand. The sur-
prise is arousing. This changes the perspective. What was previously 
in the background is now figure. 
Pre-attentive surprise reactions can be measured. The technique is 
called ERP (c.f. Chapter 1). ERP is a change in the EEG pattern. 
Originally this was done with so called odd balls (i.e. an unexpected 
red ball in a sequence of blue balls). 
This technique has been used to test reactions to deviances from 
anticipated musical sequences (Tervaniemi 2003). The findings show 
that we do react. ERPs are pre-attentive. Subjects asked not to pay 
attention to music sequences, but to read an interesting book by 
their own choice, showed significant ERP reactions on unexpected 
tones (Brattico et al. 2001)218. This indicates that we are able to fol-
low sequences without paying attention, just as we can follow a path 
absentmindedly. These experiments show three interesting things: 
1. Sequences can be learned pre-attentively. 
2. We have (for a while) a representation of this sequence. 
3. The representation creates expectations (attended or unat-
tended). 
The processing of auditory sequences has been studied by neurolo-
gists. Except for the obvious fact that the auditory cortex is involved, 
we can discern a sequence circuit comprising: 
1. Motor, supplementary, sensorimotor and pre-motor areas 
and cerebellum (Jeannerod & Frak 1999219; Dhamala et al. 
                                           
218  Brattico, E. Näätänen, R. & Tervaniemi, M. (2002) Context effects on pitch per-
ception in musicians and nonmusicians: Evidence from event-related-potential re-
cordings. Music Perception. Winter. Vol. 19. No 2. 199–222 
219  Jeannerod, M. & Frak, V. (1999) Mental imaging of motor activity in humans. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology. Vol. 9. No 6. 735–739 
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2003220; Chen et al. 2005)221. The supplementary and the 
pre-supplementary motor areas are involved in chunking 
(Kennedy et al. 2001)222.  
2. Basal ganglia (Janata et al. 2002)223. This area is critical for 
timing and attention. It has been shown that attention is 
higher when tones are expected. Thus we discriminate 
pitch better when the tone event occurs when anticipated 
(Jones et al. 2002)224. Striatum (in the basal ganglia) has 
been pointed out as crucial for sequential movements 
(Quartz & Sejnowski 2002). Comment: This is in accor-
dance with the transfer effect discussed above. 
3. Prefrontal cortex involvement in music sequencing antici-
patory tasks has been confirmed by an fMRI study. This 
part is generally known to be critical to foresight. Specifi-
cally parts of this region is activated in music imagery tasks 
(the right inferior and middle frontal gyri (BAs 45, 46, and 
47) (Halpern & Zatorre 1999)225. 
In sum, neurological evidence indicates that the processing of se-
quences involves brain areas associated with anticipation, attention, 
movement, timing and ordinal mapping.  There is a transfer effect 
                                           
220  Dhamala, M., Pagnoni, G., Wiesenfeld, K., Zink, C., Martin, M. & Burns, G. (2003) 
Neural correlates of the complexity of rhythmic finger tapping. NeuroImage. Vol. 20. 
No 2. 918–926 
221  Chen, J., Penhune, V. & Zatorre, R.J. (2005) Tapping in synchrony to auditory 
rhythms. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 1060. The Neurosciences 
and Music II: From Perception to Performance (Eds. G. Avanzini, S. Koelsch, L. 
Lopez & M. Manjo) 400–403 
222  Kennerley, S.W., Sakai, K. & Rushworth, M.F. (2004) Organization of action se-
quences and the role of the pre-SMA. Journal of Neurophysiology. Vol. 91. No.2. 
978–993 
223  Janata, P., Tillmann, B. & Bharucha, J.J. (2002) Listening to polyphonic music re-
cruits domain-general attention and working memory circuits. Cognitive, Affective & 
Behavioral Neuroscience. Vol. 2. No 2. 121–140 
224  Jones, M.R., Moynihan, N., MacKenzie, N. & Puente, J. (2002) Temporal aspects of 
stimulus driven attending in dynamic arrays. Psychological Science. Vol. 13. No 4. 
313–319 
225  Halpern, A.R. & Zatorre, R.J. (1999) When that tune runs through your head: a 
PET investigation of auditory imagery of familiar melodies. Cerebral Cortex. Vol. 9. 
No. 7 October. 697–704 
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between pitch and rhythm. The sequence is learned as an entity in 
the sense that when the first units are perceived the sequence un-
folds. 
Rules 
As already stated all music is structured according to some kind of 
organizing principle. These principles can be seen as rules. 
The mechanisms treated so far (Gestalt, perceptual learning, 
chunking, and sequencing) contribute to the formation of music 
rules. Rules are generalizations. Rules create, as do sequences, 
expectancies. But the difference is that a sequence concerns the 
single case whereas a rule concerns all cases. In a sequence we 
know that, if this, then that, whereas a rule states that if this, then 
that or that or that, but not that. Sequences do not permit variation. 
Rules do. They permit everything that is not forbidden. A hand of 
cards is a sequence. Rules come into force when we decide to play 
bridge. In traffic a sequence can be a description of how to get to 
the football stadium, whereas traffic rules imply that as long as you 
follow the rules you can go anywhere. 
Rules are not just explicit, as traffic rules are. We have an implicit 
sense of rules. Rules help constitute the frames of reference by 
which we perceive the world, understand the world and expect 
continuances in the world. In the case of music this sense of rules is 
developed very early: “[b]abies nervous systems seem to be 
equipped with a capacity to sort out the different musical sounds 
reaching their ears in order to construct a “grammar”, or a system of 
rules (Zatorre 2005)226. 
When a musician signals her intentions to the others in the group 
(e.g. this is the end of my solo; here comes the chorus) by playing 
an agreed figure, this is called cuing. To cue is to present the “this” 
in the “if this, then that” rule. This is an explicit rule, but there are 
auditory cues leading to anticipations on every level of conscious-
ness. 
                                           
226  Zatorre, R.J. (2005) Music, the food of neuroscience? Nature. Vol. 434. No 7031. 
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Examples: 
1. The rule of discrete pitch and time 
2. Genre and style derived rules 
3. Tonality (or other hierarchical organization principles) 
4. Periodicity – rules of repetition and variation 
5. Rules of voicing 
6. Rules of harmony 
7. Rules of rhythm-harmony-melody connections 
8. Rules of improvisation 
The listed categories are not mutually excluding. The first four cate-
gories contain basic music rules and the following categories can be 
derived from these four. Voicing is, to take an example, dependent 
on discrete melody and time, on tonality, on style and on periodic-
ity. David Huron (2001b)227 listed thirteen general rules of voice 
leading that appear in pedagogical works. 
To teach music is to a large extent to make the student aware of 
such rules. The music taught in music schools is a conceptualization 
of implicitly felt music rules. To some extent implicit rules have be-
come explicit as a consequence of notation. The common factor of 
these rules is that they govern what is “allowed” and what is not 
“allowed” continuances in music structures. They are however not 
thought of as strict rules, since there is an aesthetical value in sur-
prising continuances. Composing is to a large extent to relate to 
these rules. This is connected with creativity and taste. The com-
poser or the improvising soloist may surprise, but preferably in style. 
The surprise is recognized by the connoisseurs. It has a strong emo-
tional effect. In flamenco the unexpected move is commented by 
the afinados – olé – as recognition of duende (Spanish, literally 
                                           
227  Huron, D. (2001b) Tone and Voice: A derivation of the rules of voice-leading 
from perceptual principles. Music Perception. Vol. 19, No. 1. 1–64 
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meaning goblin or elf – the presence of magic) (Martin 1973: 43)228. 
We will return to the emotional impact of surprises. 
We shall now focus on the rule of discrete pitch and time, the rule 
of tonality and the rule of periodicity. 
The rule of discrete time and pitch 
Most music consists of sound events distributed over discrete scales 
and discrete rhythms. Björn Merker (2002)229 argues that music could 
be considered to be a Humboldt system. A Humboldt system is a 
limited number of discrete elements that can be combined endlessly. 
Chemistry, genetics and language are examples of such systems. 
Musical tones are however not unequivocally discrete entities in 
the same sense as the atoms in chemistry or the molecules in DNA. 
Discrete pitch and time in music is a rule, but a rule with excep-
tions. Music does not always have this discrete quality. In fact we 
often hear glissandos, blue notes, bended notes etc., not to mention 
false singing. A tone can occur anywhere. Likewise the tempo can 
be altered (rubato, accelerando, ritardando) and the durations in 
rhythm can be altered according to style. There are for example 
slight variations in the samba rhythm between the different samba 
schools in Rio de Janeiro. These variations, hard to detect for the 
tourists, are important emblems to the schools. Brazilian music shows 
many examples of so called malleable meter (Tupinambá de Ulhôa 
1999)230. The main beat may be straight as a clock but the subdivi-
sions are floating. It comprises polyrhythm and meter. 
In written music such exceptions from discrete pitch and rhythm 
are often hidden. We just see how the two dimensions of pitch and 
time make up a two dimensional discrete universe. But the score is 
of course a simplified graph of sounding music. 
                                           
228  Martin, J. (1978) El Arte Flamenco de la Guitarra, United Music Publishers Ltd, 
London. 
229  Merker, B. (2002) Music: The missing Humboldt system. Musicae Scientiae. Vol. 
6. Spring issue. 3–21 
230  Tupinambá de Ulhôa, M. (1999) Métrica Derramada: Prosódia musical na canção 
brasileira popular. Brasiliana – Revista da Academia Brasileira de Música. Vol. 2. 
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The discrete quality is in the listener’s expectation. We anticipate 
discrete scale notes on the beats (or on subdivisions of the beat). It 
is the rule. When we hear a glissando, a rubato, or false singing, we 
feel the deviance from this rule. 
This rule radically limits the anticipated continuation. Instead of an 
endless row of possible outcomes along a continuum of time and 
pitch, only scale tones related to the beat are expected. 
Tonality rules 
When we speak about tonality, we presume the harmonic sequences 
and melodies in major or minor scales leading to tonal centres (the 
tonic chord and the tonic note). It is a system of hierarchical pitch 
relationships. 
Although the term tonality did not exist before the 19th century, 
tonal music developed out of the polyphone 17th century modal 
music in Europe. Tonality was born in the cadence – the technique 
to lead the voices to end a phrase – to bring it home.  
The pitch relation in an interval can be consonant or dissonant. 
Consonant intervals are the octave, the perfect fifth and the third 
(the major third more so than the minor third). We could add the 
sixth and the forth, since they can be perceived as thirds and fifths 
(inversions). All the other possible intervals are considered disso-
nant. Music theorists argue that chords containing dissonant intervals 
“want” to be dissolved in consonant chords. People who have been 
exposed to tonal music automatically expect this to happen. 
Experimental evidence shows that infants have early preferences 
in consonant intervals (Saffran 2003)231. Consonant intervals form 
consonant chords and dissonant intervals form dissonant chords. Dis-
sonant chords are perceived as less pleasant (Blood et al. 1999). It 
has been shown that they activate the amygdala (unpleasant emo-
tions) while consonant chords activate prefrontal cortex (possibly 
                                           
231  Saffran, J.R. (2003) Mechanisms of musical memory in infancy. The Cognitive 
Neuroscience of Music (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre). Oxford University Press, New 
York 
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inhibiting amygdala anxiety). It is known that prefrontal cortex in-
hibits signals from amygdala (Quirk & Milad 2002)232. 
So we have a preference for consonance. Why is that? I discern 
three possibilities: 
1. Exposition to music. We are more exposed to the first, the 
fifth and the third tone in the scale in western tonal music 
(Huron 2006). They are thus more expected whereas 
other tones are less expected. Surprises are generally on a 
basic level alarming and scary. 
2. Exposition to sound. As stated in Chapter 2 the strongest 
tones in the overtone spectrum are the octave and the per-
fect fifth and the major third. It follows that these intervals 
are the most frequent in natural sounds. It is thus possible 
that our natural environment has created expectancies of 
consonant intervals. 
3. The tones in consonant intervals have resembling overtone 
structures. The extreme case is the octave. Here the two 
tones have identical overtone structure. The octave is psy-
chologically perceived as the same tone as the fundamen-
tal. The overtones in consonant intervals or chords do not 
clash as they do in dissonant chords. There is in other 
words a physical unevenness in dissonant chords. 
The first alternative indicates that tonality causes preferences, 
whereas the other two alternatives indicate that preferences may 
have caused tonality. 
The overtone structure is so vital for the perception of the funda-
mental that the fundamental is actually heard even if the sensory 
input only contains the overtone spectrum. I suggest that our ability 
to identify the rote in a chord is based on the same mechanism. 
We have a sense of pitch relations and a sense of the rote in a 
chord. This is the basis of tonality. Tillmann (2005)233 has shown that 
                                           
232  Quirk, G.J. & Milad, M.R. (2002) Neurons in medial prefrontal cortex signal mem-
ory for fear extinction. Nature. Vol. 420. Nov. 7. 70–74 
233  Tillmann, B. (2005) Implicit investigations of tonal knowledge in non-musician 
listeners. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 1060. The Neurosciences 
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non-musicians have implicit knowledge of tonal connections that are 
explicitly known by music theorists. 
Krumhansl & Toiviainen (2003)234 tested a group for the expected 
tone after a scale sequence. The authors found, as could be ex-
pected, that the first choice was the next tone in the scale, the sec-
ond choice a chord tone, the third choice another scale tone, the 
forth choice tones outside the scale, and the fifth choice tones on 
fractions of intervals such as quarter tones. This leads to the possibil-
ity to construct a map of probability for different tones. Huron 
(2006) accounts for several behavioural studies, which support prob-
ability maps based on tonality. This leads to the conclusion that in a 
certain musical context some continuances are generally more ex-
pected than others. 
In this sense tonality makes up a frame of reference, which gives 
music meaning. If we focus on the melody, the harmony will give 
the melody meaning. The implicit sense of music rules, makes us 
predict that the melody should be constructed of chord tones or col-
ourings of the chords. This is the internal model of how it should 
sound. Violations of such rules affect the perception of the melody. 
This effect is evident in the advanced technique in jazz music called 
playing outside (Levine 1995)235. This means that an improviser 
leaves the harmonies and plays melody tones clearly excluded by 
the harmonic context. Then she returns to the harmonic context. 
When the melody is out it is at odds with the prediction produced 
by the internal model, whereas in is in concordance with this 
model. Playing out is perceived as a wild, free, forbidden and al-
most rebellious excursion and the return in is felt a return to law 
and order. Daddy is home. Playing outside the harmony often makes 
the player move sideways as if placing her outside the internal 
model. This movement indicates that the player has a bodily experi-
ence of when she is out and when she is in. 
                                                                                                 
and Music II: From Perception to Performance (Eds. G. Avanzini, S. Koelsch, L. Lo-
pez & M. Manjo). 100–110 
234  Krumhansl, C.L. & Toiviainen, P. (2003) Tonal Cognition. The Cognitive Neurosci-
ence of Music. (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre). Oxford University Press, New York. 
95–108 
235  Levine, M. (1995) The Jazz Theory Book. Sher Music. Peta Luma, CA. 183–192 
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Gradually the limits of the rules are stretched. The in-out tech-
nique has become so established that it is regarded sophisticated 
rather than wrong. However on a basic implicit level, playing out-
side the harmony is always wrong in the sense that we feel the vio-
lation. 
Just as with sequences, there is ERP evidence showing that we re-
act to violations of expected structural outcomes such as chord ap-
propriateness. While violations of sequences cause MMN (mismatch 
negativity), these violations of expected structure cause ERAN (Early 
Right Anterior Negativity). The ERAN reaction is related to the sense 
of tonality and the functionality of chords (Koelsch & Mulder 
2002)236. Contrary to MMN (on sequences), ERAN (structure) reac-
tions do not require prior presentation. It is therefore assumed that 
ERAN shows that we have an implicit general sense of how it should 
sound. Although ERAN is more distinct for musicians than for non-
musicians, ERAN can be recorded in non-musicians and children 
(Koelsch & Friederici 2003)237, indicating that some sense of tonality 
is developed early in all of us (provided that we are exposed to 
tonal music). It is a strange and highly illuminative fact that not even 
this reaction requires attention to the music. 
The fact that the MMN for sequence differs from ERAN for rules in 
many respects (different location, longer reaction time and above all 
that no prior presentation needed for ERAN) indicates that we are 
dealing with two different processes. One process concerns a se-
quence, which is a unique case. The other process concerns a rule. 
Listeners have an implicit capacity in detecting and learning struc-
tural patterns after a few expositions. Even children can learn this. 
ERP responses on inappropriate chords have been found in five year 
olds (Koelsch et al. 2003)238. 
                                           
236  Koelsch, S. & Mulder, J. (2002) Electric brain responses to inappropriate harmo-
nies during listening to expressive music. Clinical Neurophysiology. Vol. 113. No 6. 
862–869 
237  Koelsch, S. & Friederici, A.D. (2003) Toward the neural basis of processing struc-
ture in music. Comparative results of different neurophysiological investigation 
methods. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 999. The Neurosciences 
and Music. 15–28  
238  Koelsch, S., Grossmann, T., Gunter, T.C., Hahne, H., Schröger, E. & Friederici, 
A.D. (2003) Children processing music: electric brain responses reveal musical com-
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ERAN is derived from the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
parietal cortex (Koelsch & Mulder 2002). The localization of rule 
processing in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in music has been 
confirmed by fMRI data (Koelsch et al. 2002239; Janata et al. 2002; 
Tillmann et al. 2003a). The Janata study found indication of a distrib-
uted topographic representation of the overall tonality surface in the 
rostral ventral prefrontal cortex. Interestingly this representation is 
not absolute; it can reorganize. This allows for a generalization of 
tonality from one key to another. This is in accordance with the fact 
that most people are not dependent on a certain key. They do not 
have absolute pitch. 
One year later Janata et al. (2003)240 investigated this representa-
tion further. Subjects were presented with melodies played over a 
variety of scales. Each tonality showed a specific pattern in ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex. There is thus a clear indication of this area 
(BA47) also called the frontal operculum.  Prefrontal cortex neurons 
generally are critical to “the rules of the game” so called “cue-
reward” rules or “if-then” rules. This “rule information” is fed back to 
sensory cortices (top-down processing), acting on the perception of 
the sensory stimuli (for overview see Chafee & Goldman Rakic 
(2000)241. 
In 2006 it was reported that the link between the auditory cortex 
and BA47 is critical for pitch discrimination (Hyde et al. 2006). This 
can be seen in the light of a study (Peretz et al. 2005)242 showing 
that auditory cortex functions normally among amusical (not able to 
recognize melodies) subjects. Thus a perfect auditory cortex is not 
                                                                                                 
petence and gender differences. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Vol. 15. No 5. 
683–693 
239  Koelsch, S., Gunter, T.C., von Cramon, D.Y., Zysset, S., Lohmann, G. & Friederici, 
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enough for pitch discrimination. The tones must be related to the 
representation of tonality (or other possible organizing principles). 
Periodicity – rules of repetition and variation 
As Peter Kivy (2002) has pointed out, music can be distinguished 
from narrative arts because music recycles the same material over 
and over. This would not work in a narrative because it would not 
push the story forward. Repetition creates periodicity. 
Periodicity is a rule. It is very hard to find music that is not peri-
odic. The difference from the sequence is that variation is allowed. 
It is a rule with many subdivisions. On the implicit level this rule, as 
the other music rules, work as expected outcomes on cues. 
There is an enormous amount of concepts for time in music. I will 
be very brief and by necessity simplifying. Beat refers to where you 
want to clap or stomp. Meter is the amount of beats in one bar, indi-
cated by the time signature in notated music. A bar (or measure) is 
the distance between the first beat in one bar to the first beat in the 
following bar. Meter can be played in many different ways depend-
ing on style and culture. Rhythm is style specific playing of meter. 
The bar is the basic period but there are also layers of longer pe-
riodic patterns. These patterns are structured by melody, by chord 
sequences, by repetition and variation. 
The rule is that melodic periodicity coincides with meter. This en-
tails that the tonal centres coincide with this longer periodicity. Most 
popular music is built by sequences of four bars. There are cycles of 
four, eight or sixteen bars. This is how long a sequence of chords or 
a melody arch will typically last before returning to the tonic note 
and the tonic chord (or a note or chord closely associated with these 
tonal centres). 
However there is an interesting exception from this rule. In the 
case of polymetric music (not polyrhythmic) a melodic figure such as 
an arpeggio does not even up with the meter. It is called polymetric 
because you are playing two time signatures at the same time. Sim-
ply put, the meter of the played melody does not fit with the tap-
ping of your foot. In the Glen Miller classic ‘In the Mood’ we can 
see that a melodic period of three eight notes is presented in a 4/4 
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meter swing context. This creates the rhythmic characteristic of this 
song. You can test the difference by clapping the first tone of the 
three tone melody. Now it is a waltz. And the melody is, although 
identical, perceived differently. The polymetric technique has been 
developed by Ralph Towner and others (Towner 1985)243. Polymet-
ric rhythms are thus less regular and the sensation is floating and 
playful. It makes the melody less predictable and thus more interest-
ing. 
Just as in architecture, it is the repetition and varied repetition of 
limited material that constitutes the form. The more limited the ma-
terial, the more evident is the form. As Johan Sebastian Bach 
showed, a musical universe can be built from a few elements. West-
ern music exhibits a long list of variations of repeated material 
(McAdam & Matzkin 2003)244: 
1. Identical repetition (sequence) 
2. Identical repetition but re-orchestration 
3. Transposition of pitch 
4. Variation of tempo 
5. Inversion 
6. Retrogradation 
7. Variation of the melody 
8. Variation of harmonic structure 
9. Rhythmic variation  
10. Keeping melodic contour, changing intervals 
Additionally there are all sorts of combinations of these variations. 
This list of techniques tells us something important about music: Mu-
sic is a layer of repetitions and varied repetitions. In popular music 
the base drum continuously repeats time durations. The base often 
plays the same figure bar by bar (adapted to the harmony). The har-
monies are sequenced in vamps (series of identical chord changes) 
                                           
243  Towner, R. (1985) Improvisation and Performance Techniques for Classical and 
Acoustic Guitar. 21st Century Music Productions. Wayne, New Jersey  
244  McAdams, S. & Matzkin, D. (2003) The roots of musical variations in perceptual 
similarity and invariance. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Music (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. 
Zatorre). Oxford University Press, New York. 79–94 
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changes) and a funk guitar might present more or less identical four 
bar “licks” (“ostinatos” for high brow readers). Verses of sixteen bars 
are repeated and there is an overall structure A-A-B-A-B-C-A-B for 
example, each letter representing eight or sixteen bars. In classical 
music the fugue, the rondo, the sonata form etc, are conventional-
ized patterns of repetitions and variations intertwined with new ma-
terial. 
It is thus the interlocking of the rhythm section with melodic and 
harmonic repetition and variation that creates periodicity. 
To sum up, periodicity 
1. creates time structure 
2. creates context to forthcoming musical events. 
3. makes the music easy to remember (mapped). 
4. makes the piece predictable. 
5. makes the piece easier to perceive (this follows from the 
preceding points). 
How are musical expectancies created? 
As we have seen Gestalt, perceptual learning, sequencing, chunking 
and music rules are organizing principles that help us anticipate mu-
sic. Musical anticipations are often “heard”. This phenomenon is an 
aspect of music imagery. Perception and imagery recruit the same 
areas. 
Those structures responsible for the processing of auditory stimuli 
are also activated under certain conditions of musical/auditory im-
agery when no sensory stimuli are present. (Janata 2001)245 
From this Janata draws an important conclusion: 
                                           
245  Janata, P. (2001) Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying auditory image for-
mation in music. atonal.ucdavis.edu/manuscripts/Janata_2001c.pdf  
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Indirectly, these results suggest that discrete, mentally generated, 
auditory images might be compared against incoming sensory in-
formation in the auditory cortex. 
Since imagery can be seen as expectancy, mismatches between im-
agery and the outcome of a situation may be responsible for ERP 
reactions on surprising events. Recently this idea has been experi-
mentally confirmed in an ERP study (Yumoto et al. 2005)246. Yumoto 
found that imagery generated from score reading causes the ERP 
reaction called “mismatch negativity” when this imagery is violated 
by sensory input. 
ERAN-reactions on music structures involve auditory cortex and 
frontal areas. Frontal areas are involved in rule processing. The 
ERAN-reactions thus indicate that music structure expectancies result 
from implicit rule processes – in this case rules learnt by perceptual 
imprinting of music. The incoming stimulus starts generating rule 
governed consequences. 
I suggest that there are two types of musical imagery: Imagery of 
known music and imagery of new music. The first type engages the 
sequence circuit and the second engages the rule circuit. 
ERPs can be derived from violations of long term memories and of 
violations of short term memories. From this follows that some im-
agery engages short term memory while other imagery engages 
long term memory. Thus we would have four possible categories of 
music imagery: 
1. Short term memory – sequence processing (e.g. the im-
agery of a melody just heard) 
2. Short term memory – rule processing. (I have no example 
of this since I doubt that implicit music rules can be learnt 
in one hearing) 
3. Long term memory – sequence processing (the imagery of 
a known song) 
                                           
246  Yumoto, M., Matsuda, M., Iteoh, K., Uno, A., Karino, S. Saitoh, O., Kaneko, Y., 
Yatomi, Y. & Kaga, K. (2005) Auditory imagery mismatch negativity elicited in musi-
cians. Neuroreport. Vol. 16. No 11. 1175–1178  
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4. Long term memory – rule processing (imagery of new mu-
sic) 
The last case can be a felt continuance of a piece never heard be-
fore (completion), but it can also be the experience of hearing a 
whole new piece of music being played in your head.  
What is causing imagery on a neurological level? The cerebellum 
feeds forward to predict sequences and feeds back for error correc-
tion. One of the functions of cerebellum is thus to detect, prevent, 
and correct mismatches between intended outcome, and the per-
ceived outcome, of interaction with the environment (Ito 1993)247. 
This role of cerebellum is supported by the observation that cerebel-
lar disorder causes impaired contact with reality. 
According to Jeannerod & Frak (1999) the cerebellum initiates ac-
tion sequences, based on past learning. These commands reach the 
motor cortex, where they are partly inhibited by prefrontal signals. 
The implication is that the prefrontal area selects an alternative fitting 
rule. This would, according to the authors, generate action imagery. 
Cerebellar sensori-motor driven imagery thus is an important part of 
the perception process. How does this work? 
When the organism detects a stimulus on a basic brainstem tha-
lamic level, this initiates cerebellar activity in order to direct atten-
tion to the stimulus (Schmahmann et al. 2001)248. This looking-for 
activity triggers sensorimotor imagery with possible action affor-
dances before the object is attended to. Thus the brain already has a 
vague expectancy as it directs its attention. From this we can draw 
two conclusions: 
1. The involvement of motor areas confirms that perception to 
a large extent is to act. To listen to a sound is to latently 
produce it. 
2. Imagery has, beside the function to fill out sensory income 
with “suggested” content, the function to direct attention to 
                                           
247  Ito, M. (1993) Movement and thought: Identical control mechanisms by the cere-
bellum. Trends in Neurosciences. Vol. 16. No 11. 448–450 
248  Schmahmann, J.D., Anderson, C. M., Newton, N. & Ellis, R. (2001) The function of 
the Cerebellum. Consciousness & Emotion. Vol. 2. No 2. 273–309 
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unattended events.  It can produce “the taste of danger” 
before the cause of the danger is identified. 
Discussion 
The overall impression from the literature is that our mental equip-
ment for perceiving the world (Gestalts, perceptual learning, 
sequencing and rule processing) is reflected in music structure. In 
other words – music structure mirrors the human mind. It is obvious 
that musicians over the years have developed techniques that make 
musical structures easy to perceive, remember and predict. This is 
not so much the result of the composers’ intentions as the pragmatic 
finding that some techniques seem to work. They make music user-
friendly. Popular. 
The ERP studies show that music structures are mapped as schemas 
in our brains. These schemas are activated by music. As we listen 
we follow this schema in real time. The sensory input needs to be 
related to this mapped structure to be perceived. MMN data suggest 
that auditory sensory input is “pre-perceptual, fragmentary, lacks the 
time dimension, and cannot enter conscious perception”. It is not 
until it “is mapped onto the neurophysiological basis of sensory 
memory in the auditory cortex” that we become aware of the per-
ception (Winkler and Näätänen 2006)249. 
This confirms the idea that the sensory input does not produce 
meaning until it triggers imagery. 
I have presented some mechanisms underlying the perception of 
music. They provide us with a local view of the topography. The 
concept “local view” is the cue for the second part of this chapter. 
Principles of navigation 
Navigation is the art and science of determining one's position so as 
to safely travel to a desired destination. This art uses allocentric 
                                           
249  Winkler, I. & Näätänen, R. (2006) Theoretical framework of pre-attentive auditory 
processing. http://www.cbru.helsinki.fi/research/theory/description.html 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
 
158 
landmarks such as the stars, the North Pole, the sun, lighthouses, 
fog-horns or stationary satellites. The terrain is mapped by triangula-
tion of allocentric landmarks. 
But navigation is also a sense universally shared among animals. 
This is, at least among mammals, a similar mechanism across species. 
The study of navigation in animals is a niche of experimental re-
search. The subjects are usually mice running in mazes. From these 
studies the researchers draw conclusions concerning human naviga-
tion. 
David Redish discerns five models of navigation strategies in the 
literature: random navigation, taxon navigation, praxic navigation, 
route navigation and local navigation (Redish 1999)250. Of these four, 
two are relevant in our comparison: Praxic navigation and local 
navigation. 
Praxic navigation is thought as a motor program: if the animal 
starts from the same place in the same direction, procedural memory 
tells the animal where it is. Once the sequence of movements be-
gins it completes to the end without external input. The animal 
learns a sequence of turns and directional movements that will take 
it to the goal. Once the maze is learned, praxic navigation can be 
used in the dark. When the maze is darkened the rat has to change 
the frame of reference from allocentric landmarks to egocentric 
landmarks – from external patterns of structure to internal patterns of 
movements. Instead of relying on visible cues, it now relies on mo-
tor sequences of running and turning. The movement is automated. 
Praxic navigation is procedural. 
Local navigation demands cognitive maps – a coordinate represen-
tation of the location. The anatomical locus of this map is the hippo-
campus. The map consists of allocentric landmarks. Local navigation 
is according to Redish based on 
1. the local view: a representation of the animal’s relationship 
to the landmarks in its environment 
                                           
250  Redish, D. (1999) Beyond the Cognitive Map – from place cells to episodic mem-
ory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
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2. path integration coordinates: a metric sequenced represen-
tation of position (map) that accommodates vector arithme-
tic 
3. head direction: a representation of orientation in space 
4. place code: a distributed representation of position that ties 
local views to path integration coordinates 
5. goal memory: a representation that associates motivational 
and spatial inputs and accommodates trajectory planning 
I will now suggest parallels between local navigation and the per-
ception of music structure. The suggested applications are put in 
brackets: 
1. The local view is the present moment perception of the 
piece (music momentary heard). 
2. Path integration. As may be recalled from Chapter 1, taking 
a perspective is to integrate a perspective with the ego-
centric perspective.  Local navigation theory fits this de-
scription in that the allocentric perspective is integrated 
with the egocentric perspective. Redding describes path in-
tegration as the integration of vector arithmetic with map 
position. Since rats do not do arithmetic I take this to be a 
metaphor for the feedback of own movement. This move-
ment is integrated in the allocentric map (finger move-
ments + music structure). 
3. Head direction is not relevant for place detection in music 
structure. 
4. Place code is described as a distributed representation (to-
nality!) of position tying local view (the music momentary 
perceived) with integration co-ordinates (tonality + finger 
movements). 
5. Goal memory is not relevant. The task in music is not to 
get to the goal. In music as in life it is the road that makes 
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the effort worthwhile. We may however have sub goals 
such as the return to the tonic.  
Locale navigation could be described as an integration of local view, 
the own movement feed back and map representation. Two types of 
memory are relevant for navigation: the procedural memory for 
praxic navigation, which is the body’s memory how to move, and 
the allocentric geographic map of the landscape (Berthoz 2000). 
Navigation in music 
Crossing a field generates motor/tactile, visual, and acoustic feed-
back. The path is a sequence of turns and crests, a sequence of re-
lated body movements and a sequence of feedback sensations. As 
the path is learned – representations of these patterns become inter-
connected. 
The instrumentalist has to know where she is and she must have 
the ability to go from one point to another in the music. She does so 
by movements on the instrument. This is similar to driving a vehicle 
– she moves vis-à-vis the instrument and this takes her to the 
destination. 
On musical instruments every key represents a tone. As the fin-
gers of the pianist travel over the keyboard she is travelling in the 
music. Every sequence of sounds is a sequence of places. 
To play an instrument is to move the keys to achieve acoustic 
feedback. 
As we learn to play, we use allocentric landmarks. We laboriously 
translate heard notes or notes from the sheet to the keys on the in-
strument. Gradually the body learns the movement pattern. The vis-
ual or heard structure is connected to movement structure – a bodily 
representation. When automated, the sequences in the score, the 
sequences of the keys, the sequences of sound, and the sequences 
of body movements (motor/tactile feedback) are locked to each 
other. Now we move the body through the musical structure.  We 
have integrated the allocentric perspective with the egocentric per-
spective. From now on we can use praxic navigation. Just like the 
rat in the maze, the player can perform in the dark. When the piece 
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is learnt, musicians do not have to look at the sheet or the instru-
ment to play. 
Can musical topography be compared to the landscape? McAdams 
& Matzkin (2003) discern three main types of musical invariance: 
1. Similar texture 
2. Figural similarity 
3. Similar structural abstraction 
If we allow ourselves to play with the resemblance of perception of 
music to the perception of the landscape, we may see that similar 
texture (orchestration, ornamentation, interpretation etc.) is like the 
illumination of the landscape, the colour, the season etc.; figural 
similarity (melody) is the paths and its contours; and structural ab-
straction (harmony and form) is the underlying structure in spite of 
changes in the illumination, the season and the path. 
Now imagine that you are walking in the landscape and we have 
added rhythm. 
The path 
As listeners we can choose to follow one instrument. Usually this is 
the melody. More advanced listeners can chose to follow the base 
line or even intertwining lines in a polyphonic musical weave. As 
we do these choices we chose different perspectives within the 
allocentric perspective, since we foreground one line and 
background the others. A familiar piece of music is mapped as a 
fixed sequence, whereas styles and genres are maps with forks. 
A jazz musician has a set of pre-programmed sequences that she 
plays over a given chord succession. Here and there she comes to 
the end of a sequence and has to choose from a set of directions 
given by the musical context (cue). She knows the place. Some di-
rections are possible and more or less probable and some are clear 
violations of the rule. 
Listening to this player is like following her through a town where 
every corner offers three solutions but not a fourth or fifth solution. 
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The experience of creativeness in music is to come to a fork and 
find the fourth solution – a passage nobody has seen before leading 
to a familiar place. For the listener it is an adventure to follow this – 
Yeah, yeah, OK, hm? Aha! Yeah, What? OK – and so on. Even if the 
road is not new to the musician, it might be to the audience. 
Few musicians are creative in the sense that they find new ways 
during improvisation. Rather they have tested different solutions dur-
ing practice. These solutions present themselves to the musician dur-
ing the improvisation. There may not be an entirely new melodic 
solution on some jazz vamps any more. The originality is on another 
level. It is like chess. There is not a variant in chess that has not 
been tested at least 20 moves ahead. Originality is about playing the 
less usual and combining in new ways. 
As the listener moves along in the music, every mismatch is con-
tributing new information to the context and changes the hypothesis 
of what is actually heard. The sense for probable outcomes is a 
sense for music, or musicality, if you want. 
This is in line with Neisser’s idea (1976) of the perception as a 
continuous cyclical process, which describes perception as a series of 
rapid hypothesis testing. Mismatches continuously change the expec-
tancies. They violate the sense of style. When the mismatch is worn 
out, we have a new style. This is then a neurological comment on 
Leonard Meyer’s discussion on changes of style as a result of how 
the unexpected becomes norm (Meyer 1956). However, luckily it 
seems that the mismatch reaction is difficult to erase. If we get rid of 
them totally, music would loose its meaning. We have to be able to 
discriminate the feeling of dissonance from the feeling of conso-
nance, the feeling of tones outside the harmonic context from the 
feeling of tones inside this context, the feeling of syncopation from 
on beat events, and so on. 
Landmarks 
We have stated that the perception of structure demands landmarks 
and that those landmarks are called allocentric landmarks for the 
terrain. What is the counterpart for music? I argue that the tonal cen-
tres – the tonic note (e.g. the tone C in the key of C) and the tonic 
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chord (e.g. the C major or minor chord in the key of C) serve as 
landmarks. They differ, however, from the usual understanding, 
since they are not located in spatial structure but in sound structure. 
Can we rightfully talk about allocentric landmarks in the case of mu-
sic. I will argue that we can. 
These landmarks are allocentric in the sense that they are outside 
the body of the listener. The tonic note provides a cognitive refer-
ence point, a “melodic anchor” (Bregman 1990). We feel when we 
are there and when we are not. All the other notes in a melody 
have some kind of felt potential difference to the tonic note. The 
tonic note, or closely related notes (the third or the fifth), is often 
the first and the last points in a melody. It is a point of departure 
and a point of arrival. We can feel this arrival as well as the expec-
tancy of arrival. 
Krumhansl (1995)251 found a psychological hierarchical organization 
of the seven pitches of the diatonic scale around a reference tone. 
By measuring the psychological distance between tones occupying 
different positions in this hierarchy he showed that the stable tones 
serve as reference points in relation to which all the other tones are 
perceived. The tonic note is in other words a landmark in our 
perception of music. 
The same could be said about the tonic chord. It is the most ex-
pected chord. Sequences of chords tend to lead to the tonic. We 
know this but it has also been investigated statistically (Huron 2006). 
Tillmann, Bharucha & Bigand (2003b)252 built artificial neural net-
work (ANN) models of SOMs (Self Organizing Maps). The SOMs 
were programmed to learn from recordings of music pieces. From 
this learning SOMs became capable of localizing tonal centres. 
Humans have been given the same task as the machines (to find 
tonal centres). A cross-cultural study in the 80s revealed interesting 
differences (Kessler, Hansen & Shepard 1984)253. If the subject is not 
                                           
251  Krumhansl, C.L. (1995). Music psychology and music theory: Problems and pros-
pects. Music Theory Spectrum. Vol. 17. No 1. 53–80 
252  Tillmann, B., Bharucha, J.J. & Bigand, E. (2003b) Learning and perceiving musical 
structures: Further insights from artificial networks. The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Music (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre). Oxford University Press, New York. Chapter 8. 
253  Kessler, E.J., Hansen, C., & Shepard, R.N. (1984) Tonal schemata in the percep-
tion of music in Bali and the West. Music Perception, 2. 131–165 
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enculturated to the organizing principle of the piece she is exposed 
to, she will tend to say that the most frequent tone in the piece is 
the tonal centre. If, on the other hand, she is familiar with the or-
ganizing principle, her judgement will be directed by hierarchical 
choices governed by the principle. This shows that the organizing 
principle is recognized if once learned and that this principle guides 
expectancies and thus the perception of music. The importance of 
this study is that it proves that the sense of tonality is not only based 
on expectancies grounded on how frequent a certain tone is, but 
that there really is a rule-mechanism governing this sense. 
The sense of tonality does not require explicit knowledge. Even if 
the listener is not educated in music and does not know what a 
tonic is, she would, if asked to continue a given melody, continue 
according to the rules of tonality. The only condition for learning the 
rules of tonality is that we are exposed to tonal music.  
Who remembers atonal music? In the 1920s continuity was consid-
ered a bourgeoisie fetish by radicals. Freud exposed cultural hierar-
chies as emblems of oppression. The avant-gardism movement broke 
up the hierarchies; art turned non-figurative; poetry ridded itself of 
rhymes and meter and in music Arnold Schönberg constructed the 
homogeneous twelve-tone scale. Every tone had the same value. 
The hierarchy was broken. Theodor Adorno saw this as revolution-
ary music. No tone submitted to another. 
If the scale is homogeneous there cannot be any tonal centre. This 
is why this music is called atonal. And this is why most of us get lost 
in it. It is like a landscape without landmarks. If the landscape is 
totally homogeneous, like the open sea or chaotic like a snowstorm, 
we cannot find our way home. We are reduced to use random 
navigation. As Claude Lévi-Strauss (the father of structuralism) put it: 
[Serialism] is like a sailless ship, driven out to sea by its captain, 
who is privately convinced that by subjecting life aboard to the 
rules of an elaborate protocol, he will prevent the crew from think-
ing nostalgically either of their home port or of their ultimate des-
tination (Claude Lévi-Strauss 1975: 113)254  
                                           
254  Lévi-Strauss, C. (1975) The Raw and the Cooked. Introduction to a science of 
mythology. Harper, New York 
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There are rules in atonal music, but the average concert audience 
has no access to them. They are not internalized in the body of the 
listener. It is a theoretical construction. The sounding result of these 
calculations may come as a surprise even to the composer (as I hap-
pen to know). It is not user-friendly. It does not create expectations 
as other music typically does. This protocol obstructs us from know-
ing where we are and where we are heading. It is made that way. 
The human brain is unequipped to perceive structure without land-
marks. Since expectancy is, according to some musicologists, Huron 
to name one, a prerequisite for positive musical emotion, we might 
ask if it is possible to enjoy atonal music. This has not to my knowl-
edge been tested. 
Fred Lehrdal (1988)255 listed the cognitive constraints on composi-
tional systems. Constraint No 2 reads: “The musical surface must be 
available for hierarchical structuring by the listening grammar”. 
The brain, always trying to make something out of the input, re-
acts. The sense of chaos is alarming. In films atonal music typically 
signifies loss of control, insanity and horror. 
The musical hegemony has gone through some strain to teach and 
distribute this music (not enough according to its composers). With 
this exposition it ought to be liked by means of perceptual learning. 
After all these years, it still is not requested. Ten seconds is enough 
to perceive such an object. Hours of listening do not add more if we 
cannot follow the development. 
Nowadays atonal music is merely a tool in the toolbox – compara-
ble to other tools such as counterpoint, according to the Swedish 
composer Anders Hultqvist (Hultqvist 2007)256. He describes con-
temporary music as a continuum from atonal music to consonant tri-
ads. The technique is usually mixed with other techniques. It creates 
effects by means of contrast. 
We have already stated that time must be one of the dimensions in 
the integrated allocentric/egocentric perspective. 
                                           
255  Lehrdal, F. (1988) Cognitive constrains on compositional systems. Generative 
Processes in Music. (Ed. John Sloboda). Oxford University Press. 231–259 
256  Hultqvist, A. (2007) Personal information 20/4 
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I suggest that the “One” – the first beat in each bar – serves as a 
temporal landmark. It is easy to perceive and the rest of the events 
in the bar are related to it. Particularly strong landmarks are those 
“Ones” that mark the beginning of a period. These are often indi-
cated by a change of tonality, or a change of instrumentation. Fur-
thermore they are often announced by fills and cadences. 
Music thus is hierarchically structured in respect to tonality and pe-
riodicity. The rhythm, the chords and the melody make up a musical 
topography. The musical topography is created from landmarks in 
the music structure – allocentric landmarks. 
Now let us compare navigation and music listening on a neuro-
logical basis.  
Neurological level 
Separate streams 
The ventral pre-motor area in the brain is connected to commands 
for grasping which demands perception of the form of the object and 
the dorsal pre-motor area is connected to reaching which demands a 
sense of direction and movement (Wolfensteller et al. 2004)257. 
This functional segregation is reflected in the perception process. 
Visual information is thus processed along one ventral stream and 
one dorsal stream. 
The ventral stream processes object identification (needed for 
grasping) and localisation in allocentric space. The dorsal stream 
processes localisation in egocentric space. It triggers fast procedural 
online reactions (motor response). 
Only ventral visual information can be reported. This means that 
although dorsal information is processed, it is pre-attentive. Conse-
quently patients with impaired ventral stream report that they cannot 
                                           
257  Wolfensteller, U., Schubotz, R.I., & von Cramon, D.Y. (2004) “What” becoming 
“Where”: 
 Functional magnetic resonance imaging evidence for pragmatic relevance driving 
pre-motor cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, Nov. 17. Vol. 24. No 46. 10431–
10439   
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see objects. They cannot describe form or colour. If the dorsal 
stream is intact, they may still be able to act on visual information. 
This is called “cortical blindness” or “blindsight”. Patients diagnosed 
with “blindsight” can point out directions to objects even if they re-
port that they cannot see them. What’s more, they can reliably per-
ceive facial expressions and possibly react emotionally on body lan-
guage (de Gelder & Hadjikhani 2006)258. 
Burgess (2002)259 suggests that the two streams meet in hippocam-
pus and parahippocampus. This is thus a possible location for the 
integration of the egocentric and the allocentric perspectives. It is 
according Berthoz (2000) only in the hippocampus that the body is 
placed in allocentric space (space organized around allocentric land-
marks). 
Pre-motor cortex for sound processing has a corresponding ven-
tral/dorsal organization (Zatorre et al. 2007). Jääskeleinen et al. 
(2004)260 report evidence from ERP-experiments suggesting segre-
gated “What” (ventral) and “Where” (dorsal) auditory streams. This 
was confirmed in an fMRI study testing for functional connectivity of 
the processing of word sequences (Ruchsbaum et al. 2005)261. The 
authors distinguished a ventral stream from the superior temporal 
gyrus to ventrolateral prefrontal gyrus and a dorsal stream from the 
planum temporale (in the auditory cortex) to the dorsolateral pre-
frontal gyrus. The ventral pre-motor area thus reflects sounds as di-
rect motor imitations, such as vocalization and grips for chords, 
whereas the dorsal pre-motor area is indirect and rule based. 
The ventral stream processes present now perception. It is accessi-
ble for consciousness and can be analysed for meaning (such as 
source identification). 
                                           
258  De Gelder, B. & Hadjikhani, N. (2006) Non conscious recognition of body lan-
guage. Neuroreport. Vol 17. No 6. 583–586 
259  Burgess, N. (2002) The hippocampus, space, and viewpoints in episodic memory. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholology. Vol. 55. No 4. 1057–1080 
260  Jääskeläinen, I.P., Ahveninen, J., Bonmassar, G., Dale, A.M., Ilmoniemi, R.J., 
Levänen, S. Lin, F., May, P., Melcher, J. Stufflebeam, S., Tiitinen, H. & Belliveau, J.W. 
(2004) Human posterior auditory cortex gates novel sounds to consciousness. Pro-
ceedings of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. 101. No 17. 6809–6814  
261  Ruchsbaum, B., Olsen, R., Koch, P. & Berman, K. (2005) Human dorsal and ven-
tral auditory streams subserve rehearsal-based and echoic processes during verbal 
working memory. Neuron. Vol. 41. No 4. 687–697  
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The dorsal stream is faster and multimodal (vision + hearing). It 
processes heard speech, as well as read text. It connects the planum 
temporale with prefrontal areas. The planum temporale has been 
identified as an interface between perception and the production of 
sounds (Hickok et al. 2003). It is associated with articulation and 
action planning. The planum temporale is considered a gateway to 
frontal motor systems. It is associated with all kind of sequential pat-
terns (speech, music, rhythm). The planum temporale reacts to un-
expected durations in sequences (Mustovic et al. 2003). 
As may be recalled Janata located a prefrontal area, BA47, sensi-
tive to tonality. This is one of the prefrontal areas where the path-
way from the planum temporale connects in the case of music. BA47 
is a rule processor of music. 
Melodies and harmonies activate the planum temporale on the 
right temporal lobe, whereas the speech centre is to be found on 
the corresponding left side (Peretz 2003)262. Both these areas are 
thus involved in syntactic processing. Bermudez & Zatorre (2005)263 
found that the right planum temporale has higher concentrations of 
grey matter for musicians than for non-musicians. As stated before, 
the processing of tonality and pitch is dependent on the connection 
between the planum temporale and BA47 in prefrontal cortex.  
This general picture of the dorsal stream processing of sound is 
supported and completed by Koelsch (et al. 2006). The authors de-
tect “a motor-related circuitry for music comprising the ventral stria-
tum, the insular cortex, the Rolandic, and possibly the frontal oper-
culum”. The frontal operculum BA44 detected active in this study is 
generally involved in linguistic and music rule and sequence proc-
essing (Koelsch 2007)264.  This area is adjacent to BA47 (tonality 
rules). This indicates a general frontal lobe area divided in sub areas 
designed for different syntactic tasks. 
                                           
262  Peretz, I. (2003) Brain specialization for music: New evidence from congenital 
amusia. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Music (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre). Oxford 
University Press, New York. 192–203  
263  Bermudez, P. & Zatorre R.J. (2005) Differences in gray matter between musicians 
and nonmusicians. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol.1060. The Neu-
rosciences and Music II: From Perception to Performance (Eds. G. Avanzini, S. 
Koelsch, L. Lopez & M. Manjo). 395–399 
264  Koelsch, S. (2007) Personal information 7/7 
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To sum up, the evidence indicates that music is perceived along 
segregated streams: 
1. A ventral “What-stream” for identification of sound, accessi-
ble to consciousness. This stream produces pre-motor imita-
tion of sounds. 
2. A dorsal “Where-stream” that is pre-attentive and rule 
based. This stream is insensitive to modality and organizes 
the information along sequential, rhythmical and tonal 
parameters. 
These streams correspond to the egocentric (identification) and the 
allocentric (rule based structure) perspectives.  
Integration of streams 
As already has been pointed out, it has been proposed that the ven-
tral and the dorsal visual streams converge in the hippocampus and 
the parahippocampus (Burgess 2002). We have also seen that the 
ventral stream and the dorsal stream may be associated with the 
egocentric and the allocentric perspective. “Hippocampus allows the 
animal to self-localize on re-entering a familiar environment. This 
allows the animal to reset its path integrator representation from the 
local view” (Redish 1999). I suggest that what Redish calls “the path 
integrator” is the integration of the map (allocentric perspective) 
with the egocentric perspective. When integrated, the animal lives 
the map from its own perspective. As this happens the position of 
the body is related to the allocentric landmarks and the sequence of 
the route appears. A sequence of memories is replayed. It involves 
the path and all the cues on the path. This must be so because the 
path is defined through the cues. Since these cues are lived emo-
tionally, the total experience is replayed as lived – path and context. 
Hippocampus is involved in the transfer from short-term memory to 
long term storage (Gazzaniga 1985). It is well known that hippo-
campal injury causes amnesia. It has also been noted among amnesia 
patients that new information does not seem to have emotional 
value. 
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The sequences of place cell activation in the rat hippocampus dur-
ing REM sleep mirror the sequence when the rat is navigating in a 
maze. The neurons learn the order to fire. This order can never be 
reversed. Even the neurons “beside the path” fire but weaker. A 
vector field is thus created in hippocampus, pointing to the goal 
(Redish 1999). The episodic memory is such a replay. What is re-
called is the situation as lived. If, for example the animal once has 
been frightened when it passed a rock, this rock will forever be 
imprinted emotionally as a dangerous place. 
The irreversible vector field for episodic memories of paths may 
be a neurological explanation why we cannot remember music 
backwards. If time is abstracted from the memory we may semanti-
cally be able to name a music piece, but we cannot recall it without 
the time dimension. This replay may explain music imagery (inner 
music perception not triggered by sensory input). This puts a cogni-
tive constraint on music. It is possible that most listeners cannot per-
ceive retrogrades (reversed order of tones) of themes. It is not sur-
prising that this technique cannot be found in popular music. It does 
not sell records. 
Hippocampus has been found active in contextual shifts. This 
means that hippocampus is involved in allocentrically cued shifts. 
Music structure provides contextual associations within the piece by 
means of repetition, and between pieces by means of recognition of 
style and genre. I suggest that contextual shifts in music, or viola-
tions of contextual expectances in music, imply hippocampal activa-
tion. To put a rat on a familiar track may in some basic neurological 
respect be comparable to putting on a familiar record for a listener. 
The contextual representation, be it music context or terrain context, 
is reset at the presentation: “Where am I? I recognize this; I might 
be here. If so, I expect this and this, and this. Match! I am here! 
Now I expect this.” These questions are a pre-attentive part of the 
perceptive cycle. We will come back to the emotional implications 
for music. 
I suggest that the auditory streams just as the visual streams con-
verge in hippocampus and parahippocampus. The reason is an fMRI 
study, which tested where the brain processes violations of harmony 
and violation of expected timbre.  Although both tests showed vari-
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ous activations practically all over the brain, only one place showed 
interaction between timbre (ventral) and structure (dorsal) expecta-
tions: the parahippocampus (Tillmann et al. 2006)265. 
Even if the information is integrated in the hippocampus and the 
hippocampus is associated with long-term memory this does not 
mean that all memories are stored in the hippocampus. Rather the 
information is fed back to the perception and association areas. Epi-
sodic memorizing is to reactivate the perception process. This is 
what makes episodic memories so vivid. The process can be acti-
vated by any contextual cue. Since we live the event anew, this is 
by definition imagery. I believe that imagery and episodic memory 
is connected. 
We can actually see examples of the integration of the streams. In 
televised music quiz games, where the contender is asked to re-
member the title of a popular song (contextual information), you can 
clearly see how she starts moving into the song, snapping fingers, 
waving the body, in order to recall the lyrics. Technically speaking 
this could be analysed as an attempt to set the path integrator – to 
coordinate the body with the music track. The lyrics are actualized 
through the body. When the contender finds a word, the path is 
integrated and the sequence of the words in the melody will come 
to her. Then she sings on until she finds the word that cues to the 
title. This strategy is spontaneous. The example shows that we may 
indeed use praxic (bodily) navigation strategy to arrive to contextual 
knowledge. 
Another example of music-context connection can be observed in 
people suffering from stroke who have lost their speech. They can 
often sing song texts. 
We can conclude from the evidence and the knowledge at the 
present state that music is processed along a dorsal stream connect-
ing auditory cortex and specifically planum temporale with motor 
areas and with BA47 (the rules of tonality and sequences) and a 
ventral stream for identification of sounds and sound sources. These 
two pathways possibly converge in the hippocampus. The hippo-
                                           
265  Tillmann, B., Koelsch, S., Escoffier, N., Bigand, E., Lalitte, P., Friederici, A.D. & von 
Cramon, D.Y. (2006) Cognitive priming in sung and instrumental music: Activation of 
inferior frontal cortex. NeuroImage.  Vol. 31. No 4. 1771–1782 
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campal area will associate the music with context such as styles, 
places, lyrics and emotions. However these emotions will be elicited 
by contextual associations. 
Neurological correspondence between place and 
music 
Experiments have revealed that rats have “place cells” in the hippo-
campus firing each time the rat passes a certain place (Berthoz 
2000). The rat thus has an allocentric topographical representation of 
its natural environment in the hippocampus. There is evidence for a 
neural code of human spatial navigation based on cells that respond 
at specific spatial locations and cells that respond to views of land-
marks (Ekstrom et al. 2003)266. This study identifies place cells (pri-
marily found in the hippocampus), as well as “view” cells (respon-
sive to landmarks; found mainly in the parahippocampal region) and 
“goal” cells (responsive to goals, found throughout the frontal and 
temporal lobes). Some cells respond to combinations of place, view 
and goal — for example, cells that responded to viewing an object 
only when that object was a goal.  
You may get the impression that allocentric landmarks in the ter-
rain are mapped in hippocampus whereas the allocentric landmarks 
in music are mapped in BA47 in prefrontal cortex and from this 
draw the conclusion that the perception of music and the perception 
of a landscape are basically different. However tonality must be 
learnt, since tonality is not a universal phenomenon. There can thus 
not be a brain area exclusively designed to process tonality but 
rather an area equipped to learn the rules which can be applied for 
tonality. Can this area be used for cueing for place? Area BA47 
shows spatial selectivity (Rizzuto et al. 2005)267. It is critical for 
visuo-spatial movement planning. And furthermore, the hippocampus 
                                           
266  Ekstrom, A.D., Kahana, M.J., Caplan, J.B., Fields, T., Isham, E., Newman, E. & 
Fried, I. (2003) Cellular networks underlying human spatial navigation. Nature. 
Vol. 425. No 6954. 184–187 
267  Rizzuto, D., Mamelak, A., Sutherling, W., Fineman, I. & Andersen, R.A. (2005) 
Spatial selectivity in human ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience. 
Vol. 8. No 4. 415–417 
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together with the caudate nucleus and amygdala is activated by 
chords violating harmonic relationships (Tillmann et al. 2003). This 
shows, according to the authors, that there is a tonal representation 
in the hippocampus possibly mapped by place cells. Thus there is 
one area known to map music that also processes location (BA47), 
and another area known to map location that also processes music 
(the hippocampus). This indicates a close relation between the per-
ception of musical and spatial structure. 
Implications 
The phenomenology of technique 
The integration of the allocentric perspective with the egocentric 
perspective entails that structure is translated to movement. The mu-
sic sequence is translated into a movement sequence, just as the 
sequence of the path is translated into movement. Since the planum 
temporale connects tonality representation in the prefrontal cortex 
with motor activity, we can see the planum temporale as the inter-
face between structure and movement. The movements of the 
player give rise to music structure and the structure of the music 
causes movements. This interface could be spelled technique. 
Technique is usually defined as the performance of a task with a 
minimal loss of energy. Since economizing the energy is very im-
portant to most creatures, we can expect that animals have a sense 
for technique. The bird on its way over open sea economizes to the 
limit. The cheetah balances the cost of energy with the gain of the 
hunt. For the sparrow surviving the winter, every move must con-
tribute to nourishment. The movement patterns of all animals are 
part of this cost-benefit equation. This indicates that technique is a 
sense. When we do something often, we tend to find this perfect 
balance between aim and cost. There is thus an ultimate movement 
pattern for each task. This could be demonstrated by specifying the 
animals as slalom skiers competing in a race. The structure is de-
cided by the position of the gates. Top skiers tend to move identi-
cally. Even the line between gates is identical. There is for each 
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skier an optimal way to perform the race. This movement is a “com-
promise” between the path, the skies and the body. If the path is 
fixed, the optimal choreography is fixed. 
The movements become automated. The technique, learned by 
imitation, videos and practicing, is procedural knowledge. When the 
skier starts, she has to rely on this knowledge. This knowledge is 
automatically adjusted to the terrain. All the accumulated and gener-
alized implicit knowledge from imitations and thousands of previous 
runs is used in the special case. 
If the skier has mapped the track, the movements will follow. Anja 
Pärson, super-G champion, in Alpine World Championship, Bormio 
31/1 2005 has expressed this: 
The excitement makes me tremble like an aspen leaf when I ap-
proach the start, and I get so tense by the pumping adrenalin that I 
sometimes feel as if I had lactic acid even before I have skied one 
meter.  But when it’s time to race I get tunnel vision. I see where 
the line goes from gate to gate and almost have no time to think 
during the race.  (Anja Pärson 2005)268  
This is a description of total focus. The autopilot turns on. The skier 
is locked to the target. This state of consciousness is necessary to 
handle situations at 115 km/h.  If Anja started thinking about her 
movements she would loose accuracy and probably end up hanging 
in the safety net. 
Music performance can be compared to skiing. Two players per-
forming the same melody on the same type of instrument in the 
same tempo will have to move identically. The first violinist section 
in a symphony orchestra moves like a shoal of fish. In this case the 
technique is a compromise between the music, the instrument and 
the body. But since the body schema includes tools, the instrument 
(as the skies) is perceived as a body part. The technique for the 
violinist is a compromise between the sound structure and the body 
schema. Technique in music, thus, is an “agreement” between the 
body, and the structure to be followed during the course of time. 
Speed and accuracy excludes tension and inaccurate movements. 
                                           
268  Pärson, A. (2005) Interview in Göteborgs-Posten. http://www.gp/jsp/crosslink 
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Visible cues from the score or audible cues from the music are 
gradually mapped as finger movements. Any improvising musician 
has a set of “licks” (melody fragments) suited for musical structures, 
such as scales or arpeggios (chord tones), automated as sequences of 
finger movements. The player has a set of melodies in her fingers. 
This procedural knowledge is automatically adjusted to the particular 
tune (as the technique of the skier is adjusted to every slope). 
Charlie Parker used a surprisingly limited set of basic patterns in 
his improvisations. These patterns could be used in most of the mu-
sic he performed. Parker adjusted these patterns not only to har-
mony but to the melody of the original song as well (Martin 
1996)269. The patterns may be consciously learnt, but they are not 
consciously used. Rather they are automated sequences of move-
ment connections cued to music feed back. 
The task in music playing is to produce perfect pitch, timing and 
sound. The professional player tries to achieve the ideal technique 
to do so. This imagined goal is never fully achieved but she closes 
in on it during years of training. For the professional player the 
sense of technique is not enough. The work with the technique is 
about becoming aware of every aspect of movement-sound connec-
tion and then to rehearse the movement pattern until it is auto-
mated. It happens that musicians discover that they are making some 
fundamental technical error. Flutists can develop a kind of lip-tongue 
neurosis, akin to golf swing neurosis, which forces them to disas-
semble the pattern and assemble it anew. When the technique 
works the player feels control and this interaction with the instru-
ment is confirming her musical self as a co-perception of the sound. 
How does the technique of the artist affect the listener? If the lis-
tener is a musician she may become something of a “back seat 
driver”, “helping” the musician, since the sound is automatically con-
nected to her body. In a concert this imitation is helped by visual 
cues. As listeners, we transmit this accuracy to our own bodies. This 
has been treated in the dyadic chapter. 
Luckily the audience is unaware of the pain of practice. Good 
technique is recognized as seemingly effortless performance. It 
                                           
269  Martin, H. (1996) Charlie Parker and Thematic Improvisation. Scarecrow Press, 
Metuchen N.Y. 
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seems effortless because there is no ineffective strain or tension. It is 
perceived as elegance, perfection – or even grace. The experience 
of technical performance is an aesthetic impression in its own right 
and as such part of our enjoyment of music. Seeing an artist perform 
with perfect technique is inspiring. Just to have experienced an An-
dalucian flamenco artist once, may influence a guitarist for life. 
To sum up: 
1. Technique is a compromise between the structure and the 
body. 
2. The structure of the task determines the technique. 
3. The optimal technique is maximal task accuracy combined 
with minimal effort. 
4. Technique is the conciliation of the allocentric and the 
egocentric perspective. 
5. In navigation this conciliation seems to take place in the 
hippocampus. 
6. In music listening we do not know the locus for this inte-
gration. The dorsal stream connects the rules of tonality 
with perceived (unattended) sounds and movements and 
the ventral stream identifies sounds and sound sources. I 
speculate that these streams converge in the hippocampal 
area. 
Is musical perceived visually? 
As stated in the depiction of the allocentric perspective, visual per-
ception of place is not a prerequisite for this perspective. We can 
hear place in music. Do we visualize those places? 
The integration of the musical streams in the hippocampus allows 
for contextual associations to music structures. One such possibility is 
the connection between musical place and geographic place, that is, 
between heard place and visualized place. Do we perceive place as 
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the music structure unfolds? To some extent this question is a ques-
tion about cross-modal connections between hearing and sight, since 
sight always entails spatial place. Such connections exist. The visual 
and the auditory pathways partly overlap (Hall 2003)270. We have 
already seen that the dorsal stream is cross-modal, that BA47 codes 
for tonality and place and that the hippocampus is activated by music 
processing as well as place processing. 
Do we perceive visions of places as we listen to music? Do we for 
example perceive temporal and pitch relations as length and height. 
I think the answer to this question is yes – sometimes. Here are 
some examples: 
1. We say that melody tones or chords are close to or distant 
from each other. Do we really perceive this? Or is it a just 
a metaphor. Surely we feel likeness and unlikeness. How-
ever according to Lakoff & Johnson (1980), metaphors are 
grounded in perception. The choice of metaphor indicates 
that closeness and distance can in fact be perceived in mu-
sic. This is embedded in our perception of the world. 
When we perceive the same structure, we may feel that 
we have come back to the same place. And, furthermore 
closeness in time is often perceived as closeness in space, 
since it takes time to move from one place to another. 
Thus it can be argued that there is a cognitive relation be-
tween the perception of music and the perception of spati-
ality. 
2. If the listener knows how to read music, she can link the 
heard structure with the written note system. Remember-
ing ordinary text engages allocentric judgement, since we 
can remember where on the page the word is and the 
spatial distribution of the letters in the word. There is a 
functional equivalence to spatial representation and read-
ing. Reading a music score also requires allocentric judge-
ment, and even more so, since the music score is a graph 
of the sounding music. This means that if the listener is a 
                                           
270  Hall, D.A. (2003) Auditory Pathways: Are ‘What’ and ‘Where’ Appropriate? Cur-
rent Biology. Vol. 13. No 10. 406–408 
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musician the melody heard might produce an imagination 
of the melody in writing which would put her on an allo-
centric map. 
3. Most of us, irrespective of if we can read music or not, 
perceive notes high in pitch as spatially high and vice 
versa. And to a lesser extent we perceive music as moving 
from the left to the right simply because we are used to 
reading ordinary text and graphs in that direction. The time 
line in Western culture is always a left to right representa-
tion. This means that the music is perceived in a two-
dimensional space – a horizontal time dimension and a 
vertical pitch dimension. 
4. Instrumentalists associate heard music with places on their 
instruments. 
These first four points are about place perception directly related to 
the music. However music often triggers or connects to other visual 
experiences: 
1. Music propels visual imagery. In the Gabrielsson & Lind-
ström Wik (2003) material there are numerous reports of 
music triggering visions. 
2. Shamans all over the world use music as a means to travel 
spiritually. 
3. Laboratory-based studies show unequivocal evidence for 
cross-modal links in spatial attention (Spence & Read 
2003)271. 
4. The effect of music listening on the performance of driving 
in computer games has been tested (North & Hargreaves 
                                           
271  Spence, C. & Read, L. (2003) Speech shadowing while driving: On the difficulty 
of splitting attention between eye and ear. American Psychological Society. Vol. 14. 
No 3. 251–256 
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1999)272. The authors suggest a direct link between music 
and the listening context (driving). 
5. Music is used in moving pictures (films, computer games, 
and commercials) to support movement. 
Let us stay for a moment at this last point! Why do music sequences 
go so well with visual sequences? We have on one hand a heard 
structure, and on the other hand a seen structure. Both are unfolding 
over time. I would say that the connection between the two will 
preferably be made if there is some kind of isomorphism at hand, 
that is, a structural likeness. 
Marshall and Cohan (1988)273 developed a model for the percep-
tion of film based on their research on film music. This model is 
called the congruence-associationist model. The authors argue that 
watching a movie, our attention will be drawn to the cross-modal 
congruence between the music and the moving images. This means 
that if there is some form of structural likeness between the music 
and a part of the visual field, this part is likely to be attended to. 
Music, they claim, directs the eye to visual parts that are structurally 
congruent with the music. 
The connection between the flow of images and music indicates 
that there is indeed some common underlying mechanism. In other 
words there is an affinity between the perception of structure in 
music and the perception of the structure of visual environment. 
I suggest a phenomenological explanation for the sound-image 
connection. When we hear a salient sound, the eyes will search for 
the cause of the sound. Attention is brought to the source. We need 
to select the right object out of a spectrum of objects on the scene. 
For this reason sounds must create expectancies of what we are 
about to see. This is possible simply because we know how events 
and objects sound. And, even more important, the eye is looking for 
synchronization between the sound and the object. We are, to take 
one example, sensitive to the synchronization between lip move-
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273  Marshall, S. & Cohen, A.J. (1988) Effects of musical soundtracks on attitudes to 
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ments and speech. It has been shown that babies attend to voices in 
synch with lip movements and lose interest if the lip movements are 
unsynchronized. This is in fact exactly what the Marshall-Cohan the-
ory postulates.  
It is a nice experience to listen to music as we drive a car. The 
flow of visual impressions seems to match the music. The music un-
folds over time just as the landscape does when we pass through it. 
At times you can get the impression that the music is especially 
composed to accompany your trip, especially if there are rhythmic 
features of repetition and variation in the landscape (telephone 
poles, house façades etc.). Here is another example that can be ex-
plained by the Marshall-Cohan model. If attention selects visual cor-
respondences to the music structure, we would feel that the music 
fits the visual impression. 
The examples demonstrate that place can be perceived in music, 
but this perception is individual. The visual perception of a location 
depends on the situation and on the listener. This should rightfully 
be labelled imagery since there is no visual input. This imagery can 
be seen as a part of the perception of the music. 
Implications for emotion 
What is the implication for emotion from this comparison of naviga-
tion with music listening? There are several possibilities. I am going 
to discuss feed back on anticipation (Meyer and Huron), the seeking 
system (Panksepp), technique, the joy of moving, and flow. 
Emotional feed-back on anticipation 
Two related theories treat music structure and emotion: Leonard 
Meyer’s theory in Meaning and emotion in music from the 50s 
(Meyer 1956) and David Huron’s ITPRA (imagination response, ten-
sion response, prediction response, reaction response, appraisal re-
sponse) theory in Sweet Anticipation (Huron 2006). Both deal with 
expectation. The importance of this is confirmed by physiological 
studies showing that strong emotional responses to music are typi-
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cally found in familiar music and in violations of expectancies (Al-
tenmüller 2006)274. 
Meyer’s point of departure is Gestalt theory, whereas Huron’s ap-
proach is perceptual learning. To put it simply, Meyer argues that 
when the expectations formed by Gestalt principles are fulfilled we 
are happy and when they are violated or prolonged we are less 
happy. Are musical “goals”, such as the tonic chord in a cadence, 
really that important to us? Why would we feel disappointed or frus-
trated if musical goals were not reached? There is no simple reason 
for this. However ERP research shows, as we have seen, that we do 
react to violation of expectations. 
Huron states that music listening creates expectations and that 
when these expectations are violated we react negatively. This then 
would rather explain why we do not like music, than why we like 
it. Huron offers a solution to this problem. The solution lies in the 
discrepancy between the immediate pre-attentive reaction and the 
slower “thoughtful” reaction as we realize that this cannot hurt us. 
Prefrontal cortex then sends an inhibiting signal. Now we are so 
relieved that the experience is positive. The bigger the difference 
the stronger the positive reaction, Huron argues. 
The evidence that frontal parts are inhibitory on amygdala reac-
tions can be exemplified by the case of Shepherd Coleman (Tramo 
2003)275. Mr. Coleman, who is a composer, suffered a rupture of an 
artery that lies on the surface of the front of the brain. When this 
artery burst a large amount of blood spilled out and resulted almost 
immediately in coma. Coleman recovered but there was a dramatic 
change in his perception of music. 
Tramo: 
When he (Coleman) played a piece of music that previously he 
would find emotional, after the brain damage he was unable to 
control those emotions and would break out into tears, for exam-
ple, at a moving part of the piece…  There is one part of the opera 
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the conference Music in the Brain at the University of Aarhus 21–22 April  
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(Madama Butterfly of Puccini) where Madama Butterfly sings a 
duet with her handmaiden, that he simply cannot bear. 
Coleman: 
…the duet they sing is of such intensity that I can't even listen to 
it. I'm discomforted by it. I mean it's painful. 
According to Tramo’s interpretation of the case, the damaged frontal 
parts have an inhibiting effect on the limbic system. This is in line 
with Blood’s study on pleasant/unpleasant music, since it was found 
that pleasant experiences correlated with prefrontal activity. Indeed, 
activation in prefrontal cortex has been associated specifically with 
training in the up-regulation and down-regulation of emotional re-
sponses (Williams et al. 2006276; Bonanno et al. 2004)277. 
Huron’s theory is, as can be seen, grounded in scientific evidence 
and yet it is unsatisfying.  Here are the reasons: 
1. Do we ever think that music cannot harm us? If so, we 
should be aware of such a thought. It never happened to 
me. The inhibitory effect from the prefrontal cortex does 
not need to be grounded in reasoning. There is experi-
mental evidence of prefrontal cortex inhibition of amygdala 
anxiety reactions (Quirk & Milad 2002). The fact that this 
particular experiment was performed on rats shows that 
thoughtfulness is not required. Rather the inhibition is due 
to implicit learning. This is to say that when we have been 
exposed to the threat several times without bad conse-
quences, the warning is automatically inhibited. 
2. Huron’s theory would lead to the consequence that the 
stronger the immediate negative reaction, the happier we 
are. This is doubtful. My experience is that there is a limit 
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for violations. If the violation is found to be within style, it 
is liked, but if it is out of style, it is disliked. 
3. Even if musical surprises evoke emotional reactions, music 
can be emotional without being surprising. For instance 
plain rock and roll music can make people go nuts, but 
there is not much surprise in it. I would say that the music 
that touches us the most is not seldom quite banal and shal-
low. 
4. The theory is too one-dimensional. The reactions to devi-
ances are positive or negative. Thus the theory does not 
account for the variety of emotions that music may induce. 
The most common and the most easily identified musical 
emotion is sadness (lost love). The theory does not account 
for sadness. 
5. In order to make his theory fit to musical chills (often in 
combination with piloerection) Huron states that the fast 
emotional reaction is aggression. His reason for this is that 
aggressive dogs and cats raise their hair. My own experi-
ence is that the chill feeling is a beautiful experience. It is 
close to love and longing. It seems unlikely that we have 
to go through aggression to experience this in music. And 
that this should take place in milliseconds. 
In all, I think Huron’s theory is interesting, but it needs calibration. 
Seeking & emotion 
The perception of music and the perception of the landscape resem-
ble each other in a phenomenal as well as in a neurological way; so 
much in fact that the question must be raised whether the percep-
tion of music structure is not an example of cross-domain mapping 
(see the introduction).  This means that our neurological equipment 
for the basic domain of navigation is used in the more abstract do-
main of music perception. In this context the research and ideas of 
Jaak Panksepp becomes interesting. 
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Panksepp argues that emotions have roles in specific systems 
(Panksepp 1998). One such system is the seeking system. This system 
is connected with the transmitter substance dopamine. Dopamine is 
chemically close to cocaine. On a neuronal level the neurotransmit-
ter dopamine is associated with prediction and award (Schultz, 
Dayan & Montague 1997)278. When this drug is injected in mice it 
typically makes the mice sniff around. This is a very factual example 
of the close connection between emotion and action. 
Dopamine is generally associated with motivation and movement. 
It has also been associated with the internal clock used to time dura-
tions in the striatum (Meck 1996)279. Striatum is, as we have already 
pointed out, involved in the sequence circuit. Panksepp & Bernatzky 
(2002) speculate that Meck’s finding could be connected with “the 
seeking system”. The authors connect this observation with music 
listening: 
Such basic brain mechanisms for anticipatory eagerness may gen-
erate seeking states which may promote various musical expectan-
cies, especially those related to rhythmic movements of the body 
which may be ancestral pre-adaptations for the emotional compo-
nents in music. (Panksepp & Bernatzky 2002:136) 
This emotion then is connected to curiosity, the eagerness to ex-
plore what is hiding behind the next corner. This curiosity of course 
depends on what we anticipate and the possibility of interesting sur-
prises.  
One way to produce musical surprises is to provoke perspective 
shifts in the listener. The technique of such changes is common. I 
would recommend listening to Pat Metheny’s The Way Up280, which 
exhibits a map of perspective shifts, all within the allocentric cate-
gory of perspectives. The perception of the attended part of the mu-
sic changes because the musical context is changing. 
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1. Rhythm: The rhythmic focus in a polyrhythmic beat changes 
from one rhythm to another. Foreground becomes back-
ground and background becomes foreground. Or polymet-
ric effects (as described earlier in this chapter) where the 
melody does not fit the time signature. It creates rhythmic 
ambivalence. 
2. Melody: An intertwining voice in a polyphone weave is 
suddenly focussed and becomes melody. Or two separately 
introduced themes are combined to support each other. 
They give each other new meaning. 
3. Harmony: A repeated arpeggio indicating a chord is tilted 
by the introduction of an unexpected base note, giving the 
arpeggio a new harmonic meaning. 
4. New sonic context: A sudden simultaneous and total change 
in sound. You get a new impression of the music. The sen-
sation is so strong you can hardly believe you are listening 
to the same piece, even if the tonal content is identical. 
The effect of these shifts is that you experience a constant re-
perception. The music forces you to take new perspectives. It is 
exactly as in the old pictures used to prove the point of figure and 
ground in Gestalt psychology. It could also be introducing a new 
piece of information that produces a change in perception. Me-
theny’s music constantly produces these shifts. This creates awe and 
you might start imagining your own mind at work. It is like an ex-
ploration journey. 
The perspective shifts, particularly in rhythm, are bodily felt. Now 
your feet follow the fast beat and your body sways in a much 
slower beat layered in the first beat and simultaneously you experi-
ence the triplets as waves in your body. As the melody changes 
focus from one of those rhythms to another there occurs a change in 
rhythmic focus. These sonic changes produce changes of your body 
focus. It is not only enriching – it is mind blowing! 
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Anterior cingulate cortex is involved in a form of attention called 
attention for action (Posner & Dehaene 1994)281. In other words, 
when surprises occur concerning inappropriate movements, as when 
we adapt to a new rhythmic pattern, we are alerted. What is the 
emotional effect? It is totally engaging and you forget everything 
else. Attention is focussed on to the here and now action. I connect 
this with the well-known concept flow (as described in Chapter 2). 
Music is one of the activities Csikszentmihaly associates with flow. 
The self (the conscious thoughts of the self) is forlorn and the subject 
merges with the task. The experience of merging with the music is 
commonly reported in the Gabrielsson & Lindström Wik (2003) ma-
terial on strong experiences related to music. 
Technique & emotion 
Although it is not difficult to predict music, it is less easy to see what 
the reward would be. Is the fulfilled expectancy a reward? A pianist 
was asked to play on a piano where two keys a semitone apart 
were reversed on the piano (Maidhof 2007)282. The pianist showed 
an ERP component called ERN (error-related negativity). The ERN 
response has been described as the inappropriateness of self-
monitored action within this given context (Luu & Petersen, 
2004)283. Error, or mismatch, is evaluated in relation to the context 
of the action. Violations of action relative to action context are es-
sentially expectancy violations. In plain English: you do something 
and it comes out wrong. I propose, even if this is not spelled out, 
that the ERN-response in this case could be seen as a measure of 
technical error. Even if the pianist did the right move, the result was 
not the expected. The ERN reactions were retrieved both from play-
ing and, although weaker, listening to the error.  
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Why should this experiment be interpreted as a test of technique? 
The pianist did after all not commit a technical error. The point is 
that the pianist perceived that she had made an error since the 
wrong note was heard. There was a mismatch between the per-
formance and the expected feedback. 
The ERN on errors in monitored actions in relation to the task are 
cingulate cortex reactions. The cingulate cortex is generally known 
to feed back body states, and specifically for signalling if a change of 
behaviour is required due to deductions of expected outcomes 
(Bush et al. 2002)284. The area is activated when ongoing actions are 
inadequate. The cingulate cortex has, as may be recalled, been 
pointed out as a part of the singing system. It is activated by listen-
ing to music as well as by imagery tasks of music and of imagery 
tasks of movement. 
The anterior cingulate cortex is functionally divided in a cognitive 
component tracking parameters of the task (context/structure) and an 
affective component in evaluating response outcomes. It is also 
known that dopamine is involved in the prediction of future rewards 
and the motor control needed to achieve the goal. It has been sug-
gested that dopamine is implicated in the striatal involvement in the 
“chunking” or automatization of behavioural sequences (Daw 
2003)285. 
The problem with ERPs such as the ERN is that they only detect 
errors. For this sake I want to direct the reader’s attention to an ex-
periment that indicates positive feed back. Unfortunately this ex-
periment did not involve music but it came pretty close. Ullsperger 
& von Cramon (2003)286 designed an fMRI experiment where the 
participants were to foresee which of two balls presented on a 
screen would hit the wall first. The balls were presented for a sec-
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ond. A correct answer (pressing the right button) was rewarded with 
a smiling face and vice versa. The resemblance with playing an in-
strument is this: 
1. We have the perception of movement related to a land-
mark in both cases (tonal centre and a wall respectively). 
2. Both cases involve a prediction of movement that is proce-
dural rather than calculated. 
3. Both involve button or key pressing as responses to pre-
diction of movements (seen or heard). 
4. There is a feedback in both cases – a smiling face and the 
sound of the right tone. 
Ullsperger and von Cramon found that positive feedback from the 
button pressing correlated with activity in the ventral striatum. This 
area, also known as the nucleus accumbens is activated by pleasur-
able experiences. It is an attention area, rich in opioids such as en-
dorphin receptors and considered implicated in drug addictive be-
haviour. Negative feedback was correlated with activity in the ros-
tral cingulate motor area, the inferior anterior insula and the 
epithalamus (habenular complex). The cingulate area is as we have 
seen generating ERN error related negativity and feedback gener-
ated negativity. The epithalamus is known to have inhibitory effect 
on midbrain nuclei (such as nucleus accumbens) and thus reduces 
levels of dopamine. 
Ullsperger and von Cramon’s finding about the neurological un-
derpinning of positive emotions in this task is in agreement with an 
investigation of musical emotions (Menon & Levitin 2005)287. Menon 
and Levitin found that music caused a correlated activity in the ven-
tral striatum and the nucleus accumbens. It could thus be argued that 
we do not only react to fulfilled expectancies and violations in music 
but also to performance outcomes. Thus, if we latently take part of 
the performance as listeners, there is a possibility that we would feel 
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the lack of technique in our own bodies. And on the contrary, the 
perception of perfect technique would be perceived as pleasant – 
“beautiful”. In fact, this is two sides of the same coin. The perfect 
technique is what we learn to expect and the false tone is a viola-
tion of this expected perfection.  
To sum up: 
1. Technical errors cause ERN reactions in the anterior 
cingulate cortex. 
2. Positive feedback on appropriate action monitoring ac-
tivates the ventral striatum and nucleus accumbens.  
3. The listener feels the perfection of technique in her 
own body. 
I think that no theory of music and emotion should ignore that there 
is a world of a difference between listening to tight music on pitch 
performed with ease and listening to the opposite. It is simply the 
difference between listening to the skilled professional and the ama-
teur. 
I propose that the perception of technical excellence is an impor-
tant explanation to positive emotions in music. Basically it is the 
same bodily satisfaction as when we manage to hit a target perfectly. 
It is the sensation of a perfect backhand volley. Or seeing someone 
else perform it. It is the feedback of success telling our bodies: This 
is how to do it! We feel the elegance of the move. Just as much as 
we love seeing Ronaldinho make a move, we love the perfection of 
Francisco Sánchez Gómez, alias Paco de Lucia. And just as we strug-
gle with the wrestler fighting to avoid losing by a fall, we struggle 
when we listen to out of pitch singing. 
The joy of movement 
Even if technique is fun, let us not forget that movement is fun gen-
erally. I will not expand on this since we can all relate to the truth 
in this from our own experience. Just let me point out one interest-
ing observation! Striatum organizes sequential movements. In this 
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process it releases serotonin (Jacobs & Fornal 1997)288. This could 
explain such diverse activities as jogging, rocking babies to sleep 
and gum chewing.  
From a musician’s point of view the striatum-serotonin reaction on 
repetitive action, as well as the striatum-dopamine reaction on tim-
ing, is highly interesting. Music consists of repetitive patterns which 
in turn activate repetitive body action. This might explain why we 
enjoy endless rhythmic repetition. The extreme cases are rock music 
with its monotone pulse, techno which is nothing much but rhythmic 
sequences, rave dancing, the festival in Rio de Janeiro, where you 
choose one rhythm in the rhythmical weave and beat it enthusiasti-
cally for a whole week, or the continuous monotone rhythms in 
shaman music, which put the listener in alternative states of 
consciousness. Since even the so called classical music is made up 
by rhythmic and melodic repetitive patterns and since there are 
always motor tendencies in listeners this effect can always be 
assumed to some degree. 
Conclusion 
We have discussed several phenomenal and neurological parallels 
between music listening and navigation. This connection indicates 
cross-domain mapping defined as a general cognitive process 
through which we structure an complex or abstract domain (music) 
in terms of one more familiar or concrete (finding the way in a fa-
miliar surrounding). This has many implications for music and emo-
tion: feed back on anticipation, the seeking system, technique, the 
enjoyment of movement and flow have been discussed. 
Allocentric emotions, if I may call them so, reflect the enjoyment 
and frustrations of following a path; our excitement of what might be 
around the corner, reunions and surprises, as well as the thrill to 
master this technically. All this contributes to the flow, the alert 
sense of here and now. This makes us merge with the music. Let 
me accentuate that this here and now experience, this merging ex-
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perience, is exactly the characteristic of the strong experience in 
music. 
ERP experiments show that this emotion does not result from what 
we consciously perceive. Rather emotion is generated earlier in the 
perception process. We recognize this from the egocentric and the 
dyadic perspectives. 
 
192 
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Tribal Rites 
The Tribal Perspective 
Music has two intriguing effects: 
1. It coordinates people physically. 
2. It makes us feel the emotion of others. It creates social 
bonding and may therefore be essential for maintaining 
large groups. This, David Huron argues, can be the evolu-
tionary explanation why we have developed music (Huron 
2003). The large group had an advantage in the feuds with 
other groups and in detecting, hunting and conquering big 
animals. It can thus be argued that music is beneficial for 
the spread of the genes of the tribe. 
I attempt to show that coordination and bonding are connected and 
that this connection creates tribal cosmology – a shared perception 
of the world. 
Depiction of perspective 
As can be seen from mass psychology reactions such as panic and 
riot rage, it is possible to perceive the intentions, the goals and the 
emotions of the group, not as a bunch of individuals, but as a unit. I 
will call such a unit a tribe – a group involved in, and with a history 
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of, bodily interaction. Interaction with the tribe creates the tribal 
perspective. The frame of reference is the information shared by the 
tribe. We are as listeners affected by performing groups, ensembles, 
and orchestras; but also by the audience. Audiences are shaped to 
tribes by the performers, as are music groups by their audiences. 
They belong to the same tribe. 
Tribalism can be felt at live concerts, carnivals, football crowds, 
dance-floors and rituals. When we take this perspective our roles, 
values and lifestyles are dictated by the tribe.  This can be more or 
less pronounced. It is evident in teenage audiences, but even the 
bourgeois elderly couple attending classical concerts belong to a 
tribe, although to a less pronounced degree. The music and the 
audience affect this couple, change their behaviour, their movement 
pattern, and their perception of who they are. 
Music is a sensitive subject, because it shapes identities. We inter-
nalize the features of Metallica, say, and make the emblems, the 
tattoos, the clothing, the movement pattern and the attitude our 
own.  If someone ridicules your music, you – as a person – are un-
der attack. 
What is the underlying mechanism to tribalism in music? I will in-
troduce and compare evidence and theories about group interaction 
and shared perception. I will then discuss three examples: The car-
nival in Rio de Janeiro, the song Sangrando by Gonzaguinha and the 
rock concert. 
Tribal life 
In the dawn of manhood semi-nomadic hunter-gatherer groups of 
10–30 people lived face-to-face with each other in extended fami-
lies (Oatley & Jenkins 1996)289. The total number of acquaintances, 
including other groups, has been estimated to about 150. This is the 
life Homo Sapiens (as Carl Linneus classified humanity) was adapted 
to live and it is the life we have been living during the predominat-
ing part of our history. We are talking about the pre-cultural era 
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starting approximately 160.000 years ago and lasting until 80–40.000 
years ago when the first cultural artefacts emerge. The reconstruc-
tion of this early era is a key to the understanding of who we are. 
Advanced guesses on tribal life can be made from paleontological 
research, and estimations of resources, tasks, problems and threats 
that had to be dealt with to adapt to the environment. Before lan-
guage was fully developed communication was restricted to bodily 
interaction, to concrete showing, to gestures, to the tone of voice 
and to spontaneous outbursts. What had to be communicated in tribal 
life? And how is this reflected in our behaviour today? 
The hierarchy within the group had to be fixed. Peace within a 
group is maintained by an acceptance of the hierarchy to avoid in-
ternal fights over food and mating partners. This means that domi-
nance and submission had to be communicated. The group decides 
who you are, not only in the eyes of the group but in your own 
eyes. This communication can also be seen in herd living mammals. 
In the tribal perspective you can have identity (a role in the 
group) but you cannot have individuality. We can perceive the self 
as a co-perception of the group, but individuality demands cognitive 
consciousness. The thought “This is me” must be formulated. A life 
story must be constructed. This probably demands language. If so, it 
is a cultural perspective. These two perspectives can come into con-
flict. Let me exemplify! 
At school reunions, even the most successful person can be re-
duced to the little scared and bullied child the class once doomed 
her to be. This decision is hard to change. The exposed girl loses 
self-confidence, the voice becomes weak, she not only experiences 
that the group thinks that she does not have anything of interest to 
say, but even feels that this is true. Everything comes out wrong. 
She confirms the expectations. She may have achieved many things 
in life, but this is worth nothing when she meets with the class. 
In cases like this, it does not matter that we are cognitively con-
scious of our identity. The phenomenal consciousness of the group 
dominates over the cognitive consciousness of individuality when 
we interact with the group.  Amazingly, we tend to accept the role 
ascribed to us. It is the condition to belong to the group.  
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It could be argued that this depends to some extent on linguistic 
communication. But body language is enough. How does the group 
look at you when you speak? Do you get attention? How do they 
address you in their tone of voice, gaze and body language? Do 
they abuse you or threaten you? Bullying is hard to change with 
logical arguments because it is not logically motivated.  
Thus in one group you may be held in high esteem and in an-
other you are pariah. You may be a hero at work, but despised at 
home. Every group, from the day care centre to the geriatric care 
centre, is a tribal world with values of its own. 
An interesting adaptation to the group, which can be seen also in 
animals, is the sacrifice for the group. Some group members may 
risk their life for the survival of the group (Matura & Varela 1987)290. 
The tribal perspective thus can dominate over the egocentric per-
spective, even if it means danger to the individual. The struggle for 
survival is not just egocentric but also tribal. This reflects that our 
genes stand a better chance if we protect the group (containing our 
offspring) than if we protect ourselves. 
Here we can see a parallel in traditional military training which 
aims to erase critical thinking. Soldiers are not taught to sacrifice 
their lives by verbal education but through enacting military drill, 
which is typically a matter of synchronizing the group physically to 
one movement and one will. 
Such preparation was essential in the tribal communities. If the 
warriors were not prepared to sacrifice their lives, the whole tribe 
would die, or, in the case the women were spared, they would not 
be available to the warriors again. 
Roles are given in daily interaction. Here we can see the corre-
spondence between roles and emotions. Attachment, care giving, 
cooperation, competition, and predation are tested in recurring situa-
tions as joining (happiness, love), interruption of attachment (distress 
and anxiety), resumption of attachment (relief), loss of attachment 
(despair), assisting others (love), formation of relations (happiness), 
exchange (gratitude), intercourse (sexual feelings), loss of relation-
ship (sadness), achieving and defending resources (anger), defeat 
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(shame, revenge), victory (pride), escape (fear) (Oatley & Jenkins 
1996). We call this special category of emotions relational emotions. 
They can emanate both from dyadic and tribal perspectives. 
Roles are also given in rituals. In baptism, initiation rites, mar-
riages, and funerals members are guided by the shaman, the medi-
cine man, or the priest through a transition to a new role. The sha-
man has a mediating role between this world and the spiritual world 
(the myth). The passage to new consciousness is often a state of 
trance induced by music. 
Trance 
The aim of the rite is often some kind of passage. This passage can 
be spiritual journeys or the transition of identity as in the Afro Brazil-
ian religions where participants dance themselves into trance to be 
possessed by orixas (gods). 
Trance is an altered state of consciousness. The ritual (including 
music, dance and drugs) is a technique to reach such a state. Other 
altered states are achieved by hypnosis, meditation and flow.  Com-
mon to these states are a lowered sense of cognitive consciousness 
and a heightened phenomenal consciousness resulting in unreflec-
tive presence. A common factor in all meditation techniques is the 
focusing on something simple and concrete such as breathing, a 
sound, a mantra, a body part, the pendulum of the hypnotizer. 
Thus altered states of consciousness are achieved by focussing on 
something present. Thinking is repressed. Thinking is an indirect 
experience of the world where the world is processed with sym-
bols. In trance there is an absence of inner language (Friedson 
1996)291. In the state of trance cognitive consciousness is not possi-
ble. The altered state is a phenomenal perception of the world. As a 
consequence critical defence breaks down. Suggestibility increases. 
This is a world where episodic memories and imagery is lived and 
experienced. It is a dreamlike state although the participants are 
fully awake. The heightened suggestibility makes the trance experi-
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ence a passage. You come out on the other side with a new iden-
tity. 
The Indian Tantric philosopher Abhinavagupta described how con-
sciousness changes from an individualistic state of “contraction” to a 
ritual state of   “expansion”: 
The consciousness, which consists of, and is animated by, all 
things on account of the difference of bodies, enters a state of con-
traction. But, in public celebrations, it returns to a state of expan-
sion – since all the complements are reflected in each other. The 
flow of one’s own consciousness in ebullition (i.e., when it is tend-
ing to come out of itself) is reflected in the consciousness of all the 
bystanders, as if in so many mirrors, and, inflamed by these, it 
abandons without effort its state of individual contraction. (Abhi-
navagupta in Gnoli 1956: 70)292 
This text from the 11th century gives an amazingly precise depiction 
of the tribal perspective. It describes how the own body, as it is 
reflected by the bystanders in the celebration, loses individuality. 
The partakers cognitively consciousness of themselves as individuals 
(cultural perspective) is replaced by phenomenal consciousness 
(tribal perspective). This is felt as an expansion (and a return!). 
Music is, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, highly en-
trainable because of its predictability. The listener becomes part of a 
collective movement. We do this pre-attentively, but we can also as 
active listeners entrain it attentively – get absorbed by it; cut out 
everything else, and thus reach a stage of altered consciousness. 
Judith Becker (2004)293 compares reported experiences of trance 
with reports of deep listening to music. Trancers, like music listeners, 
follow a “script”. Common experiences are: a loss of the strong 
sense of self, merging (with an object such as music or with others), 
changed perception of space and time, a kind of syncope – a real 
bodily change, such as fainting, experienced as a blessing.  Another 
common thing is that the experience as such is difficult to describe. 
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Becker reports trance amnesia – inability to recall what transpired 
during trancing. Something like this may happen in strong music 
experiences: 
I find it very difficult to find words to this music that I have expe-
rienced so strongly at one occasion. The closest description I can 
come up with is that it was a cosmic wholeness experience be-
yond time and space. The body and the music became a whole… 
(Gabrielsson & Lindström 1993)294  
This trance amnesia may have to do with the lack of inner language 
during the experience. When the experience is verbalized and thus 
transposed from one perspective to another, there is an obvious risk 
for rationalizations. The experience, if recalled at all, will be de-
picted and interpreted differently in different cultures. Additionally, 
the lack of inner language could explain the reported loss of self. If 
we cannot symbolize, we cannot formulate who we are. The so-
called “autobiographical self” vanishes. The autobiographical self is a 
semiotic reconstruction of episodic memories to a narrative. It is a 
rationalization – an effort to make our lives understandable. 
Trance is the objective in rave dancing, particularly in the style 
called Goa Trance. Rave is a neotribalistic phenomenon. 
The dance space in trance-dance parties is a sacred space. It is a 
form of meditative, collective, spiritual worship. It is a reconnec-
tion with the elemental primordial rhythms of organic, cosmic life 
force. This sonic, mantric transcendence state is heightened when 
people dance together in nature under the stars and experience the 
celestial shift of dark into light with sunrise (…). There is a trans-
mission of higher levels of knowledge through the song and 
dance, which is a direct conduit for the religious experience and 
unites them tribally (…). (The duo Insectoid 1997)295  
Goa Trance music is minimalist development over 8–9 minutes. 
Over a 4/4 rhythm, with a base pumping 16th bourdon notes strong 
                                           
294  Gabrielsson, A. & Lindstöm, S. (1993) On strong experiences in music. Musik 
Psykologie. 10. Florian Noetzel Verlag, Wilhelmshafen. 118–40 
295  Insectoid (1997) quoted from the folder of the CD Sacred Sites. Produced by 
Return to the Source 
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enough to rearrange your bone structure, you will hear short repeti-
tive melodies (if any at all). Synthesizer futuristic space spiced with 
sampled whales or birds to signal the Gaia (Earth Goddess) connec-
tion, alternatively sampled sounds from Tibetan monks or Hindi pro-
cessions to signal archaic non Western religion, are interspersed with 
mantras as “You can be Shiva, you can be Shiva”. 
This music, which started in Goa India and Ibiza in the 80s with 
British disc jockeys as priests, to explode at warehouse parties and 
outdoor events in the 90s, is perhaps a too obvious example of 
modern tribalism. However, even if the discourse has changed, the 
influence on new dance styles is strong. It works as a mean to 
achieve trancelike states on the dance floor, particularly in combina-
tions with drugs. 
The crowd 
Gustave Le Bon, a pioneer in mass psychology argued in 1895 that 
individuals in a crowd, irrespective of individual background, just by 
their transformation to a crowd, develop a “group-soul” – a creature 
with radically other features than the including cells (Le Bon 
1895)296. Here, Le Bon stated, appears the species specific uncon-
scious. 
The subject has interested intellectuals as Sigmund Freud, Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Elias Canetti and Daniel Stern – Freud because of his inter-
est in the subconscious, Bakhtin in his depiction of the carnival, 
Canetti because of the link to power and Stern in his investigations 
of the present moment. 
The crowd releases, according to Freud, unconscious impulses 
from repression (Freud 2004)297. Each emotion and action becomes 
contagious. There is a likeness, he noted, between what takes place 
in crowds and what happens in hypnoses – a suggestibility. A 
compulsion is developed to harmonize with the group and a 
pleasure to let one self go, to melt into the crowd completely. In 
crowds we regress to a lower level – an earlier level, where                                            
296  Le Bon, G. (1982) The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind. Atlanta: Cherokee 
Publishing Company 
297  Freud, S. (2004) Mass Psychology and other Writings. Penguin, London 
A Perspective Theory of Music Perception and Emotion 
 
200 
regress to a lower level – an earlier level, where emotional life is 
stronger and critical consciousness declines. 
Here we can clearly see a parallel to Trevarthen’s description of 
protoconversation (Trevarthen 1999). In the infant’s dialog with her 
mother we see the mechanisms of entrainment, perceived expecta-
tions, and the rhythmic communication. This likeness is not coinci-
dental. The common factor is imitation. In protoconversation as in 
crowds we are attuned to the surrounding.  
Bakhtin identified a moment when a group of people changes 
from being a composite of hesitating individuals to become one ge-
stalt animated by one spirit (Bakhtin 1984)298. 
Canetti stated that the most important occurrence within the crowd 
is the discharge. Before this the crowd does not actually exist; it is 
the discharge, which creates it. This is the moment when all who 
belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel equal 
(Canetti 1993)299. 
In the interaction with other people’s feelings and thoughts, what 
is ours and what belongs to other people starts to break down (Dan-
iel Stern 2004). 
What is happening in these transformations? Ever since the knowl-
edge of mass effects became systematically used in Nazi propaganda, 
this line of research has been avoided. There is however in biology 
and in cognitive science an awakening interest of how we affect 
each other in group interaction. I will briefly present two directions: 
structural coupling and joint-action theory. 
Interaction-interperception 
Interaction causes change in the participants. This can be noticed on 
any biological level. The phenomenon has been labelled structural 
coupling. 
                                           
298  Bakhtin, M. (1984) Rabelais and His World. Indiana University Press, Blooming-
ton 
299  Canetti, E. (1993) Crowds and Power. The Continuum Publishing Corporation, 
New York 
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We are speaking of structural coupling whenever there is a history 
of recurrent interactions leading to the structural congruence be-
tween two or more systems. (Matura & Varela 1987: 75) 
Structural coupling is a long-lasting biological internal structural 
change in the individual as a result of a common history of group 
interaction. These changes are described as knowledge, gained 
through collective doing. Knowledge is thus understood as a struc-
tural change resulting from interaction, not more. Communication is 
described as “coordinated behaviours mutually triggered among the 
members of a social unity” (Matura & Varela 1987: 193). 
The structural congruence is an adaptation to the other(s). It cre-
ates a shared context, in an elementary sense – a shared perception 
of the world. Matura & Varela’s book The Tree of Knowledge is one 
long argument for the thesis that the only world we can have to-
gether is the one we create through the actions of our co-existence. 
The depiction of structural coupling makes it a perception-action 
theory. Action leads to perception. If we have an interacting group, 
interaction will lead to interperception – a tribal cosmology. Let me 
take an example. 
Attention weighting refers to our ability to unconsciously direct our 
attention to features that are important to us. This is an example of 
perceptual learning. In tribal interaction some features become im-
portant and are thus better perceived than others. For teenagers 
music style is an important feature. Through daily interaction with 
the music the rhythms and the moves are internalized. Music style is 
linked to tags, clothes, movement patterns and attitudes connected 
with tribal identification. Music style becomes a very nuanced and 
rich world. Style features are spotted immediately. Wrong music – 
wrong tribe. 
Group interaction is focussed by a new branch of cognitive science 
called joint action (see Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich 2006 for 
overview)300. It concerns the ability to coordinate our actions with 
those of others. Joint action is, among other things, a state of devel-
                                           
300  Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H. & Knoblich, G. (2006) Joint action: bodies and minds 
moving together. Trends in Cognitive Science. Vol. 10 No. 2. 70–76 
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opment in children. Playing games with others starts at 12 to 18 
months of age.  
It is sometimes said that the ability to coordinate with others re-
quires a “theory of mind” – a hypothesis of the state and the inten-
tion of the other. This is however not necessary since joint action is 
considered to be implicit. It may sound amazing that such compli-
cated behaviour could be performed without cognition. But, as we 
all know many species act jointly. We find joint action on the level 
of infants, mammals (hunting herds of wolves), birds (flocks in 
plough formations), fish (shoals) and even insects (swarming). It is a 
widespread biological phenomenon. And it is poorly understood.  Is 
there a common mechanism behind these interactions? 
It has been suggested that joint action can be explained by mirror 
neuron theory (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). By watching the action 
of the other(s), exactly the same action is simulated in the observer.  
The simulation is embodied since it uses a pre-existing brain model 
of the body – the body schema (see Chapter 2). For this reason, the 
term motor resonance (Wilson & Knoblich 2005) is used. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 mirror neuron theory may explain not 
just imitation, but also complementary action, intention under-
standing, situation understanding including goals, prediction of 
movement of the other, entrainment, empathy and complementary 
emotion. This is important for joint action which is not just about 
coordination in unison, but also, as in the case of herd hunting and 
children’s games, about the ability to make complementary moves. 
This demands the ability to sense the goal of others, to predict ac-
tions, to integrate predicted effects of own and others actions and – 
the ability to share representations. Joint action can thus be specified 
as interaction depending on: 
1. Shared perspective. The “perceptual common ground” 
(Bayliss & Tipper 2005)301 is the prerequisite as well as the 
result of joint action. Such a common ground is the sharing 
                                           
301  Bayliss, A.R. and Tipper, S.P. (2005) Gaze and arrow cueing of attention reveals 
individual differences along the autism spectrum as a function of target context. 
British Journal of Psychology. Vol. 96. No 1. 95–114 
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of time, sequences and rules. This entails shared predic-
tions of movements. 
2. Common action goals (Umiltà et al. 2001; Kohler, E. et al. 
2002302; Fogassi et al. 2005303). This entails shared imagina-
tions of outcomes. 
3. A sense of the intention of the others. 
Observing errors committed by others furthermore activates the 
same neural frontal activity as own errors in similar tasks (van Schie 
et al. 2004304). The mere observation of erroneous action leads to 
pre-motor activation (Manthey et al. 2003)305. 
Motor resonance, complementary action, predictability, shared per-
spective, shared goals, and the sense of the others intentions and 
emotions create a sense of who contributes with what – the distribu-
tion of work – to achieve a common goal. Interestingly the feed-
back from the timing of the other's actions can become as effective 
for anticipatory action control as internal signals about one's own 
actions (Knoblich & Jordan 2003)306. As a result each member can 
learn to predict the timing of the other. By sensing the intentions of 
the others, we can in a second step implicitly understand the situa-
tion and know how to contribute. Every member steps into a shared 
reality depending on the shared perspective. The finding that mirror 
neurons are active at complementary action (Newman-Norlund et al. 
2007) throws new light over ensemble playing and improvising. We 
                                           
302  Kohler, E., Keysers, C., Umiltà, M.A., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V. & Rizzolatti, G. (2002) 
Hearing sounds, understanding actions: action representation in mirror neurons. 
Science. Vol. 297. No 5582. 846–848 
303  Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P.F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F. & Rizzolatti, G. (2005) 
Parietal lobe: from action organization to intention understanding. Science. Vol. 308. 
No 5722. 662–667 
304  van Schie, H.T., Mars, R.B., Coles, M.G.H. & Bekkering, H. (2004), Modulation of 
activity in medial frontal and motor cortices during error observation, Nature Neuro-
science. Vol. 7. No 5. 549–554 
305  Manthey, S., Schubotz, R.I., & von Cramon, D. Y. (2003). Pre-motor cortex in 
observing erroneous action: An fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research. Vol. 15. No 3. 
296–307 
306  Knoblich, G. & Jordan J.S. (2003) Action coordination in groups and individuals: 
learning anticipatory control. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning Memory 
and Cognition. Vol. 29. No 5. 1006–1016 
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have an automatic urge to fill in and complete what the others are 
doing. The impulse: if you do that, I will contribute with this, is 
strong. 
We empathically sense the goal and the intention of other people 
in our own body. According to Metzinger & Gallese (2003) “this 
functional mechanism seems to play a major role in our epistemic 
approach to the world”. It creates, they claim, a shared action ontol-
ogy. I suggest that the creation of shared action ontology follows 
these four steps: 
1. A mirror neuron induced imitation or complementary ac-
tion. 
2. Joint action creates phenomenal situation understanding. 
3. This situation understanding is stored in episodic memory. 
4. Episodic memories from group interactions make up shared 
action ontology. 
This deepens our understanding of the tribal perspective as a phe-
nomenal perception of the world through a filter of shared episodic 
memories. 
The discussion of structural coupling and joint action actualizes the 
definition of communication. As we generalize the meaning of this 
word to pre-attentive and biological levels the meaning expands 
from type of transfer (Shannon & Weaver 1949)307 to type of sharing 
(Allwood 2000)308 or just resonance (St Clair & Busch 2000)309. As 
we have seen the type of communication we have been discussing 
does not just result in sharing in an immediate sense. Complemen-
tary action and complementary emotion can also be caused by 
communication. In this case it could be argued that the perspective 
is communicated and shared. Tribal communication may however 
                                           
307  Shannon, C.E. & Weaver, W. (1949) A Mathematical Model of Communication. 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL 
308  Allwood, J. (2000) Activity based pragmatics. Abduction, Belief and Context in 
Dialogue: studies in computational pragmatics (Eds.  H. Bunt & B. Black)  John 
Benjamins, Amsterdam. 47–80 
309  St. Clair, R.N. & Bush, J.A. (2001) Transmission of values: the information age 
crisis in socialization. Intercultural Communication Studies XI. 67–69 
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result in differences – in hierarchies. And as we all know from con-
flicts, communication sometimes just accentuates difference. So what 
is shared in such cases? The fact that we disagree? Perhaps we have 
to admit that communication can produce sharing as well as differ-
ence.  If so we might just have to settle with the understanding pro-
duction of change.  As soon as something has caused change in 
something, there has been some kind of communication. In order to 
come up with more specific definitions we must specify the type of 
communication. 
Are there any indications of this perspective in neuromusicology? 
New fMRI evidence shows that the planum temporale is engaged by 
collective speech and singing but not at solo performances (Saito et 
al. 2006)310. This area is activated for listening as well. The authors 
draw the conclusion that this area synchronizes the singer/speaker 
with the other(s). 
Mythology 
Let us compare tribal cosmology with the anthropological concept 
mythology. Claude Lévi-Strauss was captured by the decorations on 
Brazilian Indian craft works.  The figures were interpreted as mytho-
logical conceptions of the world (Lévi-Strauss 1955)311. Lévi-Strauss 
developed this theme in Anthropologie Structurale (1958)312 and in 
Mythologiques 1–4 (1968)313. I am in the following referring to the 
general message in these works. 
Myths to Strauss were structures rather than narratives. The same 
myth could thus be told in different ways. It is like chess. Every 
game is a sequence, but under this sequence there is a rule-
governed structure allowing for endless combinations. And as in 
chess there are figures in myths with roles such as the father (mon-
                                           
310  Saito, Y., Ishii, K., Yagi, K., Tatsumi, I. & Mizusawa, H. (2006) Cerebral networks 
for spontaneous and synchronized singing and speaking. Cognitive Neuroscience 
and Neuropsychology. Vol.17. No 18. 1893–1897  
311  Lévi-Strauss, C. (1955) Tristes Tropiques. Plon, Paris 
312  Lévi-Strauss, C. (1958) Anthropogie Structurale. Plon, Paris 
313  Lévi-Strauss, C. (1968) Mythologiques. Plon, Paris 
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ster), the son (wounded hero), and the mediating trickster. The fig-
ures act out themes that recur frequently – themes where contrasts 
come into play. The roles are stereotypes, not individual. We can 
see such stereotyped roles in rituals, carnivals, in commedia 
dell’arte, in the puppet theatre and at the circus (e.g. the clowns) – 
all art forms where half human and half animal characters are 
played. Each figure wears a specific mask, a specific dress, and has a 
specific movement pattern. 
To Lévi-Strauss the myth was a collectively shared structure. And 
this structure is the implicit knowledge of the world. Such inner 
structures are manifested as images in dreams, plays, art, craft works, 
and rituals. It is often said that these manifestations are symbols. If 
so, they are symbols in the Freudian-Jungian tradition. The images 
are however not symbols in the Peircian sense, but icons. The rep-
resentations cannot be adequately expressed in words. The meaning 
of the mythological image is darkly divined and beyond grasp. 
Structuralists claim that although mythological manifestations of 
roles and relations of a tribe are specific, there is a universal struc-
ture underneath. The structure of myth is isomorphic to the structure 
of certain mind processes common to all human beings.  
As may be recalled from Chapter 2, Merleau-Ponty saw myth not 
as a representation but as genuine presence: 
Myth beholds the essence within the appearance; the mythical 
phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine presence. The 
daemon of rain is present in each drop…the soul present in each 
part of the body. Every apparition is in this case an incarnation. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1996: 290) 
This perception-action understanding of myth, and it is the under-
standing I will use, makes myth almost synonymous with tribal 
cosmology. 
According to this quote the perception of the myth is an incarna-
tion. The myth is perceived as real – a concrete perception of the 
world. An example of an incarnation of the myth is the hero. The 
hero is a figure charged with needs, virtues, qualities and expecta-
tions that emanates from the people. The hero is often wounded, has 
shortcomings, doubts, as do we all. But the hero overcomes these 
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difficulties to win a final victory, as we wish we could. This way the 
hero is the people, inseparably connected to the people. As the Bra-
zilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre once said, there is in the cult of 
the hero a touch of the affection of the cat: when seeming to be 
caressing the leg of the master, what the cat is doing is voluptuously 
stroking its own fur. 
The step from the mythological hero to divinity is not far. Jesus on 
the cross, wounded, doubting and weak is very human. This is the 
iconic image of Jesus. This is the image carried through the streets 
in Catholic processions. It is illuminating that scholars of the new 
field cognitive anthropology exploit episodic memory in their un-
derstanding of how religious knowledge is communicated.  It is thus 
argued that an imagistic mode of religiosity is created by infrequent 
but emotionally arousing ritual performance (Whitehouse 2000)314. 
Let me take a musical example. Rumour says that Quincy Troupe 
did not once interview Miles Davies when he wrote Miles – the 
autobiography. He wrote the book from other available sources and 
when he asked Miles if he had got it right, Miles’ comment was: 
“There is not a word of truth in this book. But it’s cool. Print the 
shit.” 
In fact the book gives a contradictory impression. On the front 
page of the book under the picture of Miles in a black coat and a 
black hat holding his trumpet, you can read: “Miles Davies with 
Quincy Troupe”. But among the long list of contributors in the ac-
knowledgement, Miles’ name is not mentioned (Davies & Troupe 
1990)315. It does not need to be of course if Miles is really one of 
the authors. But if he is one of the authors, why then did they have 
to tape hundreds of testimonies? There is thus a possibility that the 
book is a distillate of information shared among musicians and that 
the musicians unintentionally have added pieces of themselves and 
each other to the story. Such myths emanate in musician interaction 
– in playing, in touring buses, in the jargon. Jazz musicians have a 
way of talking that seems to be a prolongation of musical group im-
provisation. 
                                           
314  Whitehouse, H. (2000) Arguments and Icons: divergent modes of religiosity. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 
315  Davies, M. & Troupe, Q. (1990) Miles – the autobiography. Pan Books, London. 
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This book has contributed to the spread of the legend. It is not 
longer possible to listen to a solo by Miles without perceiving the 
image of the incarnated myth. The icon is present in the tone vibrat-
ing of the struggle oscillating between cool artistry and drug de-
struction, between heavenly beauty and pimp jargon from the streets 
of Harlem, between good and evil, between life and death. The 
tone carries the myth. 
Imagine Miles music without the myth! Had the sound of the trum-
pet been as captivating if we thought that the soloist was some ordi-
nary guy – married with two kids, a house in the suburbs, a Volvo 
and a golden retriever? 
This example shows that the myth may travel through different 
stages. It emanates from interaction (tribal); then it becomes a narra-
tion (cultural) – a legend, and finally it is evoked by music listening. 
Great musicians tend to be heroes – canonized as geniuses; wor-
shiped as idols. We cannot listen to the music without hearing the 
hero. 
The musician can have another mythological role – the role of the 
mediator – the trickster, the shaman, the priest moving between 
worlds. Half human, half spiritual the mediator reveals the other side 
to the tribe. He invites the tribe to travel in the spiritual world. The 
technique to make this happen is the ritual. 
Rites 
To the early tribes human communication was probably largely re-
stricted to indexical pointing, emotional contagion and showing how. 
In showing how - a situation is mimicked. The tribe enacts the situa-
tion and thus the situation is internalized as procedural knowledge. 
When this becomes a tradition, we have a ritual. The rite is a con-
crete attempt to make things appear. It is at the same time a collec-
tive enactment of a situation and a way to make this situation real. 
This makes the ritual an education process, a sharing of knowledge 
in the tribe. The rite produces, communicates and reinforces tribal 
cosmology. It is a staged drama concerning the identity of the tribe, 
its members and the conditions of life. 
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The rite is a representation, but not quite, because the act is actu-
ally performed. It is the fascinating border between the real and the 
image of the real; between the real and communication, and be-
tween life and art. 
Child games are ritualistic in this sense. What are these games, but 
an interaction creating a consistent world? Here we detect the 
stereotyped characters, the fixed roles typical to myths: mummy-
daddy-child, chaser-chased, wolves and fairies, witches and goblins. 
The Brazilian anthropologist Roberto DaMatta (1991)316 character-
izes ritual is as something displaced and highlighted. Something is 
taken out of its context, replaced, dramatized and staged. 
An important feature of the ritual is that it follows a schema. It is a 
replication of joint-action sequences. The order of events, move-
ments, gestures, and words is fixed. Every event is anticipated and 
this is why the tribe can entrain the action. 
In this sense music is not only a constituent of rituals; it is itself 
ritualistic. Every time we sing or play a song we reproduce an ear-
lier occasion. Even as we listen, we enact music more or less 
openly. Entrainment is, says anthropologist Judith Becker, the 
strongest form of interaction. Bodies and brains synchronize gestures, 
muscle actions, breathing, and brainwaves while enveloped in col-
lective rhythmic action (Becker 2001). It actualizes, she states, the 
supra-individual state – a collective embodied understanding of the 
action. 
In this respect communal singing is a ritual. Communal singing is 
heard around camp fires, in churches, in schools, in football arenas, 
political meetings, and at national celebrations. Just by this brief look 
at the occasions, we get an inkling of possible functions or effects. 
Social bonding is an important ingredient in all of them, as is the 
emotional understanding of who we are and how we are related to 
common roots and a common cause. 
There is, to take an example, no midsummer eve in Sweden until 
we start singing the old songs that go with the ritualistic cheering 
with aquavit. It is the singing – that makes the event happen. We 
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may know it is midsummer, but it is not until we sing the songs that 
it really happens. 
By the same token the ritual is the only way to conjure up relig-
ious reality – to reincarnate the words, to really make the wonder 
happen. We sing in unison in the chorales. We read the prayers in 
unison. The priest is performing the very moves and speaking the 
very words priests have uttered again and again for ages. If anything 
is changed or modernized, as they sometimes try, the magic disap-
pears. For example, we are touched at a funeral when the priest 
take the spade and spreads earth over the coffin and says: “Ashes to 
ashes, dust to dust” because, as we follow him, we entrain the exact 
ritual and the exact text that unites us with the ancestors before us, 
mourning their deceased fathers and mothers in an eternal chain. It 
triggers episodic memories of earlier ceremonies – including the 
emotions. It opens up a bodily connection to the past. The past is 
reshaped. It happens again. The former funerals happen in this fu-
neral. In a flash we might sense in the wind the universal condition 
of life – death. It is, for many of us, not until the moment of the 
ritual, we actually experience the loss. We need the ritual to finally 
accept the fact, because without the ritual we never really parted. 
The perception of the real event, the perception of the myth and 
the perception of the symbol can be seen as developmental stages 
in the child as well as in human history. It has an obvious affinity 
with thought figures in the 20th century: Freud’s id-ego-superego, 
Peirce’ index-icon-symbol and Lacan’s real-imagery-symbolic. These 
are, I would say, perspectives. 
At first ritualistic communication was perhaps unintentional. But at 
some point gestures and sounds lead to iconic communication. The 
gesture, the dance move, the facial expression, amulets, totems, face 
paintings, and masks and the picture became charged with tribal 
meaning, as are today clothing, moving patterns, hand signs, tattoos, 
tags and graffiti – and music sounds. 
In the ritual, information is transferred from a source domain to a 
target domain. When the experiences are acted out collectively, 
every member or the tribe entrains the experience. Practical life is 
the source; the myth is the target.  This myth is the cosmology of 
the tribe. 
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Carnival 
In Rio de Janeiro, as in the rest of the world, samba music and car-
nival are closely associated. I want to stress this because in the 
following I will discuss how tribal mechanisms colour the perception 
of music. This could be argued for any music except purely 
intellectual music constructions. Behind jazz, blues, kletzmer, tango, 
flamenco, raga, religious music, Arabian music etc. there are tribal 
traditions important for the perception of the music. Even classical 
music can be traced back to folk music roots and influences. I just 
choose to show it for samba music. 
The carnival in Rio has become a major commercial tourist attrac-
tion. But still it is a cordial matter to the cariocas (inhabitants of Rio). 
There are about fifteen samba schools in Rio. Each school prepares 
the appearance at the carnival for half a year. Thousands of members 
are engaged in song composing, costume making, and music and 
dancing rehearsals. The schools are located in and associated with 
the morros – the hills where the favelas (shantytowns) are built. 
These favelas have tribal features. They are illegal enclaves in the 
city with their own drug related gangster governments and their 
own gangster laws. There are violent feuds between the favelas. It 
is estimated that one third of the population in Rio (11 million peo-
ple) live in such enclaves. 
The samba school is important for the identity of the people at the 
morro. Every school has its own name, its own honourable history, 
its own colours, its own heroes, and its own rhythmic accent. This 
accent is very important. “It is death penalty to confuse those 
rhythms”, the samba music arranger Jota Moraes jokingly (?) told me 
(Moraes 1999)317. To play the wrong rhythm at the carnival in Rio 
could be compared with sitting in the Vasco section with a Fla-
menco t-shirt at Maracaná Football Stadium. It is not considered 
healthy. In fact the samba schools compete against each other just 
like football teams do. There is a league and the schools can move 
up and down in a system of divisions, depending on their perform-
ance at the carnival. While this official carnival is displayed for pay-
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ing audiences, there are also several unofficial carnivals in the 
streets where anybody can participate. 
Thus for one week each year local self governed tribes wearing 
their own emblems, masks and dresses, interact totally entrained in a 
ritual where they play their own musical accent, dance their own 
movement pattern, and compete with other groups. 
The connection between rhythm and tribal identity is not unique 
for the samba schools. We can see it in Afro Brazilian religions. In 
the four-day non stop Congado Festival in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, ten 
to twenty Congado groups, each with a rhythmic pattern of its own, 
a tempo of its own and a choreography of its own, confront each 
other (Lucas 2005)318. At this confrontation the drummers insist on 
keeping their own rhythmic pattern. They have to be synchronized 
with their own group and avoid synchronization with the other 
groups. This is difficult to do since we have a tendency for entrain-
ment. 
These are the moments we need more strength and firmness, we 
have to be very careful and only look at the skin of our drum. 
(Geraldo da Luz, translated by Glaura Lucas 2002: 73)319  
What then is staged at the carnival? In his analysis of the medieval 
carnival the Russian linguist Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) recognized 
the grotesque (Bakhtin 1984). This word, Bakhtin explains, emanates 
from the Italian word grotta, alluding to rock-paintings in caves 
found in Italy. These are characterized by a free and creative play 
with plant, animal, and human forms transforming into each other – 
creating each other. The grotesque could be interpreted as a cosmic 
vision for life conditions; life is created from life, birth from death, 
and form from form. Bakhtin saw the carnival as such a grotesque 
unity, a dancing and twining body consisting of bodies – copulating, 
terrifying and hilarious. 
                                           
318  Lucas, G. (2005). An ethnographic perspective of musical entrainment. In Time 
with the Music: the concept of entrainment and its significance for ethnomusicology 
(Eds. M. Clayton, R. Sager, G. Lucas & U. Will. European Meetings in Ethnomusicol-
ogy (special ESEM-Counterpoint volume). Vol. 11. 96–99 
319  Lucas, G. (2002) Os Sons do Rosario: O Congado Mineiro dos Arturos e Jatobá. 
Editora UFMG, Belo Horizonte 
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The grotesque captures separate moments of time in one image, 
presenting something that conquers logic. Time as a symbolic repre-
sentation is dissolved into the present moment. The confrontation of 
two cosmologies, the cultural ideology of prevailing power and the 
grotesque, releases a popular laughter. It is the sudden insight that 
we are all the same. This shared “something” is nothing less than the 
universal conditions of birth and death, generations of decaying and 
renewal; in one word time – presented in the grotesque picture. 
Carnival is, in the analysis of Bakhtin, the occasion when the peo-
ple come out in the streets to play with the structure of power. In 
this sense the carnival is a ritual. Something is replaced, staged and 
played.  It is a degradation – to bring down everything lofty, ideal-
istic, and abstract to the level of the body. The official moralist dis-
course is inverted. Or even, as Bakhtin says, the central thoughts, 
images and symbols of official culture are transmitted to the lower 
bodily parts. In feudal European societies the official ideology was 
the Christian vertical hierarchical conception of the world with 
heaven and hell. Hell was visualized in masks and dramatizations, 
but, and this is emphasized by Bakhtin, in a playful popular way. 
Laughter conquers horror – demystifies horror. Laughter, Bakhtin 
claims, liberates us, “not just from the outer censorship but from the 
immense inner censorship”. Bakhtin recognizes a renewal in this: 
death giving birth, affirmation of earth and body – of sexuality. 
The mask has a connotation of change and reshaping identity. It is 
ridiculing in a play grounded in a very special connection between 
reality and image.  In the menagerie of characters the Harlequin 
had a special role. With his padded cloths he personified the always 
hungry servant, cunning and witty. The word Harlequin can be de-
duced from Erlekin (devil, as in Erlkönig by Goethe). In the diable-
ries in the medieval mystery plays, precursors to the carnivals, the 
devil was presented as the gay spokesman for the up-side-down 
holiness. 
There is thus a transmission from cognitive consciousness to proce-
dural (bodily) consciousness. The carnival stages, Bakhtin claims, a 
“carnivalization of consciousness”. This is how Bakhtin depicts the 
“carnivalesque” crowd: 
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This festive organization of the crowd must be first of all concrete 
and sensual. Even the pressing throng, the physical contact of bod-
ies, acquires a certain meaning. The individual feels that he is an 
indissoluble part of the collective, a member of the people’s body. 
In this whole the individual body ceases to a certain extent to be 
itself; it is possible so to say to exchange bodies, to be renewed 
(through change of costume and mask). At the same time the peo-
ple become aware of their sensual, material bodily unity and 
community. (Bakhtin 1984: 255) 
The carnival thus produces a shift from a cultural perspective to a 
tribal perspective. 
The Brazilian anthropologist Roberto DaMatta refers to Bakhtin in 
his analysis of the carnival in Rio (DaMatta 1991). DaMatta recog-
nizes the structure of power in Brazil – the Casa-principle. Casa, 
literally meaning house, refers to a feudal structure studied by the 
world famous Brazilian anthropologist Gilberto Freyre in the thirties 
(Freyre 1964)320. The patriarch at the casa grande (farmhouse) con-
trolled his family, the slaves and the neighbourhood. This can be 
spotted in the history of politics in Brazil where populist dictators 
have taken on fatherly roles. Against this corrupted vertical structure 
of dependencies and bribes, DaMatta puts the horizontal Rua (street) 
principle. This refers to democracy – the anonymity of the street 
where everybody is equal – an anonymous nobody. 
According to DaMatta the feudal casa-principle still governs Brazil. 
It constitutes a hindrance to democratic development. This, DaMatta 
states, is the Brazilian dilemma. Brazil is formally a democratic con-
stitution – but in practice it is ruled by hierarchical connections, 
bribes and guns. Brazil is one of the most unequal countries in the 
world. At carnival the casa-structure is highlighted in a distorting 
mirror. Carnival is loucura (madness). The rich dress down and the 
poor dress up. 
During festival it was a fiesta and everybody was happy. You were 
not a washing woman or a worker or a bum. You dressed up as 
                                           
320  Freyre, G. (1964) The Masters and the Slaves. Borzoi Books, New York 
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dignified people – counts and lords – as better people. Then court 
moved to the ghetto. (Old woman interviewed by Olsson 1977)321  
But in the Carnival people also expose themselves naked. They 
show off sexually. Samba is the dance of the hips. 
Carnival is great, to let out the bicho (wild animal), to be loose. It 
is the time of fantasia (fantasy), as they say. It is called fantasia to 
dress up. But in fact it is not. In fact we are masked the whole year 
but not during festival. (Gonzaguinha 1979)322 
In this quote Gonzaguinha (mentioned in the introduction as an in-
spiration to this work) expresses Bakhtin’s idea. All the year there is 
a cultural repression. Only during carnival the people are free to 
express themselves. The tribal mechanisms produce this freedom. 
This contrast is particularly accentuated during times of hardship. 
Could you imagine a country with the problems we have got if 
there was no alegria (carnevalistic happiness), joy and music? It 
would have exploded. People would have killed each other long 
ago. Without music this country wouldn’t have existed. (João Bo-
sco in Bar Brasil 1990)323  
The unification of individuals in the crowd is reflected in the music. 
A carnival samba orchestra consists of hundreds of individuals like a 
great symphony orchestra with the difference that everybody is 
playing percussion. It is a web of rhythm sections creating a breath-
taking polyrhythmic mass effect. Some of the sounds are clearly 
carnevalesque as the agogô sounding like a cow-bell, the cuíca per-
forming crazy sounds, and smaller bells with their connotations of 
jesters. Rhythmic individualities and personalities become scales in 
this colourful anaconda. 
                                           
321  Olsson, L. (1977) Samba, TV documentary produced by Lennart Olsson for TV 1 
Sweden. Broadcasted March 2 
322  Gonzaguinha (1979) interview by Radio Globo. 
323  Bosco, J. (1990) Interview in Bar Brasil, a Swedish Radio series on Brazilian music 
by Lennart Peck, Lennart Kjörling and Sven Kristersson, part one. Broadcasted  July 
2.  
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The elements that we recognize in the Carnival in Rio de Janeiro 
can be spotted in carnivals all over the world – with variations de-
pending on the culture structure the carnival is confronting. 
In Brazil as in the rest of the world samba is associated with the 
body and the people – yes to the body and yes to the people. In 
the Samba, É Gonzaguinha stages a crowd demanding recognition: 
“Look at us, we do not mind sweating, but from pleasure” (Gon-
zaguinha 1994)324.  The message is: We, the African slave descen-
dants, are not just a working force but humans. And how appalling 
this may seem to you, we are not just manpower, we are entitled to 
sensual pleasures. 
Sangrando 
The ritual is a forestage to art (Dissanayake 1992). In art we can 
see, as did Lévi-Strauss, the manifestation of myth. This is not only 
the case in visual art but also in poetry. A beautiful example is Gon-
zaguinha’s song Sangrando (Bleeding)(Gonzaguinha 1989)325. In this 
song Gonzaguinha expresses how the relation between him and his 
audience in the very act of the performance becomes charged with 
mythological meaning. He is conscious about this meaning and com-
municates this consciousness to the audience.  This is, I would say, 
an important aspect of the “commission” of the artist – to imagine the 
mythological meaning of the situation, and to catch this imagination 
in a form (in the case of poetry a word-form). It is to some extent to 
move tribal consciousness to the realm of cultural consciousness. 
   Gonzaguinha (1945–1991) was raised in favela São Carlos in Rio 
de Janeiro by foster parents. He identified himself as a moleque (a 
pejorative name for street kids). In the eyes of the poor, he was a 
hero because he, the successful artist, was originally one of them 
(African heritage, poverty, and the bodily felt experience of struggle 
for life day by day in the streets). A contributing factor to his high 
esteem among the people was his courage. He openly criticized the 
                                           
324  Gonzaguinha (1994) CD: É. Mestres da MPB, Warner 
325  Gonzaguinha (1980) CD: De Volta au Comeco, EMI 
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feared and hated military dictatorship and was repeatedly thrown 
into custody. 
I never had the privilege of hearing Gonzaguinha live, but I wit-
nessed a concert in Rio de Janeiro 2004 where the singer/actor Gas-
par Filho impersonated Gonzaguinha and performed his songs, 
among them Sangrando: 
Bleeding 
When I release my voice 
Please understand 
That every word 
Is someone opening up 
The heart in the mouth 
Bleeding 
It is the battles of our life 
I am singing 
When I open my mouth 
This strong force 
All you can hear 
Is surely lived 
See the lustre in my eyes 
And the trembling in my hands 
And the sweat of my body 
Carrying all my race and emotion 
And if I cry and the salt damps 
My smile 
Don’t be surprised, the song 
You are singing 
Is my strength to sing 
When I release my voice 
Please understand 
This is just my way to live 
And to love 
(Interpretation to English by the author) 
The thin body is crying out: Look at me, I am singing my life, my 
anger, my sufferings and my love. I give you my heart. I am bleed-
ing. Almost every line contains body metaphors. What happens to 
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metaphors as we entrain the music? Let us once again bring Mer-
leau-Ponty’s words about the myth to the fore: 
Myth beholds the essence within the appearance, the mythical 
phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine presence. The 
daemon of rain is present in each drop…the soul present in each 
part of the body. Every apparition is in this case an incarnation 
(Merleau-Ponty 1996: 290). 
In the tribal perspective the metaphors appear as a “genuine pres-
ence” – thus as a perceived phenomenon of lived life. As we be-
come caught in the present moment, symbolization ceases to exist. 
The cognitive consciousness is replaced by phenomenal conscious-
ness. The words will be bodily experienced. The words become 
flesh. The myth is incarnated. 
Interestingly the Brazilian word for song “canto” also means place 
or corner. So the line your song is my power to sing could also be 
translated: Your standpoint is my power to sing. Given this connota-
tion Gonzaguinha expresses that he takes the perspective of the 
audience and this gives him the power to sing. The whole stadium 
is electrified. The power from the audience is fuel to the artist. Gon-
zaguinha defines his relation to the audience when he connects his 
bodily experiences with the experiences of the audience: “It is the 
battle of our lives I am singing”. 
We follow the music from the soft melancholic first statements, 
where Gonzaguinha in a spoken tone merely reflects on what hap-
pens when he sings, to an intensification one octave up when the 
speaking converts to singing and the text suddenly reflects the pre-
sent situation: “See the trembling in my hands”. As the song unfolds, 
the presence introduces itself in the lyrics. 
The emotional climax comes on the word “race”. The Brazilian 
word for race (raça) is hard to translate. It is metaphorical with con-
notations ranging from instinctive commands of the body to the call 
from the African blood. It is referring to the power of the singer. 
When Gaspar sings All my race and emotion the Brazilian pronuncia-
tion of raça with the hissing “r” from the depth of the throat hits us 
like a snakebite. The presence becomes acute. We feel the raça in 
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our own skin. Now his throat is our throat, his chest is our chest, his 
sweat is our sweat and his heart is our heart. 
I experienced this. The reactions of the audience affected me. 
There was this force touching us. Some were crying. All of us were 
deeply moved. At this moment the singer was connecting the hearts 
in the audience. 
There is an element of African rituals in most Brazilian religions. In 
these the proselytes, dancing to the sound of drum rhythms, are 
possessed by spirits. There is thus a disposition in the audience to 
accept such transitions. 
This is not to say that the audience is possessed by the spirit of 
Gonzaguinha, when these words hit them in the music, neither that 
this street-smart and sometimes aggressive singer from the favela 
was some kind of saint. Far from it. Rather that the performance is 
saturated with the myth.  Gaspar sings Sangrando holding his hands 
out as to meet and embrace the audience. Not occasionally, but 
through the entire song. This is an iconic sign the cariocas (the in-
habitants of Rio) can recognize – Corcovado. This gigantic monument 
of Christ placed on a 600 m hill can be seen from any angle in Rio 
as if blessing this criminal city in the tropics. It is blessing and cruci-
fixion in the same image. Bleeding wounds are opened, not neces-
sarily consciously associated with Jesus. But the image charges the 
words as batteries are charged with electricity. When Gaspar sings 
about the sweat transporting all his race and emotion, we are on 
line as if wired to one another and the shockwave from these 
charged words hit us physically. At this moment the myth Gon-
zaguinha is mediated by Gaspar. We live the myth. We are the 
myth. 
The artist is personifying our suffering on stage, handing over his 
body to us. It is revolutionary in the sense that Jesus Christ was 
revolutionary, when he suffered for us and at the last supper offered 
his body and blood in the communion. “This is my way to love”. The 
essence of the communication is this flesh and blood. This is us. This 
is what we are: This unbearable division in divinity and fragility - 
this unbearable longing. 
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The rock concert 
There is expectation in the air. We can feel the sensibility of the 
audience. Sometimes this can be a concrete experience, as can be 
understood by formulations as: “the atmosphere was so tense that 
you could almost touch it”. When the band enters the stage the 
expectation is released in a unison tribal roar. 
We forget about ourselves. The united crowd moves with the art-
ist. It is one single body. The listeners merge with the band. And 
with each other. This can be seen in the perhaps somewhat outdated 
practice to use a lighter at emotional moments. As if to show that 
their hearts are glowing, people wave their lighters. A wave of 
thousands lights shows that we are all connected to this e-motion. 
In an interview with Jerry Garcia and Phil Lesh in The Grateful 
Dead David Gans (1991)326 tried to catch what happens between the 
members in the band and between the band and the audience at a 
concert. Gans start with a question concerning the mythology of the 
band. 
Gans: How did the personal, collective quest turn into this in-
credible myth? […] When did it happen? How did it get transferred 
to the crowd? 
Garcia: I don‘t know. It seems to me that as soon as we were 
playing at the Acid Tests, you‘d look out there and you‘d see that 
guy and he‘d look up and go, “Yeah, I know what you guys are 
doing. I know what you guys are up to!” And you knew that they 
knew. It was one of those things. It was like one on one. Recogni-
tion, it was flashes of recognition. No telling what, really, but that 
thing that you recognize. And you recognize it because it‘s there. I 
could never say what it was. 
Lesh: It‘s communal, in the sense that it exists— 
Garcia: In that moment, when that guy looks at you and goes 
“Yeah, I get it”. 
                                           
326  Gans, D. (1991) Conversations with the dead. The Grateful Dead Interview Book. 
Citadel Underground, New York 
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Lesh: You‘re both in the same place. 
Garcia: That‘s right. You know, and he knows, and that‘s that 
moment. 
Lesh: It‘s as close as you can come to being somebody else. 
It is interesting to follow the discussion about what this “it” may be. 
Obviously it is a real experience, but it is very hard to nail down 
what “it” is. It is not a semantic experience. What is agreed on here? 
It is communal, they say. It is some insight that is recognized. It is 
confirmed in the eyes of someone in the audience. 
Then Lesh says: You’re both in the same place. This is the key. It is 
the shared perspective. And it is so astonishing that these are his 
exact words, because everything else is vague. The shared perspec-
tive of what? This question is difficult to answer because the music 
does not signify any shared meaning. But remember that the whole 
conversation started with the search for the mythology of the group. 
This is “it”. This is what is heard in the musical interaction – I am 
part of it. We all are. 
It is unthinkable that a single spectator would act the same way a 
spectator in the crowd does in the rock concert. The base drum is 
insisting: NOW, NOW, NOW until everybody is linked to the same 
now. A drumbeat is not a monotone copy of something already 
heard and known, but every time a unique event enriched by all 
the other drumbeats. Where the analytical listener feels bored of the 
monotonous repetition, the listener entrained is captured in the pre-
sent moment. There are in his mind no former beats. There is just 
this one beat connecting him with thousands and throwing his head 
more violently at each individual beat as if this particular beat was 
the ultimate experience. And this very beat explodes as he leaves 
the earth with a jump in a sustained n-o-o-o-o-w. And there he sails 
in a body no longer named Patrick, or Betty, or Bob – but Weeee. 
And the drum is no longer on stage but beats inside Weeee. 
And when we leave the concert, we can see in the eyes of totally 
unknown people that we have something in common. We have 
shared the experience, although we do not know, as Lesh said later 
in the interview, “whatever the fuck it is”. 
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Listening alone 
Can a CD bring forth a tribal perspective in a sole listener? As al-
ready pointed out communal speech and singing engages the 
planum temporale. This area is not activated when we speak or sing 
alone (Saito et al. 2006). Since this area is also activated when we 
just listen to music, I draw the conclusion that music listening entails 
synchronization with the musicians.  As we start moving, we take on 
a jazz, a punk, a flamenco etc. attitude to the world. This is, as if we 
were to spell this out, how we dance the world – and make it ap-
pear. Listening to music we are always embraced by the tribe. Lis-
tening to music, we are never alone. 
Discussion 
It is a wonderful experience in music to share the rhythm of time 
and movement with others. This is to intuitively feel where the 
band is heading; to become part of one whole music body and to 
know how to contribute. 
Different instruments take on different roles. I would even say dif-
ferent social roles. The drums lay out the common time perspective, 
the base provides the solid structural ground, the keyboard colours 
the space with harmonies and the soloist has a free role of emotional 
expression within the laid out frame. These instruments attract dif-
ferent personalities. Musicians are group people; bassists more than 
others. They live for the group, whereas soloists are more individu-
alistic. They have to be. The soloist must love taking up space, at-
tract attention, exhibit emotions, while the others must love backing 
her; even to the limit of provoking her, exciting her and moving 
her – literally. In music as well as in any tribe or society the perfect 
mix is needed. Or shaped by the group. Interacting groups shape 
and distribute roles. And individuals have a tendency to live up to 
the roles attributed by the group. 
I suggest that this is connected with the ritualistic element in mu-
sic, since we know that rituals define and redefine roles. 
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As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter David Huron has 
suggested that the evolutionary explanation of the music phenome-
non lies in its capacity to create bonds. I agree, but I think that this 
becomes even more obvious if we consider the ritual rather than 
the music as the original phenomenon. Most anthropologists agree 
that music as a universal phenomenon is ritualistic. It is only in the 
modern era music has developed as a separate art form. Freeman 
(2000)327 discusses this in his article The neurological role of music in 
social bonding. Dance is keeping together in time, he claims. “Ritual 
music and dance foster social bonding and so has been essential to 
creating the trust upon which all social interaction depends”. 
Music is a part of a multimodal phenomenon. And it is perceived 
as such. Mirror neurons are multimodal (Keysers et al. 2003) and 
music, contrary to most other activities, engages the whole brain. It 
is not just the music we copy, it is the whole act. And we are par-
ticipants in that act. 
Simply, music moves us. When music engages the human mind 
most strongly – when performers play music, or when listeners tap, 
dance or sing along with music – the sensory experience of musi-
cal patterns in intimately coupled with action. Thus, music is an 
excellent example of a perception action cycle… (Janata & Grafton 
2003) 
At a concert we are not just interested in tone relations but in what 
the artist is expressing on stage. Even at home, as we listen to a 
record, it is not only the sound that is of interest. We can be totally 
engaged – we move, we feel, and we imagine. We have a relation 
to the group and the music style and our identity is coloured by that 
relation. 
It is tempting to agree with Huron about the evolutionary benefits 
of music to the tribe, but it is even more obvious that the ritual is 
beneficial, since the ritual is communicating knowledge; it is com-
municating a way to perceive the world. Through the rite humans 
                                           
327  Freeman, W.J. ( 2000) A neurological role of music in social bonding. The Origins 
of Music (Eds. N.L. Wallin, B. Merker & S. Brown). MIT Press, Camebridge, MA. 411–
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could share experiences. Evidently those tribes who developed this 
skill had an advantage. 
Many scientists have speculated about the development of music. 
Let me just present a thought on how things just might have devel-
oped: 
1. A returning hunter communicates his experiences by way 
of a concrete showing, mimicking the actual moves and 
sounds of the hunt. 
2. Spectators chose to interact in this staged hunt and follow 
in the steps of the hunter. This imitation capacity is inborn. 
The participants recognize in their own bodies how the 
hunt took place. 
3. The ritual is performed before the hunt, just to show the 
tribe that today is hunting day. 
4. The ritual is performed to make the hunt successful, be-
cause last time it became successful after this ritual. The rit-
ual now has tribal meaning. It means hunting, it means we 
are the hunters, it means today is hunting day and it 
means: If we do not do this, the hunt will not succeed. 
5. Rhythmic performances make the ritual easier to entrain. 
6. Scales make the sounds easier to entrain. 
7. Those tribes who developed rhythm and scales survive be-
cause they can communicate better than other groups. 
8. The music is separated from the ritual to be developed into 
an exquisite art form in its own right, playing with the 
tools developed in rituals. 
If the ritual is the origin of music, it explains why music is never 
perceived just as music but as movements, visions, emotions etc. We 
perceive the rite in the sound of music. 
As mentioned in the introduction, a classical question in music phi-
losophy is: Why do we listen to sad music? Why do we at all engage 
in other people’s problems? There is, from an egoistic point of view, 
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not much reward to be had from this. There is possibly a gain in a 
group perspective, that we have the ability to be empathic. This 
depends on the individual’s ability to perceive things from a wider 
perspective. As we have seen there is an altruistic streak in groups. 
We should expect that some kind of emotional reward is implicated. 
Funerals are perhaps the oldest and most universal of rituals. It is 
easier to understand why a funeral releases sadness than why music 
would. Sadness is an emotion associated with loss of relation – with 
longing. Sad music mimics mourning. It makes us take part in com-
munal mourning; interact in mourning. We are linked to a super-
conductive emotion. Music is the outstanding medium to express 
sadness and longing in love songs, religious music, and all kinds of 
nostalgic songs about home, mummy, good old values, etc. It is the 
most arousing emotion in music (Panksepp 1998). This is not only 
reported by Panksepp but also in Bossius’s interviews on trancing 
(Bossius 2003)328 and in Becker’s investigations of deep listening 
Becker (2004). 
Gabrielsson & Lindström report that relational emotions are com-
monly reported at strong music experiences, particularly emotions of 
safety and warmth: “I felt safety and community with all who par-
ticipated” (Gabrielsson & Lindström Wik 2003). This emotion has a 
counterpoint in neurophysiology (Blood & Zatorre 2001). It is estab-
lished that pleasurable responses to music correlate with activities in 
the brain regions implicated in reward. Opioids are released by so-
cial contacts, sex and play – and by music. 
It is just possible that ritualistic group mourning produces an emo-
tional shield. As we take part in a funeral, as we collectively cry out 
the loss, we are comforted by the interaction of the group. The in-
teraction in itself produces warmth and safety. It creates bonds that 
make it possible to endure as a group and move on together. 
Does then sad music produce opioids? Sadness occasionally causes 
“chill responses” sometimes called piloerection (Panksepp 1995)329. A 
chill is felt, the hair on the arms is erected, a sensation is felt down 
                                           
328  Bossius, T. (2003) The Future in the Rear Mirror. Black metal and transculture. 
Young people, music and religion in a post-modern world. Daidalos, Gothenburg 
329  Panksepp, J. (1995) The emotional sources of chills induced by music. Music 
Perception. Vol.  13. No 2. 171–207 
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the spine and tears may come into our eyes. It is a warm experi-
ence. Such chills are thought to be caused by opioids. 
Even if the listener is alone and listens to sad music, she takes part 
in something that is perceived and felt as a ritual. This connects her 
to her bodily experiences of loss and to episodic memories of loss. 
But in this the warmth from invisible others is felt. This fills existen-
tial emptiness with a meaning that is not, and cannot be, formulated 
in words. 
Maybe the question why we are emotionally affected by music 
should be rephrased: Why are we emotionally affected by rituals? 
This question is easier to answer. Rituals are not abstract tone rela-
tions. They are human interactions. 
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Contemplating Music 
The Cultural Perspective 
On its way to the listener music passes many transformations such as 
the music culture that surrounds and inspires the composer, the fan-
tasy and the thinking of the composer, the encoding to a music 
score, the decoding by the musician of the written music, the musi-
cian’s interpretation of this decoded music, the sound of the instru-
ments, the phonogram, and the perception of the listener. This could 
be divided further. On its way from the composer to the listener the 
music occurs in different shapes. We can see all these stages as signs 
of each other – as representations. Where then is the music? Or 
more precisely: What is a sign of music and what is music? We could 
also ask in what sense music could be a sign of extra-musical reality. 
I intend to show that the answers to these two questions are per-
spective dependent. 
Depiction of perspective 
Michael Gazzaniga describes in The Social Brain (1985) how his 
split-brain experiments led him to the conclusion that the human 
brain has a module in the left hemisphere with a special and specifi-
cally human capacity. He called this module the interpreter. This de-
vice allows us to interpret our perceptions and to interpret our ac-
tions (rationalizations). Cave paintings, graves and mythology in-
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scribed in tools bare witness of early human efforts to interpret her 
existence. From there on perceptions could be taken as signs of 
something. The most important example of this is the coded sound – 
the word. 
With the interpreter it is possible to communicate without bodily 
interaction. The code (a conventional connection between a sign and 
its denotation) is a prerequisite for accumulation of knowledge. It 
makes mass communication possible. And it allows for knowledge to 
be passed on to the next generation. The code, in other words, 
shapes larger entities of people with common understandings – cul-
tures. 
The concept mentifacts designating intellectual, aesthetical, spiritual 
and ethical values in a culture was introduced by the English biolo-
gist Sir Julian Huxley, along with the concepts sociofacts for social 
structures and artefacts for material objects (Huxley 1951)330. Roland 
Posner (1989: 265)331 treats mentifacts as a set of codes. Posner pro-
ceeds: “Mental culture can therefore be regarded as a set of codes”. 
This leads to a semiotic definition of a cultural society as a set of 
code users. Anybody in possession of the cultural codes belongs to 
the society. I will discuss “culture” in this narrow sense. 
If the codes are shared in the culture, we have a language. This 
language does not have to be verbal. People create in their daily 
communication semantic fields. The discourse produces the meaning 
of the concepts of the culture. When we use codes, we see the 
world through the eyes of the culture. I will call this the cultural 
perspective. This delimits my definition of the cultural perspective to 
the cognitively conscious. 
In the cultural perspective we take an indirect attitude to the 
world. We deal with the representations of the world, not with the 
world itself. We use signs. The sign is the vehicle to leave the here 
and now. With the sign we can think about things in the past and 
things to come. We are no longer locked to phenomenal direct ex-
perience of the world. We can think about things that are not here 
                                           
330  Huxley, J. (1951) Knowledge, morality & destiny. Psychiatry. May 14. 129–151 
331  Posner, R. (1989) What is culture? Toward a semiotic explanation of anthropo-
logical concepts. The Nature of Culture (Ed. W.A. Koch) Brockmeyer, Bochum. 240–
295 
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and things we have not experienced but just read about. We can 
share other people’s thoughts, the thoughts of an author and the 
commonly shared beliefs of the culture. With the sign “me” I can 
step out of myself and think about myself as an agent. I insert the 
current discourse of individuality. For example I can think about 
myself as someone who listens to music. This is totally different from 
the co-perception of myself in music listening. 
Music and the cultural perspective 
Music is contemplated, reflected on, thought about, analysed and 
talked about by musicians, listeners, critics, and scientists. Music is 
inscribed in culture, in a weave of texts – a discourse. It reflects 
culture and is thus – in itself – a sign of culture. Music is artefacts as 
products, sociofacts as institutions and mentifacts as discourse. 
Musicology, as all sciences, always takes a cultural perspective, 
simply because it uses cultural codes and mentifacts. I want to em-
phasize that this is a perspective because you often see that musi-
cologists generalize the scientific analysis of music to the perception 
of the music listener. This is a mistake. The perspective of the lis-
tener is, as we have seen, not always cultural. Musicologists tradi-
tionally work with the analysis of written music. This is far from 
dancing, everyday listening and tribal experiences. Since the bodily 
interaction with music is not part of traditional musicological method, 
we tend to underestimate this side of music perception. 
Cultural knowledge about the composer, the artist, and the music, 
is undoubtedly important for everyday listeners. All kinds of aided 
guidance, such as programs, song lyrics, interviews, and lectures 
direct the understanding of a piece. No doubt biographical knowl-
edge about the composer or the artist contributes to the emotional 
experience as we listen to music. The information that Eva Cassidy 
died of cancer shortly after having recorded Over the Rainbow affects 
my understanding of the lyrics, the voice and the phrasing. 
But how does it affect emotion? We cannot exclude the possibility 
that our explanations why we are moved are not always true. As we 
have seen from the neurological evidence, the emotional reaction 
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sometimes comes first. Sometimes the context is not the cause of the 
emotional reaction. It helps us to explain the reaction in words, but 
this explanation is in fact a rationalization. “Why do you like this 
music?” we may ask. And the respondent might answer that the 
voicing is excellent, that the singer is charismatic, that the sound is 
beautiful, that this whole genre is interesting and so forth. Why is 
this judged good? Because we like it. 
What, then, comes first, rational judgement or emotion? This is a 
crucial question. We will come back to it in a chapter solely de-
voted to the discussion of emotion. 
This discussion leads to the following questions: 
1. Does music signify contextual meaning? 
2. Does this signification produce emotions in the listener? 
3. And ultimately: Can music signify emotions? 
These questions cannot be answered without a review of semiotics 
and what this science actually claims and can claim. 
Semiotics 
The ancient Greeks thought about symptoms as signs of illness.  
Since then representation has been a subject of interest for philoso-
phers such as Augustine (354–430), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), 
and John Locke (1632–1704). Modern semiotics was fathered by the 
Suisse linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and the American 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). They were fol-
lowed by Ernst Cassírer (1875–1945), Louis Hjelmslev (1899–1965), 
Charles W. Morris (1901–1978), Roman Jakobson (1896–1982), and 
Umberto Eco (b. 1932), among others. The aspects of this field are 
covered in an anthology consisting of four enormous volumes called 
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Semiotik – ein Handbuch zu den zeichentheoretischen Grundlage 
von Natur und Kultur (Posner et al. 2004)332. 
Non-linguistic use of semiotics was introduced by structuralists as 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (b. 1908) and Roland Barthes (1915–1980), as 
well as by psychoanalysists as Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) and Julia 
Kristeva (b. 1941). Semiotics became the instrument to “read” a cul-
ture through its artefacts in anthropology to Clifford Geertz (1926–
2006). One such artefact is of course music. For a theoretical under-
standing of the semiotic analysis of culture, see The Nature of Culture 
(Koch 1989)333. 
In the fifties semiotics made its entry to ethnomusicology and mu-
sic anthropology as a cross-cultural method to analyse “utterances” of 
music from different cultures (Monelle 1992: 28). It developed into 
a tool to analyse the “meaning” of music (including affective mean-
ing) in the 70s. Music ultimately was seen as a language with an 
explicit semantic meaning, which had to be decoded. 
There is a vast literature on signification in music, e.g. (Nattiez 
1975)334, (Stefani 1976)335, (Tagg 1979), (Martinez 1991)336, (Tarasti 
1994)337 and (Cumming 2000)338. The principal lines are summed up 
by Monelle (1992). 
There is not one semiotic theory, but many. Peirce’s semiotics is 
the most elaborated system of them all. This is the source of com-
monly used concepts as the Symbol, the Icon and the Index. It is a 
general theory of all forms of representations. It has become widely 
applied in other sciences. Since this theory is the most influential in 
musicology, I will focus on that. Even so, there is the problem that 
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Peirce, although the theory as such was fairly consistent over the 
years, never stopped redefining key concepts. For example it has 
been estimated that the key concept “sign” has 76 definitions. The 
many definitions are due to Peirce creative personality. In his many 
articles and letters Peirce always seemed to extract new aspects. 
This is enriching to the reader. It specifies Peirce’s thinking, but it 
calls for care and knowledge about the whole work for followers 
and users. 
It would have been nice to delimit the discussion to the question: 
Does Peirce’s classification of signs in 1903 (when he published his 
work on signification) allow for music to signify (Peirce 1967)339? 
Even so, the question is difficult to answer. The reason is: I cannot 
claim to understand the theory. Even if I did, it would be an enor-
mous undertaking to explain it. And even if I could, nobody, or 
almost nobody, would understand the explanation. In fact it is 
somewhat of an intellectual sport to depict practical applications of 
Peirce’s sign classes. 
We are in good company. Many renowned semioticians have got 
lost in their attempts to follow Peirce’s writings. According to Pape 
(2004)340, no one, “with the notable exception of Savan”, has under-
stood the inferential connections between sign classes and the cate-
gories (leaving at least one more successful interpreter). But what if 
all the others were right and Savan and Pape were wrong. Maybe it 
cannot be understood. There is a possibility, and this is a blasphe-
mous thought, that the reason why the theory cannot be understood 
is that the premises are wrong. It is a problem that Peirce’s philoso-
phy, although visionary and way ahead of its time, is about one hun-
dred years old. Accordingly there is new evidence in relevant fields 
not accounted for by the theory. 
Peirce believed that semiotics was the answer to how we acquire 
knowledge of the world. Semiotics was just the means in a much 
greater undertaking. The ambition was nothing less than creating an 
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understanding of how knowledge of the world is possible. The onto-
logical question was: How do we make up a representation in our 
minds of what is out there? Peirce tried to grasp the general struc-
ture of experience (Pape 1997). The aim was a grammatica specula-
tiva that could describe the forms of all types of representation and 
knowledge. 
One keystone in Peirce’s philosophy was phenomenology, but this 
is the phenomenology before Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology was 
in the air (James 1884)341; (Bergson 1889)342 and Husserl (in ex-
tenso). Peirce criticized, but was never the less part of Cartesian 
Philosophy (Ochs 2004)343. The barrier between man and world 
creates the problem how we get access to this world. This was the 
problem Peirce tried to solve. This may be one of the premises that 
could be questioned. 
With The Phenomenology of Perception (1945) Merleau-Ponty pre-
sented a new understanding of perception. The objectified body was 
subjectified. We interact directly with the world. And perception 
emanates from these actions. The world-mind duality was dissolved. 
Take a look at this statement by Peirce: 
It is that the word or sign which man uses is the man himself. For, 
as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction with 
the fact that life is a chain of thought, proves that man is a sign; so, 
that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an exter-
nal sign. That is to say, the man and the external sign are identical, 
in the same sense in which the words homo and man are identical. 
Thus my language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the 
thought. (Peirce 1931: Vol. 58 § 5) 
Signification is thus, according to Peirce, the only source of informa-
tion. All mental activity is made up of signs. And consequently hu-
mans are signs. It could be noted that Peirce does not even bother 
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to specify this sign to the human thoughts, or the human mind, but 
to humans as if there is no such thing as a body. 
This is not commensurable with perception-action theory. Here are 
some of the clashes emanating from this false premise: 
1. The separation of the world out there from our inner 
world must be rejected. The critique of the dyadic Carte-
sian ontology is an acknowledged consequence of Mer-
leau-Ponty (1996) and James Gibson’s (1986) phenome-
nology of perception. This is furthermore the message in 
Lakoff & Johnson’s Philosophy in the flesh (Lakoff & Johnson 
1999)344. The world, as we know it (and what else is there 
to discuss?), is, as we have discussed in the preceding 
chapters showing itself to us as a the result of action and 
interaction. Everything we know about it can be traced 
back to bodily experiences. 
2. We do not interpret information to the extent that Peirce 
believed. Most understanding is automated in perception. A 
child does not interpret the bouncing of a ball as a sign of 
gravity; she can catch it anyway. Infants do not interpret 
the mouth movements of the mother as the consequence 
of muscular activity; they can imitate it anyway. Animals do 
not interpret situations; they act on them anyway. Inten-
tional meaning and situation understanding are thus inte-
grated parts of perception. We do not decode stimuli but 
perceive the situational meaning directly as “affordances”, 
which means that the use aspect is evident. We perceive 
emotional information from an utterance without decoding 
it. This information is in the tone of voice – the emotional 
prosody. In emotional face-to-face interactions we perceive 
each other and understand the social situation directly. 
3. A perception is first of all an invitation to act. We are not 
likely to interpret something coming in our direction as a 
ball before we perceive it as something to catch or duck. 
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The invitation to catch the ball is automated in the percep-
tion. 
4. Thus we must distinct phenomenal consciousness from 
cognitive consciousness. Cognition is semiotic; perception-
action is not. Phenomenal consciousness is typically situa-
tion dependent. Gazzaniga (1985) provided neurological 
proof with his series of split-brain experiments that we in 
fact are capable of acting without any foregoing rational 
decision. Rather we tend to invent reason after action. 
Phenomenologists therefore use the concept perception to 
imply a being-in-the-world perspective – the perspective 
of the present moment. Perception is prior to semiosis. 
5. Knowledge does not have to be encoded in the semiotic 
sense. Knowledge of how to perceive learnt by perceptual 
learning, procedural knowledge, and episodic memories 
are three examples of knowledge that is not semantic. 
6. Neural representations are not signs to the perceiving sub-
ject (but to the neurologist). 
All these points falsify the thesis that humans can be reduced to 
signs. I am not just a sign. I am also the phenomenological body, co-
perceived, interactive, and intentional. Peirce never stopped work-
ing on the semiotic project, indicating that even to the originator 
there were always loose ends. One such loose end is the concept 
Firstness described as a pre-reflective quality. Icons (see below) are 
said to have Firstness. The idea of a pre-reflective sign is an anom-
aly, as I intend to show. 
Since the work was never completed and since key concepts have 
various definitions, followers tend to present their own view. They 
do so without reference to the systematic layout and disciplines in 
Peirce’s philosophy (Eco 1979345; Schönrich 1990346). 
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To sum up: 
1. Semiotics is not one, but a set of theories. 
2. The most used theory is not internally consistent and has 
never been completed. 
3. Peirce’s theory is, although based on phenomenological 
theory, not commensurable with perception-action theory. 
4. Followers do not understand the foundations. 
5. Followers make up their own versions. 
The sign is perspective dependent 
The simplest understanding of the sign is the dyadic constellation 
signifier/signified for the representation (representamen) and the 
object signified. Peirce’s most influential contribution is the 
discrimination of three classes of sign relation (the relation between 
the sign and the object signified): 
1. Icon. The signifier has some characteristic in common with 
the object signified “(…) by partaking in the characters of the 
object”. (Peirce 1931–1958 vol. 4 § 531). This could be 
resemblance (e.g. a painting of a falcon). 
2. Index. This sign is caused by causality or closeness (Peirce 
1931–1958 vol. 4 § 531) (e.g. a falcon feather). 
3. Symbol. The Symbol is a conventional sign (Peirce 1931–
1958 vol. 2 § 307) (e.g. the word “falcon”). 
By “conventional sign” we mean that it is made a convention, i.e. 
the meaning is agreed and generally accepted. To say that the Sym-
bol is conventionalized thus means that it is culturally coded, as are 
words. The understanding of a Symbol thus implies a cultural per-
spective. 
I will now argue that to detect a sign, any sign, we need to take a 
cultural perspective. I will use the 1897 definition of the sign. This 
definition is chosen because it is the most well known, because it 
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approximately covers most other Peircian definitions of the sign and 
because it contains the interpretant which is an important agent in 
Peirce’s triadic understanding of the sign: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, 
that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or 
perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call 
the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its 
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference 
to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the 
representamen. (Peirce 1931–38: vol. 2, § 228) 
This definition makes all signs cultural. I have two arguments for 
this: 
1. The sign “stands to somebody for something”. This means 
that the beholder must be able to discriminate between the 
sign and the “something” that it represents. If the perceiver 
is not aware of the difference between these two entities, 
she will have a phenomenal perception. The “something” 
will be perceived directly. When we smell a hot dog, our 
salivation turns on; we feel hungry and we start looking 
for food. Any meat-eating animal would do that. 
2. The interpretant – the “equivalent” and “more developed” 
sign “in the mind of that person” is created by the original 
sign. This is the thought of the sign. This interpretant must, 
as for reasons already stated, be able to separate the two 
constituents of the first sign. There must be a border be-
tween these two constituents. According to Louis Hjelmslev 
(1953) meaning gives substance to form. This is the form 
of content. There is, he states, no possible existence for 
this meaning unless it has a form. The “paradigm” in one 
language and the corresponding “paradigm” in another lan-
guage cover the same zone of meaning, which without 
these languages is an undivided, amorphous continuum. 
The borders in this zone of meaning thus do not appear 
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until they are formed by language. This demands a cultural 
perspective. 
Perhaps it could be objected that Hjelmslev must be wrong, since 
we can think in images and separate the image from the reality. 
However in Peirce’s understanding of iconicity does not permit that: 
So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose 
the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction between 
the copy and the real disappears, and it is for a moment a pure 
dream – not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that 
moment we are contemplating an icon. (Peirce 1885: 181)347  
This depiction of the icon does not fit the definition of the sign. If 
the border between the copy and the real disappears, the beholder 
cannot possibly perceive that something stands for something. This 
means that to the viewer there is no sign. The content is seamlessly 
merged into the form. As soon as I say to myself: This painting de-
picts a falcon I take a cultural perspective. 
This is why I stated earlier that a pre-reflective sign is an anomaly. 
And this is why I argue that signs are perspective dependent. Let 
me exemplify: 
1. Tommy is thirsty and sees a glass of water. He gets an im-
mediate urge to drink, which is coloured with the emo-
tional aspect of thirst and quenching thirst. The glass in this 
case is not a sign of something to drink. Rather the use as-
pect, as James Gibson pointed out, is immanent in the per-
ception. The urge to drink is unmediated. Now Tommy’s 
sister Mary makes her entrance. Mary thinks (verbally): 
“Tommy is looking at a glass of water. Maybe he will have 
a sip.” For her the existence of the glass and the act of 
drinking is not the same thing. In the first case we have a 
perception and in the second case we have signification. In 
the first case the glass does not stand for something, while 
in the second case the glass does stand for something. Thus 
                                           
347  Peirce, C.S. (1885) On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of 
notation. American Journal of Mathematics. Vol. 7. No 2. January. 
Contemplating Music 
 
239 
the same glass of water can be a perception including the 
impulse to drink in one perspective and an interpretant 
consisting of a mental representation of the sign 
glass/drinking in another perspective. In Mary’s perspective 
the glass and the possibility to drink are connected “in ref-
erence to some sort of idea” (as the definition reads). It is 
not until this idea is developed in Mary’s mind that the 
glass/drinking sign appears. 
2. Exposed teeth in wolves may be interpreted as an indexi-
cal sign of aggression. By humans. Not by other wolves. 
To them it is aggression. To talk of exposed teeth as semi-
otic communication is to take an anthropocentric perspec-
tive. Only humans can be stupid enough to reflect on the 
meaning of the exposed teeth when confronted by a wolf 
in rage. 
3. Let us say that we smell a hamburger. Most of us would 
agree that this is an indexical sign of a hamburger. But 
what if we look at it and draw the conclusion that this is a 
hamburger. This is the same thing although in another mo-
dality. Still we would say that this is a hamburger rather 
than a sign. And – what about the hamburger in the 
mouth? Is the chewing resistance, the aroma and the taste 
signs or is it maybe a real hamburger? Well, compare this 
to a blindfolded panel testing wine! With the wine in the 
mouth, a member of that panel might consider the per-
ceived qualities of the wine to be signs of wine district, 
grapes and storage. In one case taste is not a sign, in an-
other it is. 
4. Is prosody a sign of emotion, or is it emotion? Is body lan-
guage a sign of emotion, or is it the “real thing”? Are 
blushed cheeks signs of emotion or the real thing? Let us 
go deeper! Is high blood pleasure a sign or an emotion? Is 
the chemistry in our bodies, when we are aroused, signs 
or emotions? Well, to the doctor testing a depressed pa-
tient, these variables certainly are signs. Is then the subjec-
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tive experience of these bodily states a sign of emotion, or 
emotion? 
As we can see from these four examples, the existence of the sign 
depends on whom we ask and the situation. This decides the per-
spective. We cannot know if we are dealing with signs before we 
know the perspective. 
It is easy to make the mistake to assume that Peirce’s 1897 defini-
tion implies communication since it states that somebody is ad-
dressed. If there is an addressee we have to assume a sender and 
that this sender is intentional. But at a closer look at the definition 
we find that the addressee is addressed not by a sender but by the 
sign. The definition does not imply intention, not even a sender and 
thus not communication. In some cases of semiosis there is no 
sender. This means that the sign does not have to be encoded. 
Let me exemplify this with the feather of the falcon. This indexical 
sign is not intended and not encoded. Can something not encoded 
be decoded? Somebody picks up this feather, examines it and draws 
the conclusion that this feather comes from a falcon. Is she decoding 
a sign? Yes, she is using semantic knowledge to decode the feather 
as a sign of a falcon. She conceptualizes the sign. A sign can thus be 
decoded even if it is not encoded. 
Anything can thus be a sign, if it is culturally decoded. Even a 
walk in the forest is semiotic, if we choose that perspective. Trees 
and stones may remind us of people or goblins. There are signs of 
the age of trees, signs of season, signs of ecological mechanisms, 
signs of geology, signs of animals, signs of human activity etc. The 
nature as thus is a sign of God’s existence, to some of us. But the 
forest is also a reality of its own, and is perceived and lived so by its 
inhabitants and occasional visitors. We interact with it. The paths 
shape our movements, the waters urge us to drink, the prey makes 
us hunt etc. 
Sometimes we do reflect on what we perceive and sometimes we 
do not. Sometimes we act without hesitation and sometimes we 
think about the consequences. Sometimes the forest is just a back-
ground to a conversation and sometimes, as now, it is the focus of 
the conversation. Sometimes we use the interpreter and sometimes 
we do not.  
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Music can, just as the forest, be thought of and almost any associa-
tion can be triggered by listening. It is important to stress that these 
associations may be emotionally charged and thus that they may 
affect us. Any element in music can be considered a sign. But music 
is not just semiotic; it is also lived by composers, performers, dancers 
and listeners in direct interaction. 
The sign thus is perspective dependent. So are the concepts “code” 
and “representation”. We say that music is encoded as a neural rep-
resentation. This understanding is cultural. It is dependent on our 
knowledge in neurology. As perceiving subjects we are not aware 
of the neural code unless we take a cultural perspective. 
Is music a language? 
It is often said that music is a language. What exactly do we mean 
by that? Is music comparable to a national language? This question 
may sound naïve. To most readers it is clear that music is not sym-
bolic the way national languages are. If it is not, what kind of lan-
guage is it? I will make this comparison in a literary way. The pur-
pose is to show that the eventuality of symbolisation in the Peircian 
sense can be ruled out. 
What are the similarities between sounding music and spoken lan-
guage? Language has one physical and one semiotic side. Louis 
Hjelmslev referred to this as two forms: the form of expression and 
the form of content (Hjelmslev 1953). The form of expression is also 
called emotional prosody. This is the melody (pitch change), the 
timbre (overtone constellation), changes in volume, and intonation 
aspects of language. Let me exemplify! 
Let us say that the Prime Minister of Sweden is interviewed. Emo-
tional prosody then is the perceptual difference between a reading a 
script of the speech and listening to an impersonator imitating the 
speech. A skilled impersonator will not only reveal information that 
you cannot get from the script (e.g. fear, bragging, uncertainty, per-
sonality) but ad his personal critique of the Prime Minister. 
The form of expression and the form of content are linked to two 
different kinds of knowledge. The form of content is declarative and 
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the form of expression is procedural. Prosody thus is learnt and 
communicated through imitation. The form of expression comes very 
close to music, and one of the ways to investigate music and emo-
tion is to make this comparison (Juslin & Laukka 2003). 
Is music semiotic? Yes, it is. As we have seen anything could be a 
sign. Music is no exception. But, in language the signs are Symbols 
– conventional arbitrary signs. Are there Symbols in music? No! Here 
are the reasons: 
1. If music signs were Symbols, listeners would agree on the 
meaning of an instrumental piece of music. This could easily 
be tested. I have found no such investigation. The reason is 
of course that nobody truly believes that instrumental music 
can produce such shared meaning. It is from the beginning a 
hopeless enterprise. Music does not signify the same thing 
for you and me. A melody means one thing to you and an-
other to others. The associations differ depending on who we 
are and the situation (Gabrielsson & Lindström Wik (2003). 
2. In language it is not a fact that a change in temporality 
changes the information. You can read this sentence at any 
speed and read some words quick and some slow. The 
meaning would be the same. In music, changes in the note 
values would change the identity of the piece. The reason 
why language information is not affected by temporal 
changes is that it is symbolic. The symbol is totally abstract 
and does not contain a time dimension. 
3. Contrary to language, it is hard to delimit and define a Sym-
bol in music. Where does it start? Where does it end? 
4. The smallest sign of meaning in language is the so called 
morpheme. This can, according to Hjelmslev, be defined 
through the commutation principle (Hjelmslev 1953): a mor-
pheme is the smallest part that would change the meaning. 
To some extent this can be performed in music. If we for 
example insert a new base tone in a chord, the chord would 
change and so would the function of that chord. Another ex-
ample is the change of a major third to a minor third in a 
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chord. But in language we can see that the prefix “un” 
changes real to “unreal”. Negations are not possible in music. 
Musical signs do not follow logical rules. Symbols do, accord-
ing to Peirce (1980–2000: 173)348. 
5. Since Symbols are arbitrary it is possible to translate one lan-
guage to another. If music was a symbolic representation, it 
should be possible to translate music sign by sign to a na-
tional language. If so a verbal description of a piece of music 
would give the same meaning as listening to the music. This 
is obviously not the case. 
6. Music semiotic theory implies that symbolical meaning has 
been established through the span of music history. But 
knowledge of music history is not needed to enjoy music. 
I conclude that music is not a language in the same sense as national 
languages are. Language has one aspect in common with music – 
the physical aspect – the form of expression. But the most important 
thing, which makes a language a language – the culturally agreed 
code, it does not have. This means that there is no one to one rela-
tion between sound and content and thus music is just an “abraca-
dabra”. Play “abracadabra” it says in the score. It is all about the 
sound – the form of expression. Meaning and emotion is immanent 
in this sounding form. 
From this follows that musical structures cannot be combined to 
narratives. Peter Kivy (2002: 182–201) argues that narratives in mu-
sic is nonsense. There are simpler ways to tell a story than to com-
pose a symphony, he states laconically. 
Music can be interpreted as a sign or a set of signs, but everything 
can. Thus we can say that music “speaks” to us – metaphorically. But 
this is personal information. It depends on who we are and the 
situation. 
Musicologists often present analysis under the pretext that the mu-
sic signifies this or that, and it may, but since the signs are not sym-
bolic, they are not culturally coded. What the musicologist is launch-
                                           
348  Peirce, C.S. (1980–2000) Harvard lectures on the logic of science. The Writings 
of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 1. (Ed. M. Fisch) 
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ing is therefore her personal associations packaged in semiotic ter-
minology, which makes it sound more scientific and general than it 
is. We do not hear these signs until the musicologist has presented 
them and explained them to us. This may lead to a new way of lis-
tening. For other musicologists. 
Can semiotic theory explain music emotion? 
The position that music can be a sign of emotion is taken by Philip 
Tagg (Tagg 1979). This sign – the museme – is treated as a symboli-
cal sign. It is argued that the emotional meaning of the museme has 
been established in music history and in music culture. Let me dis-
cuss this with a well-known example. 
Let us recall the alarming music in the murder scene in Hitchcock’s 
Psycho. Did the composer Bernard Herrmann use a sign of horror? 
Or is it horror lived by the audience – horror perceived? How did 
Herrmann know how horror sounds? Did he find this in his own 
body? Are we associating it with warning signals? Why then do 
warning signals sound like that? No one can misinterpret it. Or 
should we say misperceive? This sound seems to correspond to the 
bodily state of horror. It puts the body in an alarmed state. If this 
were a symbolic sign, any sound would do, since symbols (as 
words) are said to be arbitrary signs. This is hardly the case. 
It is exactly this connection between music and the body that rules 
out that music could be arbitrary signs. Music is, as stated before, 
procedural knowledge once it is learned. Let me provide an exam-
ple of a clash between semantic and procedural understanding of 
music. 
Ian Cross has described his difficulties to learn to clap the tactus of 
a Bolivian rhythm (Cross 2003)349. The perception of tactus in Bolivia 
differs from most other Western music. Cross was able to learn how 
to clap this rhythm, but it felt theoretical; it did not appeal to feeling. 
This testimony indicates that he was trying to learn the rhythm intel-
                                           
349  Cross, I. (2003) Music, cognition, culture and evolution. The Cognitive Neurosci-
ence of Music (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre) Oxford University Press, New York. 52–
56 
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lectually and succeeded, but this new knowledge clashed with his 
body knowledge. 
The so-called modular theory suggests that special-purpose brain 
modules automatically and subcortically process acoustic stimuli, re-
sulting in perceptions of emotion (Juslin & Laukka 2003). I would 
say that this is more than a theory. I have already presented many 
other references indicating that music engages the limbic/paralimbic 
system prior to neocortical activity. 
Modules are domain specific (Peretz et al. 1998). The left temporal 
lobe is involved in decoding and interpretation, while the right 
takes care of melodic and prosodic features and their emotional as-
pects. Right-sided temporal brain damage thus is one of many neuro-
logical lesions affecting the production of emotional prosody. This 
can be noted in speech as a flattened monotone melody of speech 
with a slowed down variation of pitch. The prosody is dissociated 
from inner feelings (the patient recognizes this and is disturbed by 
it). When it comes to perception, it has been noted that the sensi-
tiveness to emotional prosody, facial expressions and gestures are 
affected by right-sided brain damage. 
Interestingly the right hemisphere is engaged in music listening 
amateurs, while both hemispheres are engaged in trained musicians. 
The explanation is that musically schooled listeners have names for 
the events in music (Fagius 2001: 71)350. 
Brain dissociation is a strong argument against any theory claiming 
that semiosis causes musical emotions. Since music and language are 
processed by different brain modules, it seems far fetched that music 
perception should involve decoding of Symbols. This is supported by 
findings reported by Isabel Peretz. Composers who have lost speech 
as a consequence of brain damage are still able to compose; and 
reversely, brain damage can cause loss of all musical ability but not 
speech (Peretz 2003). 
In concordance with these findings it has been shown that ERP 
curves are different for unexpected words (N 400) than for unex-
                                           
350  Fagius, J. (2001) Hemisfärernas Musik. Bo Ejeby förlag, Gothenburg 
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pected tones (P 600) (Besson & Schön 2003)351. According to the 
authors this difference points to different brain processing of lan-
guage and melodies. 
The neurological picture is complex. Since both music and lan-
guage are auditory, sequenced and melodic; since both contain 
forms of expression, several brain areas are used both in music and 
language processing. But the results show interesting differences as 
well, indicating that music does not symbolize. 
A convincing argument against the proposal that music signifies 
emotion are the many brain scanning studies previously referred to 
indicating separate pathways for the processing of music structure 
and the processing of musical emotions. 
It may be interesting to note that Peirce never claimed that music 
could signify emotions. In the only statement he made about music 
he rather indicated the opposite: Musical emotions can signify. In a 
letter to Lady Welby 1904 Peirce exemplified the icon as: 
[a] vision, – or the sentiment excited by a piece of music consid-
ered as representing what the composer intended. (Peirce 1931–
1958: vol. 8, § 335). 
Let us say that a composer has the intention to illustrate the move-
ments of the sea. Musical features similar to the movement and the 
sound of the sea would cause an emotional reaction in the listener. 
This emotional reaction would make her imagine the sea. The feel-
ing (phenomenally perceived emotion) this piece induces in the 
listener then is an iconic sign of the sea provided that the feeling 
makes her think about the sea, according to Peirce. 
This possibility is not at odds with the neurological findings. Rather 
there is anecdotal proof that musical emotions can signify. Recall the 
patient who suffered from amusia but was able to identify music 
titles from the emotion. It is however doubtful whether this emotion 
qualifies as a sign. 
There is thus not much in favour of the idea that music could sig-
nify emotions. But, what about the Eva Cassidy example? I know 
                                           
351  Besson, M. & Schön, D. (2003) Comparison between language and music. The 
Biological Foundations of Music (Eds. I. Peretz & R.J. Zatorre) Science and Medical 
Publications. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 267–293 
Contemplating Music 
 
247 
that she died from cancer. When I first listened to her interpretation 
of ‘Over the Rainbow’, this came to mind. The song is an indexical 
sign of Eva Cassidy’s fate. However an important aspect here is the 
fact that the words of the song are understood in the context of the 
singer’s fate. The line “Somewhere over the rainbow, skies are free” 
means in this context that death is a liberator of the present pain. 
Not until this text dependant cultural connection is made, can the 
song signify this breathtaking longing for liberation. After just one 
listening occasion, the music becomes charged with this emotion and 
is thus perceived emotionally even if I do not listen to the lyrics or 
explicitly make the connection to the fate of Eva Cassidy. But this 
does not mean that the music signifies emotion.  
Conclusions 
1. The listener may be cognitively conscious about music, but she 
may also be just phenomenally conscious or just listen pre-
attentively. 
2. Any event in music may act as a sign. 
3. There is no sign until a perception is culturally decoded. This 
has two consequences.  A) The mere perception of a music 
feature does not make it a sign. B) The fact that somebody 
perceives a sign does not automatically make it a sign for 
somebody else. The sign is perspective dependent. The old 
watershed in music philosophy whether music is a representa-
tion or not must thus be answered politically: Yes and no. It 
depends. 
4. Music is not a language, since music is generally not a system 
of Symbols. 
5. Music can have emotional meaning to the listener without be-
ing a sign. I would call this view enhanced formalism. Music 
can be a form that does not re-present. The emotional meaning 
is present in the form. 
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If we should formulate these conclusions in one sentence, it would 
be: Signs exist only in a cultural (cognitively conscious) perspective, 
but since musical emotions are pre-reflective, semiotics is not the 
answer to the music emotion enigma. 
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Emotion 
What is an emotion? 
Although emotion research has a long history, scientists have not yet 
agreed on what they are investigating. This fact tells us something 
about how difficult this subject is. Some argue that they know ex-
actly what an emotion is (Rolls 2005)352 while others (Tomkins 
1991)353; (LeDoux 1996)354; (Panksepp 1998) rather state that emo-
tion is an umbrella concept for a variety of related phenomena. Fur-
thermore some claim that they know where in the brain emotions 
occur while others insist that this is a perception action phenomenon 
engaging the whole body. Since the concept emotion is so evasive I 
have, up to now, focussed the discussion on perspective specific 
musical emotions. 
A question that has become more and more acute along this inves-
tigation is: On what level of awareness do emotions emerge? As we 
have seen perceptions and emotions are to a certain extent proc-
essed along different pathways. How does emotion relate to percep-
tion? Does the perception cause the emotion or does the emotion 
cause the perception? Is emotion a perception? 
It is time to devote a special chapter to the emotion. Let us start 
with a statement by Antonio Damasio: 
                                           
352  Rolls, E.T. (2005) Emotion Explained. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
353  Tomkins, S. (1991) Affect, Imagery and Consciousness. Springer Publishing Com-
pany, New York 
354  LeDoux, J. (1996) The Emotional Brain – the mysterious underpinnings of emo-
tional life. Touchstone, New York 
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All of the machinery of emotions is triggered and brought into ac-
tion in an involuntary, non-conscious manner. So we really have 
no control over how the concert of an emotion is going to be 
played.  (Damasio 2003)355  
This involuntary and non-conscious nature of emotion may seem 
surprising since we can feel happy or sad and thus are seemingly 
aware of our emotions. Furthermore, culture demands that we exer-
cise some control over our emotions. 
What does Damasio mean? We use different parts of the brain to 
produce spontaneous smiles and fake smiles, he states. If you ask 
someone suffering from stroke to smile only half the face will smile. 
But if you tell a joke to the same person you will see a symmetrical 
smile. This observation could be connected with Merleau-Ponty’s 
example of the man who could not put his hand on his head when 
asked to, and then suddenly smashed a fly that had landed there. 
These examples illustrate that voluntary actions following on cogni-
tively conscious decisions differ neurologically from spontaneous 
procedural actions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, it has been found 
that facial mimicry reactions measured by EMG (electromyographic 
activity) are to fast to be conscious (Dimberg et al. 2000). Further-
more this first fast reaction can be replaced by a culturally more 
suitable expression. This has been called emotional regulation (Gross 
2002)356. If, for example, the first reaction is aggressive, it is re-
placed milliseconds later by a smile. The subject is not aware of the 
first emotion, but of the second. Thus this first emotion fits Damasio’s 
description. Some emotions belong to the involuntary domain. The 
biologist/neurologist understanding of emotion obviously differs from 
the everyday use of the word, which refers to the subjective va-
lence of our present state – the feeling. The conscious observation 
of emotion is believed to be specific to humans and thus does not 
cover the biologist’s use of the word. The every day understanding 
demands cultural development of the concept emotion. If there 
                                           
355  Damasio A.R. (2003) Radio interview in Emotion and the Brain from The Gray 
Matters radio series produced for Public Radio International, in association with the 
Dana Alliance for Brain Initiatives. 
356  Gross, J.J. (2002) Emotional regulation – affective, cognitive and social conse-
quences. Physiopsychology, 39. 281–291 
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were no such developed concept, we would not be able to separate 
the emotion from the world perceived. The biologist understanding 
does not presume such a concept. 
In the eyes of the biologist emotions are important steering 
mechanisms for animals, including human beings. Even in bees, we 
can see substances reminding of, and with the same function as, do-
pamine (Quartz & Sejnowski 2002). Do bees have emotions? Yes, in 
the biologist sense that bees have a system designed to steer behav-
iour, reminding of our emotional system. 
Why do we have to care about this bee level understanding, 
when it is the human experience of emotion – the feeling – that 
really interests us? The answer is that in order to understand the 
feeling, we need to understand biological emotion. The feeling is 
after all a symptom of the emotion. 
Other symptoms of emotion are behaviour, high blood pressure, 
blushing, substances in the blood, facial reactions etc. but the emo-
tion itself eludes us. What then is a symptom of what? To find the 
emotion is like peeling an onion. There is no core. This is in 
agreement with Damasio’s statement. We are not aware of the emo-
tion. With a biological understanding of emotion, the symptoms are 
the only thing we can become aware of. 
The lack of awareness and control make emotions difficult to re-
search. It is not like the research of physics or even the research of 
cognition. Emotion has for periods been considered not researchable 
(LeDoux 1996). 
The difficulty of pinpointing what an emotion is has caused debate 
among neurologists since the anatomy of the emotion circuits de-
pends on how the concept emotion is understood. Most researchers 
consider the limbic system as the emotion circuit whereas LeDoux 
(1996) even denies that there is such a thing as a limbic system de-
signed to process emotions. He argues that every emotional reaction 
has a function in a perception-action system, which involves the 
whole organism. It is dubious, LeDoux reasons, to appoint a specific 
brain area as the emotion circuit. 
Although limbic activity coincides with emotional symptoms, the 
whole process of perception-action is emotional. Emotion directs 
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perceptive attention (Vuilleumier 2005)357, amplify cortical response 
to stimuli (Schupp et al. 2003)358, motivate action, guide action and 
feeds back action. Every aspect of our lives is emotional and for this 
reason it is hard to deny that every perception-action process is 
emotional some way or other. I would go as far as to suggest that 
James Gibson’s affordance (see Chapter 2) is the emotional reaction 
to the object perceived. 
There is thus a vast diversity of phenomena and functions that are 
referred to as emotional. Just consider the different modalities! Are 
emotions elicited by sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell and bodily 
reactions equally? Does the feel of a soft surface have something in 
common with the pleasant aroma of a rose? Are the emotions of 
these experiences the same? Perhaps emotion is a generic term for a 
variety of phenomena. Probably it is a simplification to talk about 
one emotion circuit. Jaak Panksepp identifies seven circuits with 
different functions and connections: seeking, rage, fear, panic, lust, 
care and play (Panksepp 1998). 
Of course these pre-attentive, basic and biological reactions can be 
connected with cognitive ideas and be attended to. But since music 
seems to affect us on a direct level, the understanding of the bio-
logically unattended reaction is needed. 
The neurophysiology of emotion 
There are no unambiguous interpretations of brain scanning pictures 
of emotion processes. This is due both to the problems stated above 
(what are we looking for and is there a specific area for this) and 
the complexity of the anatomy of the emotional system, if we at all 
can speak about an “anatomy”. The fact that a brain area is proved to 
be involved in an emotional reaction is just one piece of evidence. 
It takes further research to pinpoint the function of that area. It could 
                                           
357  Vuilleumier, P. (2005) How brains beware: the neural mechanism of emotional 
attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Vol. 9. No 12. 586–595 
358  Schupp, H.T., Junghofer, M., Weike, A.I. & Hamm, A.O. (2003) Attention and 
emotion: an ERP analysis of facilitated emotional stimulus processing. Neuroreport. 
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do the job, be inhibitory or just be a relay station. Areas reported to 
be involved in fear, such as the amygdala, are sometimes reported 
active in positive emotions as well. Different parts of the same area 
may have specific functions. 
The auditory processing of cues for identification of source and 
emotional expression is important to our understanding of social 
situations. This requires sophisticated representation. A multitude of 
neurons is devoted to these tasks. Sensory information is projected 
into the hippocampus, the orbitofrontal cortex, and amygdala for 
emotional valence (Rolls 2005). Many other areas in the limbic sys-
tem and the paralimbic system have been found active (for a review 
of the anatomical specification of limbic and paralimbic structures see 
Mega et al. 1997)359. 
The hippocampus generally maps for place, faces and episodic 
memories. It is involved in emotional valence. The orbitofrontal 
cortex monitors rules of the type – if this cue is present, then this 
reward or punishment will follow. It is the basis for pre-attentive 
decisions. It has been shown that orbitofrontal cortex is involved in 
rapid one-trial reversal of emotional behaviour. This means that it is 
engaged in switching the rule, or, in other words – in ac-
tion/outcome learning (Rolls 2005). Damage to the orbitofrontal cor-
tex leads to lack of emotional adjustment (uncooperativeness) and 
uncontrolled impulsiveness, but also impairment in the ability to 
process voice expression. Individuals with frontal lesions have 
shown unrestrained sensitivity to music. This indicates inhibitory 
function. 
To say that the hippocampus recognizes the cue, prefrontal cortex 
applies the rule and amygdala initiates the emotional signals is a 
simplification. There is also feedback from the body informing the 
brain of the current state and the current needs. This information 
steers the perception. 
                                           
359  Mega, M., Cummings, J. Salloway, S. & Malloy, P. (1997) The limbic system: an 
anatomic, phylogenetic, and clinical perspective. The Neuropsychiatry of Limbic and 
Subcortical Disorders (Eds. S. Salloway, P. Malloy & J. Cummings). American Psychiat-
ric Press, Washington DC. 3–18 
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The amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex feed into the hypo-
thalamus for autonomic/endocrine responses that influence the or-
gans via the brainstem in order to prepare the body for action. 
The amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex also project into the 
striatum in the basal ganglia for implicit motor responses. The stria-
tum is rich in transmitter substances, particularly dopamine, which 
activates movements. 
Striatum feeds into the thalamus, which in turn projects into pre-
motor supplementary motor and motor areas of the cortical brain. 
While these commands are given, the neocortex may still be 
working on the conscious identification of the sound. When we be-
come aware of the object causing the reaction, the reaction has al-
ready occurred. 
Musical emotions 
There is an abyss between neurophysiological research on musical 
emotions and the emotional experience of listening to Brahms. This 
abyss can never be bridged. These are two different perspectives. 
Although the progress in neurophysiology is fast due to new tech-
niques, the experiments are designed to answer the most basic 
questions. They are not on the Brahms level but rather on the ma-
jor/minor level. And even this is not solved other than in the sense 
that this or that brain area is involved. This research can however 
help us see what is possible and what could not be. In the following 
I will present new reports as well as repeat some of the information 
given in earlier chapters in order to give a comprehensive picture 
of the neurophysiology of musical emotions. 
As we have seen the hippocampus, the amygdala and the orbi-
tofrontal cortex are generally activated in emotion processes. It has 
been found that the hippocampus and the amygdala are activated by 
music (Brown et al. 2004a; Levitin 2006). So is the orbitofrontal cor-
tex (Blood et al. 1999; Koelsch et al. 2005; Menon & Levitin 2005). 
Singing, listening, and imagining music generally activates auditory 
cortices, prefrontal areas (BA47) (Janata et al. 2003), primary motor 
cortices, the supplementary motor area (SMA), the insula, the cingu-
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late sulcus, the thalamus, the cerebellum (Perry et al. 1999; Brown 
et al. 2004; Zarate & Zatorre 2005; Koelsch et al. 2005) and the 
mesolimbic system (the midbrain connection between the ventral 
tegmental area and nucleus accumbens) (Menon & Levitin 2005). 
The cerebellum is not, as was previously assumed, strictly motoric. 
There is increasing recognition that the cerebellum contributes to 
cognitive processing and emotional control (Schmahmann & Caplan 
2006). Cerebellar lesions result in emotional disorders and impair-
ments in just about any cognitive function. Cerebellum is linked to 
the limbic system and is implicated in imagery, and consequently in 
expectation. 
Let us try to break down the sometimes contradictory and rapidly 
changing information to make an informed guess of the design of 
the music-perception-emotion circuit: 
From its way from the ear to auditory cortex auditory information 
passes the colliculus at the brainstem. This area controls avoidance 
and orientation reactions.  This is interesting because it is involved 
in anticipation and motor prediction. It contains maps of visual and 
auditory representation as well as representations of the body. These 
maps are “drawn” by the same neurons. In other words information 
from the senses unites here to construct a coherent representation of 
space (Berthoz 2000), which is related to the body schema. There is 
thus already at this stage a certain multimodal connection uniting 
heard information with space, and body movement. 
In auditory cortex there are indications of two pathways: The ven-
tral pathway for identification of source and one for movement de-
tection. 
The ventral pathway processes single sounds and single chords, as 
can be recalled from Chapter 2. Major, minor and dissonant chords 
cause reactions in the amygdala, the retrosplenial cortex (BA26), the 
cerebellum and the brainstem. Recent studies additionally show that 
the retrosplenial cortex is implicated in the perception of pleasant 
music (Brown 2004; Masaki et al. 2006360). 
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The dorsal pathway connects, as we have seen in Chapter 4, 
planum temporale with frontal cortices processing musical syntactic 
rules (frontal operculum) and rules of tonality (BA47). The planum 
temporale feeds into the superior insula, which activates pre-motor 
areas (Rolandic operculum) (Koelsch et al. 2006). We also know 
Chapter 3) that mirror neurons in pre-motor areas are activated by 
music. Koelsch’s study indicates mirror neuron activity in the 
Rolandic operculum. Mirror neurons thus imitate music movement. 
Mirror neurons are connected with bodily representations in the 
brain (the body schema). The information is then projected back into 
the insula which is an area associated with the processing of feed-
back of bodily states. The insula feeds into the limbic system. Gen-
erally it has been implied that the limbic system feeds into the mo-
tor centres; with music we may have an example of the opposite. 
This supports the idea that emotions may be induced by imitated 
movement patterns. It also makes it possible to react emotionally to 
deviations from expected outcomes (music rules) since the rule can 
be compared with the imitated movement before the information 
reaches the limbic system. Probably this is a reciprocal relation. For 
instance, if we feel calm our breathing becomes slow, but we can 
also achieve calmness by slow breathing. 
The pharmacology of music 
There are about 150 transmitter substances acting on the synapses 
between nerves to affect neural activity. The very complexity of this 
system calls for careful interpretations. I just intend to sketch some 
possibilities relevant to music. 
Several studies mention the striatum in the basal ganglia as an area 
activated by pleasurable music (Blood & Zatorre 2001; Koelsch et al. 
2006). Striatum receives (along with the limbic system, and prefron-
tal cortex) noradrenalin (for drive and motivation), dopamine 
(motivation, movement) and serotonin (soothing). 
Striatum is, as may be recalled from Chapter 4, involved in the se-
quence circuit. It organizes sequential movements. Dopamine is ac-
tivating. It stimulates pre-motor cortex. If we cannot produce dopa-
Emotion 
 
257 
mine we cannot move (Parkinson’s disease). As pointed out in Chap-
ter 4, the internal clock used to time durations in the seconds-to-
minutes range is linked to dopamine function in the basal ganglia 
(Meck 1996). 
Dopamine is thought of as a motivation substance, since it is re-
leased when rewards are available (Schultz et al. 1997). Dopamine 
release also indicates uncertainty about the outcome – curiosity. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4 Jaak Panksepp connects dopamine with “the 
seeking system”. Dopamine could thus be implicated in musically 
triggered movements and the stimulation of variation in music. 
Dopamine is an active ingredient in the mesolimbic pathway (the 
connection between the nucleus accumbens and the ventral tegmen-
tal area). Opioid transmission in the nucleus accumbens is thought to 
be associated with dopamine release in the ventral tegmental area. 
As we have seen the mesolimbic pathway is activated by music lis-
tening (Menon & Levitin 2005). 
A substance implicated in sequential movements triggered by the 
striatum is serotonin (Jacobs & Fornal 1997). This might explain why 
we love rhythmic music, swinging and dancing. It is possible that 
emotion in music, at least when it comes to the general pleasurable 
feeling can partially be explained by this role of the Striatum. The 
rhythmic quality of music thus seems to be one important factor to 
explain why we enjoy music. 
The so-called chills (a sensation in the spinal chord associated with 
piloerection) in music engage the striatum, cingulate cortex and in-
sula (Blood & Zatorre 2001). Chills are thought to be produced by 
the same reward/motivation system as in social bonding, parental 
love, loneliness and longing – and narcotic drugs like heroin and 
morphine (Panksepp 1995). 
There are thus various examples of release of transmitter sub-
stances in striatum. This is interesting because of the drug culture 
connected to music. Known drugs are similar to, precursors to, or 
affect the level of, transmitter substances. Thus amphetamine, co-
caine and nicotine increase the level of noradrenalin and dopamine. 
Serotonin is released by ecstasy, anti-depressive drugs such as Pro-
zac, and to some extent by LSD and mescaline. 
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Music opens the taps of drug related substances in the brain. It is 
likely that people involved with music are seeking the musical crea-
tive stage by means of drugs. The natural high caused by the release 
of modest amounts of transmitter substances can be “helped” by arti-
ficial means, which intensifies the music experience. It may change 
the joy of dancing to rhythmic craze; chills to ecstatic love. 
Causality between perspective and emotion 
Does the perspective steer the emotion of the listener? To answer 
this question we need to be aware of the levels of awareness (cf. 
Chapter 2): 
1. Pre-attentive levels: We have already shown that we act 
and react emotionally on this level. The perceived per-
spective thus does not affect such emotions. But, the choice 
of perspective is taken on a pre-attentive level. This im-
plicit choice triggers a perception action process including 
the selection of relevant information. As we have seen 
each perspective actualizes specific information, which is 
processed by specific brain circuits connected to emotional 
areas of the brain. It is thus arguable that the pre-attentive 
choice of perspective precedes and causes emotional reac-
tions. 
2. Phenomenal conscious level: To deny that the perception 
on this level does not affect us is to say that we do not re-
act emotionally to our conscious perceptual experiences. If 
so, I would not react emotionally when I become aware of 
the fact that some stranger at my door is armed. 
3. Cognitively conscious level: To deny that this can affect us 
is to state that we do not react emotionally to what people 
tell us. 
From this we can draw the conclusion that the evidence that emo-
tions can be evoked on a pre-attentive level does not contradict that 
they can also be evoked on attentive levels. On level two and three 
Emotion 
 
259 
the perspective clearly causes emotions (since it is implied in the 
perception). This said I want to direct the reader’s attention to the 
fact that the enigma of music emotion is not to be solved on these 
two conscious levels. The problem is, as stated in the introduction 
that music often moves us although we are not aware of the reason. 
The emotion of interest is the emotion caused by pre-attentive per-
ception processes. What does this imply for the perspective? The 
perspective is clearly a phenomenal experience. I suggest that per-
spectives can be pre-attentive and be processed in parallel. Other-
wise we would not be able to switch between perspectives. On this 
level they may correspond to source domains. The most intense 
process is the winning hypothesis – the phenomenal perception. 
Now let us reverse the question: Could the musically induced 
emotion change the phenomenal perspective? I suggest that this is 
the case. Although we can change perspective voluntarily, we nor-
mally do this automatically. Something steers attention and thus the 
phenomenal perspective. In the automatic choice this must be some-
thing pre-attentive. Musically evoked emotions could therefore be 
such a steering mechanism. Let me illustrate this with an example: 
In a course of music in film I replaced the piano music added to a 
silent movie (Buster Keaton) with Elegy to the Victims of Hiroshima 
by Krzysztof Penderecki for pedagogic purposes. The result was 
amazing. The funny characters became bizarre and the comedy 
turned into an allegory about the absolute pointlessness of human 
life. This shows that the emotion induced by the music can change 
situation understanding. Even if I had an idea of what could be ex-
pected, I must say that the result astonished me. 
Why did Penderecki’s music have this effect? Keaton has the fea-
tures of a tragicomic clown. The tragedy is connected to his appear-
ance. It is in his face and in his movements. His movements are 
wrong somehow. They do not connect properly to the world. Hu-
morous piano music does not help to identify with the clown, rather 
we identify with a laughing mob. The music sets the scene. It places 
us in a circus crowd. Every accident is accentuated and commented 
by the piano music. It is like the piano is saying: “Woops! Here we 
go again.” We take a tribal perspective. Tragic music on the other 
hand, makes us take the perspective of the little man. We feel his 
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helplessness. We take his perspective of the world as a hostile place. 
This is a dyadic perspective. 
Musically evoked emotion may thus trigger the choice of phe-
nomenal perspective.  
To sum up, the pre-attentive choice of perspective causes emotion 
and emotion selects (among other agents) the phenomenal perspec-
tive. This is based on reasoning. It calls for further investigation.  
Emotions and music – a hypothesis 
The neurological evidence implies that music emotions exemplify 
the general involuntary and non-conscious character of emotions 
emphasized by Damasio. Music has been described as a supra-
liminal affective stimulus (Panksepp & Bernatzky 2002). This is evi-
dent in film music. Musically evoked emotions colour the characters. 
We do not have to be aware of the music for this to happen. The 
same effect can be seen when music is used as background in every 
day situations. We can create a setting for a dinner with music. Ro-
mantic music makes the other lovable. It makes yourself lovable, 
both in the eyes of the other and in your own eyes. If you played 
hardcore rock your partner would give another impression. And you 
would perceive yourself differently. The perceived other and the 
perceived self are emotionally coloured by the music. The emotion 
elicited by music can seemingly attach to any object. 
If we are to take Damasio literally the emotion proper cannot be 
attended. But since music elicited emotions attach to objects at-
tended, the emotion is experienced as a quality of that object. 
Thus we can hypothesize: 
1. Music evokes unattended emotion in the listener. 
2. The object attended is coloured by that emotion. 
3. The object attended and thus coloured by emotion can be 
the own body (feelings). 
4. Or the music. 
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This hypothesis indirectly suggests a function of emotions. Objects 
are perceived as dangerous or attractive. There is an invita-
tion/warning in the emotion. Emotions are not there to enrich our 
lives, although this is a nice side effect, they are there to help us 
survive. We do not think about our feelings when we confront 
something dangerous. Rather we experience the threat in the other 
and take action. We allocate our own emotion to the other where it 
becomes a quality – a feature, a characteristic. Sometimes this quality 
is symmetrical as when own love makes the other lovable and 
sometimes it is complementary as when own fear makes the other 
aggressive or when someone is crying and we want to comfort. 
The prerequisite for this hypothesis is that we can focus any object 
as we listen to music and still be affected by the music. This de-
mands that the emotion elicited by music and the perception of mu-
sic are to some extent processed along separate pathways. The neu-
rological evidence presented in the preceding chapters indicates that 
this is the case.  As we have seen from the literature we are not 
aware of the emotion proper; and we do not have to be aware of 
the music to be affected emotionally. Even patients with amusia 
have emotional experiences of music. 
The emotion produced by the music could be associated with any 
attended object. Not until we attend to that object do we become 
phenomenally aware of the emotion, but only as a quality of that 
object. The objects attended to could be objects in the environment, 
in fiction, situations, concepts, thoughts, memories or fantasies – any-
thing we can focus. Interesting variants of such attended objects are 
the own body and – the music that elicited the emotion. 
If the object attended is the own body, the body becomes emo-
tionally perceived. This is the feeling: I feel tough, laid back, ex-
cited, good, sad, young, alive etc. It is a perceived quality of the 
body. 
Now, let us say that the object attended to is the music at hand. 
This music evokes a reaction of sadness, say. If the music is attended 
to, our sadness clings to the music – becomes a quality of the music. 
The music sounds sad. 
This hypothesis separates musically induced emotions from the 
definition of emotion presented by Edmund Rolls in Emotion Ex-
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plained. According to Rolls emotions can be defined as “states elic-
ited by rewards and punishers, that is, by instrumental reinforcers” 
(Rolls 2005: 11). 
Music emotions are similar to, but still different from, emotions in-
duced by a primary reinforcer such as a snake. Snakes elicit fear. 
Snakes are punishing. For this reason we avoid them automatically. 
We react emotionally to a snake before we identify it. The reaction 
makes us direct our attention to the snake. Then we can make the 
connection: “I hate snakes”. The emotion becomes connected with 
an attended object. This is the likeness. 
The emotion elicited by a reinforcer typically directs the attention 
to the reinforcer. But musical emotions do not do that. This is the 
difference. 
Maybe it could be objected that the snake case is an over-explicit 
example, but even if we consider threatening sounds such as 
growls, we would identify the source. With music this does not al-
ways happen. Although no human being sounds like a symphony 
orchestra, we easily confuse this sound with the emotions of a char-
acter in a movie. 
When the music in a thriller is scary, it does not take your atten-
tion from the situation in the film and make us identify the source. 
Rather it is the other way around. We cling even harder to the ac-
tion in the film. Even if the music is alarming as in Hitchcock’s Psy-
cho, we still focus on the action. The stimulus music does not direct 
our attention to the stimulus the same way the stimulus growl make 
us attend to the dog. We would never confuse the growl with a 
friend walking at our side. We would not find the friend frightening. 
But this happens with music. Scary music makes film characters 
scary. There is absolutely no logic in it. But it is a fact. Music colours 
the world with emotions. 
The point is: A reinforcer must connect the emotion elicited with 
the stimulus that caused the emotion. We must unmistakeably direct 
our attention to the stimulus that caused the emotion. Otherwise it 
could not reinforce behaviour directed to the stimulus. This does not 
happen with music. It is a mere coincidence if we connect the emo-
tion with the music. 
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Music thus cannot be a reinforcer. It would be a disaster for an 
animal to fail to attend to a reinforcer. But it is not a disaster if we 
mistake music elicited emotions to be a characteristic in an actor. 
Music does not punish or reward behaviour the way reinforcers do. 
Why is this important? Because Rolls claims that his definition of 
emotion is universal. Any exception from this definition would over-
throw the definition, he says. 
Maybe emotion elicited by music is the exception. This issue is 
however complicated because as we have seen, single sounds are 
reinforcers and music is made up by single sounds. But music is 
more than its sounds. If we heard a single musical sound, we would 
no doubt direct our attention to that sound. A possible explanation 
would be that music is an emotion communicated rather than a re-
warding/punishing object. 
The hypothesis presented reverses traditional attempts to explain 
why music moves us. The emotion does not have to emanate from 
awareness, identification, recognition, judgement, coding of signs or 
reflections on the impression of the music. Rather music produces 
emotions directly – subliminally. These emotions may, but need not, 
attach to the music that caused the emotion. 
This is said with the reservation that we are now talking about pri-
mary emotions. To discuss the full palette of emotions elicited by 
music, a lot more must be considered such as all kinds of listener’s 
perspectives and cognitive associations and the emotions connected 
to these associations. Here it is likely that music can act as a secon-
dary reinforcer when connected to episodic memories (of home, 
childhood, a loved one etc.). 
This hypothesis does not explain why music moves us, but it sheds 
some light on how music elicited emotions are recognized and how 
music animates the world.  
The fact that the emotion elicited by music can cling to any object 
has made music the perfect tool for creating attitudes. Music has for 
this reason a widespread function in advertising, politics, religion 
and entertainment. Music forces attitudes on consumers to any dis-
played object. 
The study of musical emotions leads to another important objection 
to established theory on emotion. As mentioned in Chapter 3 Dar-
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win distinguished six categories of emotions derived from facial ex-
pressions. It has been argued that these expressions are universal, 
inherited and thus basic (Ekman 1994)361. The idea that we have a 
limited number of basic emotions has become cemented in psycho-
logical literature. I question this idea. The fact that the concept “basic 
emotions” is derived from reports depicting facial expressions alerts 
the suspicion that the proposed number possibly reflects that we 
have a limited capacity to phenomenally distinguish and cognitively 
name facial expressions. Furthermore, since musical emotions to a 
large extent are pre-attentive, we cannot tell how rich they are. My 
own phenomenal experience of musical emotions tells me that the 
limited number is absurd. I do not jump between six emotions as I 
listen to music. Rather it is a fact that music, as reported by some 
subjects in Gabrielsson/Lidströms Strong experiences in music, 
evokes experiences richer than words can express (Gabrielsson & 
Lindström Wik 2003). If music, as has been argued in Chapter 3, 
activates the sensory motor schema, this would lead to a continuous 
multidimensional space of emotions. Rather than six. 
Conclusion 
I have suggested a hypothesis. The premises are that emotion in a 
biological sense cannot be attended or controlled and that music 
affects us subliminally. The hypothesis states that emotions elicited 
by music colours what we attend. This includes the own body (feel-
ings) and as a special and intriguing case: the music heard. This ex-
plains why music can be perceived as emotional. This hypothesis is 
not at odds with neurological findings. 
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Conclusions and Discussion 
Conclusions 
I have applied perception-action theory to music perception. This 
brought us to a perspective theory for music perception and emotion.  
Human behaviour is traditionally explained genetically or cultur-
ally. Musicology traditionally emphasizes culture in the analysis of 
music. Music listening is seen as a “language” and the encounter of 
new styles is analyzed as “enculturation”. The perspective theory 
shows a third possibility: procedural knowledge achieved by imita-
tion and perceptual learning.  This is neither innate, nor cultural. It 
is often pre-attentive and for this reason easy to neglect. In order to 
make this level visible I have given culture a delimited definition 
connected to Ronald Posner’s concept mental culture.   
The egocentric, the dyadic, the allocentric, the tribal and the cul-
tural perspectives have been discussed. Every perspective entails 
emotional implications. 
In this conclusive chapter I will suggest an overall understanding 
of the key question: Why does music move us emotionally? 
What is the function of musical emotions? 
If we do not settle with the mere proposition that music triggers this 
or that brain circuit to react and cause emotion, we need to connect 
the emotion with use.  To explain use is to give a reason why. 
What, we may ask, is the affordance? However it is hard to find a 
general use aspect of music listening (other than pleasure which 
would be a circular argument: We love music because we love it). 
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As may be recalled from the introduction, abstract or complicated 
behaviour – target domains – can be derived from concrete basic 
behaviours – source domains. If we can find the source domains of 
music listening, we can theoretically derive the emotion as a func-
tion in basic perception-action processes. 
Is then music listening source domain processing? Music listening 
engages like no other activity the whole brain. We have seen that 
the auditory cortex, the frontal lobe, the pre-motor areas, the cere-
bellum, the midbrain, the brainstem, the basal ganglia, the corpus 
callosum, the insula, the cingulate cortex, the limbic, and the para-
limbic areas are activated. Circuits, areas and pathways for sequence 
and rule processing, for movement-emotion, for imagery and for 
singing have been proposed in brain scanning studies of music per-
ception. These are circuits on different levels connected in the over-
all perception-action processing of music. The variety of circuits in-
volved supports the idea that music listening is not a specific and 
inherited process but a complex of basic processes. 
We may ask: Are there no music specific areas? What about the 
processing of tonality, which has been traced to a specified area in 
prefrontal cortex? 
The answer is that tonality is not universal and it is a relatively 
new organizing principle in the history of music. These facts under-
mine the idea that the perception of tonality is inherited. Tonality 
must be learned. The area processing tonality must be a general rule 
area. 
What about the perception of pitch? As we have seen the process-
ing of pitch involves not just auditory areas but also rule processing 
in the prefrontal cortex and cerebellum. There is thus no specific 
area for pitch processing. Separate areas must interact to produce the 
perception of pitch. 
Each of the suggested perspectives entails use aspects. In the fol-
lowing I will suggest four principal source domains and connect 
these to the perspectives. The cultural perspective does not qualify 
as a source domain, since it is complex and abstract. For these rea-
sons the cultural perspective will not be taken into account here. 
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According to metaphor theory the source domain can be actual-
ized by the target domain as a metaphor. The persona (the other) 
and the landscape are such metaphors for music. 
On a pre-attentive level the target domain “music” may be proc-
essed by source domain circuits. It could thus be the case that we 
process music as if it was an expressive person, or as if it was a 
landscape; that we use circuits originally “designed” for the percep-
tion of the other and the landscape, and that these processes gener-
ate emotions. The “as if” aspect was treated in Chapter 1, where it 
was connected to imagery. If we process music as if it was some-
thing else, this process may activate memories associated with the 
source domain and thus the source domain could appear as imagery.  
I suggest four source domains underpinning the target domain mu-
sic: the perception of single sounds, the implicit understanding of the 
other, finding the way in the environment, and joint action. Each 
domain is a perception-action process with a concrete use value and 
with domain specific emotions. Since these processes entail a selec-
tion of information, I suggest that these source domain processes are 
pre-attentive perspectives. 
The perspective theory of music and emotion 
1. The Egocentric Perspective: The landmark is the own 
body (the body schema). The knowledge this perspective 
uses is the automated knowledge how to react to primary 
and secondary reinforcers. 
Source domain: The identification and localization of 
sound source leading to immediate reactions. We are es-
pecially sensitive to voices. Calm voices are even and so-
norous; stressed voices higher in pitch, loud and yell; 
dominating persons are loud and submissive persons have 
weak voices etcetera. The voice quality reveals the iden-
tity of the speaker. Unexpected sounds are generally 
frightening as are unexpected sound qualities and loud 
sounds. The egocentric emotional response is a pre-
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attentive reaction to a reinforcer and the function is to 
steer the action of the listener vis-à-vis the sound source. 
Relevance to target domain: Music consists of sounds: 
timbre of the instrument, timbre of instrumental constella-
tions, volume, pitch, and chords (consonance, dissonance 
major/minor) are single sound parameters. We react emo-
tionally to single musical sounds and most of all to voices 
or instruments that are close to voice in timbre. As argued 
(Chapter 2) minor chords are more dissonant than major 
chords – perhaps not so much because the minor third is 
somewhat more dissonant than the major third but because 
of the clash between the minor third and the major third 
overtone emanating from the key note. Sound is important 
to musicians and listeners but is all the same sadly over-
looked in the literature of music and emotion. 
2. The Dyadic Perspective: The landmark is the other. This 
perspective selects information from procedural knowl-
edge. 
Source domain: Understanding the situation from the 
other’s perspective and understanding how to contribute in 
interaction. This implies a sense of the intention of the 
other. Through implicit imitation the observer copies the 
movement of the other to her own body or adds comple-
mentary action. This source domain is important for implicit 
interaction, communication, learning, and bonding. This is 
a pre-attentive mirror-neuron process activating pre-motor 
areas. These areas, which are connected to the limbic sys-
tem via the insula, set off the pharmacology of emotion. If 
the pre-motor pattern is imitated the emotion evoked in 
the beholder will be the same as in the other. If, on the 
other hand complementary action is triggered, this pre-
motor pattern will cause complementary emotions. 
Relevance to target domain: Music is, among other 
things, the emotional expression of the composer/musician. 
This expression has a movement pattern and a sound qual-
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ity. There is an increasing amount of indications that this is 
latently and overtly imitated by the listener. This entails 
that dyadic emotions are pre-attentively communicated. 
Complementary emotions have not been tested for music. 
The fact that the mirror neuron system is more active in 
complementary action than in pure imitation opens up the 
possibility that sad music could cause tenderness and love 
in the listener. 
3. The Allocentric Perspective: The landmark is in the 
landscape/structure. This perspective combines place, rule 
and procedural knowledge. 
Source domain: Finding the way. This perception action 
system engages the frontal lobe (rules processing), hippo-
campal structures (mapping of place in a structure) and 
cerebellum and basal ganglia (sequence processing). Im-
plicit rule and sequence processing create pre-attentive 
expectations. There are three implications: Anticipation of 
structure, the “seeking system”, and technique. We antici-
pate the structure. Mismatches between perceived actual 
outcome and predicted outcomes, cause emotional reac-
tions. This surprise may depend on a clash between antici-
pated structure steered movement and imitated movement. 
It alerts the animal. If there is a mismatch, something un-
predicted is going on. This emotion steers the attention to 
whatever that may be. Jaak Panksepp’s “seeking system” 
connects structure with body movement. The drive of find-
ing (curiosity) is dopamine regulated and this substance ac-
tivates seeking behaviour. This is triggered by the possibil-
ity of reward. It activates body movement. 
Another connection between structure and movement is 
the technique. Technique is about finding the movement 
adapted to the structure with a minimal cost of energy. 
Since economizing with energy is vital to all animals, we 
can suspect that there must be an emotional re-
ward/punishment feedback system for technical perfection. 
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As we have seen accuracy in monitoring activates the re-
ward system. 
Relevance for target domain: Most music has allocentric 
landmarks. These landmarks are a prerequisite for the per-
ception of music as a structure following musical rules. 
Places in this structure can be anticipated. This helps us en-
train the flow of music and to feel the deviances from ex-
pected continuances. Such planned deviances are powerful 
tools for composers. 
When it comes to “the seeking system” the connection to 
music is perhaps less obvious, but we know that move-
ment and dopamine production are connected. It is hard to 
believe that music makes us move because of curiosity. 
But music is engaging if it contains unexpected events. 
Surprise reactions could affect the production of dopamine 
and make us more attentive. Even if we move because of 
mirror neuron reactions, the dopamine production may ac-
centuate those movements. 
Technique is of major concern for musicians, as it is for 
listeners. Accurate technique is felt through effortless tim-
ing, pitch, sound and phrasing. Just consider the difference 
between a performance distinguished by effortless timing, 
pitch, and accuracy and the opposite: struggling to hit the 
right tone and follow the rhythm! We feel the effortless 
performance as talent – as grace even. Bad technique can 
turn beautiful music to horror. Technique is an overlooked 
source of pleasure in the literature of music and emotion. 
4. The Tribal Perspective: The viewpoint is taken from the 
perspective of the interacting group. This perspective, 
which concerns our behaviour as group members, depends 
on procedural and episodic memory. 
Source domain: Joint action – collective interaction to 
achieve common goals. Joint action has been explained by 
mirror neuron theory. A shared perception of the situation 
is created. This process allows us to implicitly understand 
the goal of an interacting group and tells us how to con-
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tribute. If the joint action is a ritual, this will trigger epi-
sodic memories, from earlier rituals (since the memories 
are connected to the movement patterns). These memories 
may be emotional (as when the national anthem is played 
in sport ceremonies and the whole stadium is united in na-
tional pride). Tribal emotion unites the tribe in action to-
wards a shared goal (e.g. going to war). 
Relevance to target domain: The mere bodily synchro-
nization with others in repetitive rhythmic movement is in 
itself pleasurable. Music is used in rituals and is in itself 
ritualistic in the sense that an established behaviour pattern 
is reactivated. Traditionally, music is an element in the rit-
ual. The ritual creates a common understanding of the 
world – a mythology. It actualizes episodic memories from 
former rituals. The emotion is connected to this collective 
understanding (as when we sing Christmas carols). Playing 
music in a group is the ultimate example of joint action. 
The audience gets involved in this interaction. Even when 
we listen to music alone we interact with the performing 
group. We have imitation tendencies and we have tenden-
cies to contribute – to fill in and complete. 
Music is sometimes been described as abstract – as a lan-
guage even. From this viewpoint use and emotion are 
puzzling. But if we consider music as a ritual, it becomes 
much less abstract. The affordance becomes visible: Come 
and join in! Dance with us! Sing with us! You may sit at a 
birthday party; you may eat the cake, but nothing really 
happens. Then a musician comes in. She sits down at the 
piano and finds the key songs that unite the party. We sing 
along and now it happens: This is us! This is the love we 
share! To sing and dance with other people is to be em-
braced by them.  
Collective mourning at funerals is a universal phenome-
non. Sadness is the emotion that is most easy to identify in 
prosody and music, maybe because we hear crying and 
sobbing. Crying is highly contagious. If I were to point out 
one powerful emotion in music it would be this: the emo-
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tion of longing. It is the experience of how music tears 
your heart out of your chest that really makes you wonder 
about the inexplicable power of music. The other side of 
this coin is the possibility of complementary emotion. If 
the music can express sadness, and melancholy, it could 
trigger the complementary emotion love and tenderness.  
This theory suggests a relation between the perspective and the 
emotion. But what is the causal connection? Are all four source-
domain processes simultaneously activated as we listen to music? I 
suggest they are, to some degree, and that the difference in inten-
sity decides which perspective will present itself on the screen of 
consciousness. This means that we have many candidates for the 
emotional reaction to music. Can they all be responsible? 
The case of Clive Wearing (Sacks 2007)362 is interesting in this 
context.  Mr. Wearing is an eminent English musician. In 1985 he 
was struck by herpes simplex encephalitis affecting the hippocampus. 
Wearing completely lost his ability to encode memories and thus 
developed total amnesia. Thus he has just moment-to-moment con-
sciousness. But his musical skills are intact, with one important ex-
ception. If the music stops, he cannot proceed. 
According to Sacks, the explanation is that Wearing has a proce-
dural memory of music. Procedural knowledge is implied in the 
dyadic, the allocentric and the tribal perspectives. With the reserva-
tion that egocentric reactions are not learned by means of imitation, 
procedural knowledge could even be claimed to be involved in the 
egocentric perspective since the automated reaction of sounds is a 
bodily and implicit reaction. The involvement of procedural knowl-
edge is the important difference between these four perspectives 
and the cultural perspective. It makes music embodied. It explains 
three typically musical phenomena. 
1. The fact that the procedural memory is based in subcortical 
areas (cerebellum and basal ganglia) explains why this 
memory is robust. Music can be remembered by old peo-
ple, when other memories are gone. It can be remem-
                                           
362  Sacks, O. (2007) The Abyss – music and amnesia. The New Yorker. Sept. 24.  
Conclusions and Discussion 
 
273 
bered by patients suffering from stroke when speech is 
lost. We may forget declarative facts but we will not forget 
how to move. 
2. It explains why music can only be remembered by piece 
by piece.  
3. And, what is most important for the music emotion ques-
tion, this musical information can be communicated by 
means of imitation. 
The answer to the music emotion enigma is linked to the fact that 
music is procedural knowledge. The practice of music is procedural. 
Playing, listening and music imagery is procedural. Let me illustrate 
the importance of this by pointing out the difference in intensity 
between the emotion when your country is named, and the emotion 
when national anthem is played and sung. In the last case you are 
involved in a procedure, which engages the body. This movement 
pattern evokes episodic memories. Likewise, there is a difference in 
emotion when you read a poem you know by heart and new prose, 
even if the content is the same. Some people simply cannot read 
poems, because the voice will break. It is the developing schema 
(the temporal topography), which actualizes movement-emotion 
connections in the listener. The connection between movement and 
emotion is twofold: The movement is an emotional expression 
and/or it evokes episodic memories. 
Let us re-synthesize the processes by connecting the source do-
main processes to the target domain music in order to get a com-
prehensive picture: 
As we listen to music we process it as the emotional expression of 
the musician/composer. Since music is sequenced and rule based, 
we can anticipate the structure. These rules are to some extent style 
specific, which explains why unknown styles do not move us. By 
way of mirror neurons the physical expression of emotion is copied 
to the body of the listener. These expressions are the same as, or 
complementary to, the expressions of the musicians. In a concert the 
musicians and the audience entrain the same movement/structure 
pattern. Just as we follow performers in athletics, we follow the 
musicians as they struggle with the technique to hit the notes and to 
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produce the sound. We take part as back seat drivers, and we feel 
the perfection in our own bodies. Everybody shares the emotional 
expression. A tribal mass effect of shared emotion and situation un-
derstanding is created, including emotional episodic memories con-
nected to the movement pattern. Surprises in the music are mutually 
shared; emotions derived from sound shifts are mutually shared, the 
experience of technique is mutually shared. We all follow the same 
sensory-motor track on-line with the musicians. This sharing of the 
experience makes the emotion stronger. Even when we listen alone 
a joint action ritual takes place since we interact with the performing 
group.  
Basically, music listening then is an emotional movement pattern 
communicated to the body of the listener. Listening to music you are 
connected bodily with others and share their emotional experiences. 
Even if there is a time gap between the production of a phonogram 
and the listening occasion, you interact with the composer and the 
musicians as if connected online. Thus, listening to music, you are 
never alone. 
The fact that most musical emotions are pre-attentive paves the 
way for the hypothesis that these emotions can attach to any object 
that we happen to attend to. This makes music a powerful instru-
ment to sell products, ideologies, and pop stars. Intriguing special 
cases are the own body (feelings) and music. This is thus the reason 
why we state that music can be felt as emotional. 
This description is admittedly rough. It has to be because the re-
search of mirror neurons and joint action is in a virginal state of de-
velopment. Furthermore this is the first attempt to connect perspec-
tive with emotion in general and with music emotions specifically. 
There is thus no research on this at the present state and no hard 
evidence.  
Discussion 
The perspective theory has bearing on the discussion in music phi-
losophy presented in the introduction. Since sounding music does 
not symbolize in the Peircian sense, it is not a form of content, not 
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declarative, and thus not communicated on a cognitively conscious 
(cultural) level. Rather it is a form of expression. It is procedural and 
communicated on a phenomenal and/or pre-attentive level. This 
means that Hanslick was right when he stated that music principally 
is tonally moving forms. But he was wrong when he concluded that 
music cannot communicate emotions. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
form implies implicit meaning. This can be connected with Peter 
Kivy’s concept enhanced formalism. The temporal topography of 
music has meaning. Contrary to Kivy, I claim that we are emotion-
ally affected by this form. We do not have to be phenomenally 
aware of the form for this to happen. As with all procedural knowl-
edge the form of expression is communicated by means of imitation. 
It has been shown that this imitation affects the listener emotionally. 
Arousalists claim that music cannot have emotions since it is not a 
sentient being. For this reason they insist that music must be per-
ceived as emotional because we project our own emotions into the 
music. This brings us to the objection against arousalism theory: 
“Arousal theory does not explain why different kinds of music elicit 
different emotions”. This is true, but perspective theory does. Music 
causes pre-attentive emotions. This is the emotion we project into 
the music, where it becomes attended as a quality of the music. The 
contradiction between the proposition that we project our own emo-
tions into the music and the proposition that these emotions are 
caused by the music is thus avoided. Both statements are true but 
from two different perspectives. 
Another issue in music philosophy is: Why do we listen to sad mu-
sic? I can see two alternative explanations: 
1. Sadness is the easiest emotion to identify in prosody as 
well as in music. There is an endless line of music styles 
that express sadness due to loss: Emigrant songs, seamen’s 
songs, love songs, country etcetera. Experience of loss is 
universal. It is closely connected to vocal expression and 
bodily expression. Thus it ought to be imitable. As we 
have seen imitation leads to positive emotions. This means 
that although we are imitating a sad expression and con-
jure this sadness, there is an embracing factor in the fact 
that we imitate. Empathy for the sad person is not an en-
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tirely negative feeling. Empathy connects us. Empathy 
makes us warm. It is a prerequisite for love. 
2. The finding that mirror neurons are activated for comple-
mentary action, paves the way for complementary emo-
tions. 
These two mechanisms probably interact. If someone dies, and your 
friend is devastated, her emotion from her loss is different from your 
empathic emotion. You feel what she feels but you also feel love. 
Musical emotions are of this second kind. They are thus not reactions 
to events but interpersonally communicated emotions. The implica-
tion is that musical emotions differ from other emotions because 
there is a positive factor in all musical emotions. 
The perspective theory may also have some relevance for the de-
velopmental explanation of the music phenomenon. 
There are two positions: 
1. A position claiming that music is an inherited capacity. It 
has been proposed that music maintains large groups and 
that this indirectly would be beneficial for the spread of 
genes. It has also been suggested that music skill is an ad-
vantage in the struggle for mating partners. 
2. The “source domain position” claiming that since there is 
no obvious use value in music, there cannot be any de-
velopmental advantage in it. Music is a composite of 
source domains, each with a developmental history of its 
own. 
I have already shown (Chapter 5) that the “large group argument” 
could be derived from the tribal perspective; that it is the joint ac-
tion aspect of music as a rite that creates emotional bonds and shared 
understanding. The large group advantage is thus not necessarily an 
argument for position number one. 
When it comes to the “mating partner argument”, I suggest two 
arguments following from the perspective theory: 
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1. On the dyadic level: An artist could implant implicit emo-
tions in a listener that are perceived as attractive personal 
qualities of the artist. Powerful music makes the artist pow-
erful, sexy music makes her sexy, sensual music makes 
her sensual and sad music gives the impression that she is 
longing for love and comfort. 
2. On the tribal level: Consider the rites of fertility. They are 
universal; they are ancient and they can be seen on MTV. 
We can trace show-off behaviour in mating rites to the ani-
mal world. Anyone understands the invitation of moving 
hips in samba but cultural restraints prevent us from acting 
out. 
This dissertation argues for a primacy of emotion. Perception is not 
only coloured by emotion but even steered by emotion. Thus we 
may ask: How has emotion affected the development of music? I 
propose that musicians must have felt: “This works and this works, 
but not this. If I do this, I communicate emotionally with the tribe.” 
For this reason the development of music could be described as a 
long trial and error search for emotional response. Some usable 
sound structures – some memes (reproduced units of behaviour) 
(Dawkins)363 – have crystallized. Other musicians have reused these 
memes in new compositions, varied them and developed them. As 
composers and musicians we see the effect in the audience, and 
above all, we feel the effect in ourselves. The emotion leads the 
composer and has thus been leading the development of music (to-
gether with other factors such as the development of instruments 
and cognitive knowledge). Due to geographical obstacles and cul-
tural barriers these memes have remained local. The music we have 
today, the diversity of music all over the world, is to a large extent 
the result of this long random search. 
                                           
363  Dawkins, R. (2006) The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Chapter 
11 
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Listening attitudes 
The perspective theory has implications for strong emotions in music 
listening. The cultural perspective is in many ways an exception. 
Cognitive awareness takes the focus away from the phenomenal 
experience of music. This conclusion may seem amazing since it 
entails that the more we think about what we are hearing, the less 
we will experience on a bodily and emotional level. 
So-called deep listening implies an altered state of awareness 
(Becker 2004). It is a state reminding of meditation. In meditation 
something concrete is focussed. This could be the own breathing, a 
body part, a drum rhythm or a mantra repeated over and over. 
Through this technique, cognitive awareness is cut off. A here and 
now state of phenomenal consciousness is reached. It is a dreamlike 
state reminding of hypnoses – a state of raised suggestibility. It is the 
state in which we are transformed into other beings in religious rites 
or guided by shamans on a journey. It is a state where the world is 
perceived holistically; a state where the self is dissolved in the 
world. It is a state of heightened sensibility, a state where we 
merge with the music, become one with the music. All these effects 
are evident in the investigation by Gabrielsson/Lindström on strong 
experiences of music. Any perspective could be taken; with the 
exception of the cultural perspective leading to cognitive awareness. 
The more we intellectualize the perception, the more we lose the 
experience. 
I would also count the focussed kind of listening that emerges 
from perceptual surprises to the deep listening category. In Chapter 
4 we discussed the seeking system. I exemplified with Pat Me-
theny’s The way up how a composer can create perspective shifts 
that are surprising and felt in the body of the listener. The listener 
experiences flow – a totally consuming presence in the music. 
The common factor in these two listening attitudes is the present 
moment perception, in the meditation case through a rejection of 
thoughts and in the flow case through the focus on present events in 
the music. This too is a consequence of the procedural character of 
music. 
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Future research 
1. Philosophy: The perspective theory is not limited to the 
analysis of music. We need to identify the landmark and 
the frame of reference for a full understanding of any 
situation involving perception, interaction, communication, 
signification and emotion. If the suggested theory is ac-
cepted, a general philosophy of perspectives is waiting to 
be carried out. 
2. General application: Since learning can be pre-attentive, 
we should ask how entertainment violence in sports, me-
dia and computer games affect us. And since this learning 
is established on an implicit level, how do we deal with 
violent tendencies?  
3. Cross modal effects: I would like to see an investigation 
where the principles for musical sequences and rules were 
applied on moving abstract pictures to see if this would in 
anyway cause musical experiences. 
4. Neuromusicology: I have listed five experiments that could 
be carried out to answer the questions we have today in 
the discussion of the dyadic perspective. 
5. How does the perception of technique affect musical emo-
tion. 
Finally I want to expand on a music-psychological issue. We know 
that any style or genre could induce strong emotions. It is, according 
to Gabrielsson/Lindström rather the fit between the situation, the 
listener and the music that matters. The exploration of this fit is a 
challenge for musicology. We have seen indications that pre-motor 
imitation produces pleasurable experiences. This may guide us to an 
understanding of the fit between the listener and the music. If the 
music is imitable, it will evoke positive reactions. I suggest that this 
does not exclude sad music, since we obviously like to listen to it. 
What then makes music imitable? As we have seen in Chapter 3 
familiarity with the object is a general condition for imitation. I 
speculate that we must have a memory of the musical pattern – a 
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sensory motor schema. Another and complementary possibility is a 
familiarity with the emotional expression. This does not have to be 
musically imprinted. The listener could have an emotional experi-
ence, which makes her sensitive to the musical expression of that 
emotion. She could have a personal disposition for this emotional 
expression. Such sensory-motor patterns may have been established 
in childhood, due to events of strong emotional valence. Let me 
provide an example. 
In Solei Noir Julia Kristeva explains melancholia as a bodily and 
painful memory of a mother lost in infancy (Kristeva 1989)364. Since 
the loss is pre-linguistic there is no name or symbol to attach to the 
bodily felt suffering. The memory of the mother (the sun) is black. 
Generally black suns then would be embodied memories of pain 
from infancy not accessible to cognitive consciousness. This causes 
the melancholic to phrase and rephrase her pain in vain, never be-
ing able to accurately formulate her loss. Kristeva analyzes several 
pieces of art and poetry as consequences of this drive to formulate 
the loss. The artist falls in love with the beauty of the artistic expres-
sion, which finally may become a substitution for the lost mother. 
The loss can be detected, Kristeva claims, in semanalysis which is an 
analysis of prosodic traces from the pre-linguistic phase. The exis-
tence of a “black sun” thus causes a pain that cannot be communi-
cated as a form of content, but it can be detected as a form of ex-
pression – as an oceanic longing. This is an example of a purely 
emotional memory – a memory that is not attached to an object. It is 
thus implicit. Such memories leave prosodic traces (Charles 2005)365. 
An explanation of this phenomenon is of course the connection be-
tween primary emotions and action. This memory is procedural 
since it is bodily and leaves traces of emotional expression.  
If, then, the listener has the same emotional experience as the art-
ist, she would have the same sensory-motor pattern as the artist – 
and the expression of the artist would be imitable. She would im-
plicitly recognise the cry for the missing mother in her own voice. 
                                           
364  Kristeva, J. (1989) Black Sun. Colombia University Press, New York 
365  Charles, M. (2005) Patterns: Basic unites of emotional memory. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 25. 484–505 
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Final words 
It was my emotional reaction on the Brazilian singer Gonzaguinha 
that made me think about music and emotion. I could not under-
stand how this singer from a totally different culture, singing in a 
language I did not understand, could move me so much. I do not 
claim to have the answer now, but I can see that there is a match 
between Gonzaguinha and myself. This might cause imitation. We 
were both songwriters and guitarists. He was playing Brazilian music 
and I had a few bossas on my repertoire. We were both dwelling in 
the zone between folk songs and jazz. We were the same age and 
to some extent expressing the same concern for the issues of the 
era. We were young in the political 60s. We were both university 
kids. This might sound cognitive but I believe that it is to a consid-
erable extent embodied. To be a radical at the university was to 
some extent to belong to a tribe, sharing the attitudes, the type of 
clothing, the haircut, the music and even the movement pattern. 
This is something, but it is not enough. 
The summer I heard Gonzaguinha was the summer after my father 
had died. My mother had passed away a few years earlier. It was 
thus the first summer without my parents. Everything, the path we 
went to fetch milk from the nearby farm, the path to the sea, the 
very stones on these paths called them back. 
I was particularly taken by Gonzaguinha’s song Fotografia (photo). 
There was this drone base producing dread and, at the same time, 
an oceanic horizon. Over this, the sensitive voice with outbursts of 
falling lamenting wordless singing. 
The song inspired me to do my own version called Sorrow. My 
song was about the paths where I used to walk with my parents. I 
later learned that Gonzaguinha’s song was commenting on photos in 
the newspaper of the killings of street children in Rio de Janeiro in 
the early 90s. Gonzaguinha identified with these kids. He called 
himself a moleque – a street kid. One photo, he states in the song, 
shows a kid looking into the gun of his killer. This is an image of 
the loss of innocence. 
The common feature of the two songs, the deep theme, was thus 
the loss of childhood. And the experience that inspired these two 
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songs was in both cases an event that actualized the loss of child-
hood. Why then is the loss of childhood traumatic to both of us? 
As it turns out, we have a traumatic childhood experience in com-
mon. We both have “black suns”. Gonzaguinha lost his mother at the 
age of four months. You can, when you know it, trace this in his 
lyrics. The cover of the album Luiz Gonzaga Jr. shows how he could 
perceive himself: divided, broken, and smashed into pieces. There is 
a black hole in his forehead (Gonzaguinha 1973)366. 
I was, due to illness, separated from my mother for a couple of 
months at the same age. 
* * * 
The emotion elicited by music has a quality of fundamental truth. 
The experience is undeniable. Something…happened here. The 
very fact that there is nothing except the music itself that caused this 
experience makes us think that music moves us in very profound 
ways; makes us feel that this truth cannot be formulated. This makes 
the claim of truth stronger, because this truth is general – it is about 
nothing and everything. It is about life. There are no words for it… 
You claim that this must be spiritual some way. That it is greater 
than us, ungraspable, God given; and speaking directly to our souls. 
I can’t deny that. It is beyond the scope of science. 
 
                                           
366  Gonzaguinha (1973) CD: Luiz Gonzaga Jr. EMI Brasil. 
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